491. Letter From Dillon to
McElroy1
Washington, August 28,
1959
Dear Neil:
[Facsimile Page 1]
In his letter of August 14, 1959, Deputy Secretary Gates forwarded to me
a memorandum dated August 13, 1959 to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
questioning the capability of a control system to detect and identify
underwater nuclear explosions. As requested by Mr. Gates, I suggested to
Dr. Kistiakowsky that his office
undertake a technical assessment of this problem.
In his reply, a copy of which is enclosed, Dr. Kistiakowsky raises some questions
with respect to the concern of the Joint Chiefs and suggests that the
matter be reviewed within the Department of Defense.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas
Acting Secretary
[Typeset Page 1723]
Enclosure
Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Dillon
Washington,
August 25,
1959
Dear Secretary Dillon:
[Facsimile Page 2]
Thank you for your letter, dated August 18, 1959, suggesting that
this office undertake an assessment of the problem of detecting
underwater nuclear explosions. On the basis of the information at
present available to me, I do not believe that it would be feasible
for my office to undertake such an assessment at this time.
As indicated in Secretary Gates’ letter of 14 August to you, the
Report of the Geneva Conference of Experts concluded that there was
a “good probability of detecting nuclear explosions of one kiloton
yield set off deep in the open ocean,” and that “the on-site
inspection carried out by the international control organ…would be
able to identify with good probability underwater nuclear explosions
with a yield of one kiloton and above.” It is not clear from the
memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, forwarded to you by Secretary Gates, what new information is
available to question these conclusions. This capability is
apparently questioned, at least in part, on the basis of limitations
in the seismic method; however, it should be noted that the
detection and identification of underwater tests would be based
primarily upon the hydroacoustic method and the subsequent
collection of radioactive debris. Although it is stated that
techniques for the concealment of underwater explosions are
feasible, there is no indication as to how this might be
accomplished or the possible magnitude of the concealment.
If there is concern about this matter on behalf of the Department of
Defense, it might be useful, as a first step, for an appropriate
technical group within the Defense Department, such as AFTAC, to undertake a careful
examination of those aspects of this problem which are raised by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of such a technical study, it
would be possible to determine whether there are reasons for
questioning the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts.
Sincerely,
