Office of the Historian

494. Memorandum of Conversation1

US/MC/22
London, September 1, 1959, 4:30 p.m.
[Facsimile Page 1]

PARTICIPANTS

  • UNITED STATES
    • Secretary of State Herter
    • Mr. Gates
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Irwin
    • Mr. Martin
    • Mr. White
    • Mr. Farley
  • UNITED KINGDOM
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Mr. Ormsby-Gore
    • Sir Patrick Dean
    • Mr. C. O’Neill

SUBJECT

  • Nuclear Testing

Nuclear Testing

Mr. Herter suggested that Mr. Farley might summarize the proposed tactics when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume on October 12. Mr. Farley said that, as Mr. Herter had mentioned to Mr. Lloyd just before the conclusion of the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, the United States, felt that we should face up to the serious implications of the most recent technical evaluations of our ability to detect underground tests. We should therefore state to the Soviet Union the implications of the “large hole” technique and propose both joint research and experimentation to resolve the uncertainties in monitoring techniques for a suspension of underground tests, and a limited initial agreement covering atmospheric and high altitude tests.

Mr. Lloyd recalled that the U.S. and U.K. scientists under the leadership of Dr. Killian and Dr. Penney, while agreeing that there were substantial uncertainties in the detection of underground tests and that a program of research should go ahead, had cautioned that it was doubtful that there would be any early solution of these technical uncertainties. Mr. Herter said that the only alternative tactic which we saw was to push ahead with the discussion of the inspection issue, accepting the inspection quota in principle but proposing and justifying a number of inspections so high that the Soviet Union would reject it.

[Facsimile Page 2]

Mr. Lloyd revised the recommendations of Dr. Killian and Dr. Penney for a joint U.S.–U.K. research and experimentation program on [Typeset Page 1729] detection of underground tests, reading a summary list of nine items to be pursued. Mr. Farley said that a number of these actions were already in various stages of planning or execution. Mr. Herter asked whether the Soviet Union had shown any interest in participating in this activity. Mr. Farley recalled that at the time of tabling of the report of the Berkner Panel, the U.S. had suggested the possibility of joint research and experiment to resolve difficulties in underground detection but the Soviet Union had not been willing to discuss the new seismic data and thus had not reacted to the proposal for joint research.

Following a mention by Mr. Farley of preliminary AEC planning for possible eventual conduct of underground nuclear explosions to test the “large hole” theory, Mr. Lloyd said that the U.K. Embassy in Washington had just sent in the text of a proposed U.S. AEC-DOD press release on this program. He questioned whether more than the first general sentences were needed. Mr. Herter and Mr. Farley said that the later sections of the draft release were useful to put the program in the proper context, since they made clear that the explosions would not be for weapons development purposes, would only be conducted if a subsequent Government decision to do so was made, and were for the constructive purpose of improving knowledge of detection and identification techniques. Mr. Lloyd pointed out that the relationship to the Geneva negotiations was not spelled out, and Mr. Gates said that he thought an announcement on underground nuclear testing for this particular purpose ought to be held up until our general policy on underground nuclear weapons testing had been established. Mr. Herter said that further thought should be given to a possible offer of a joint research program with the Soviets. He said that he would see that if possible the release would be held up for future consideration.

There was then further discussion of the safety tests which the U.S. was considering. Mr. Lloyd said that it was the view of the U.K. that these tests were very important and the United States would be justified going ahead with them.

  1. Source: Tactics for nuclear test ban talks, joint research. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D, CF 1449.↩