491. Letter From Dillon to
McElroy1
Washington, August 28,
1959
Dear Neil:
[Facsimile Page 1]
In his letter of August 14, 1959, Deputy Secretary Gates forwarded to me a
memorandum dated August 13, 1959 to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
questioning the capability of a control system to detect and identify
underwater nuclear explosions. As requested by Mr. Gates, I suggested to Dr.
Kistiakowsky that his office
undertake a technical assessment of this problem.
In his reply, a copy of which is enclosed, Dr. Kistiakowsky raises some questions with respect to the
concern of the Joint Chiefs and suggests that the matter be reviewed within
the Department of Defense.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas
Acting Secretary
[Typeset Page 1723]
Enclosure
Memorandum From Kistiakowsky
to Dillon
Washington, August 25,
1959
Dear Secretary Dillon:
[Facsimile Page 2]
Thank you for your letter, dated August 18, 1959, suggesting that this
office undertake an assessment of the problem of detecting underwater
nuclear explosions. On the basis of the information at present available
to me, I do not believe that it would be feasible for my office to
undertake such an assessment at this time.
As indicated in Secretary Gates’ letter of 14 August to you, the Report
of the Geneva Conference of Experts concluded that there was a “good
probability of detecting nuclear explosions of one kiloton yield set off
deep in the open ocean,” and that “the on-site inspection carried out by
the international control organ…would be able to identify with good
probability underwater nuclear explosions with a yield of one kiloton
and above.” It is not clear from the memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded to you by Secretary
Gates, what new information is available to question these conclusions.
This capability is apparently questioned, at least in part, on the basis
of limitations in the seismic method; however, it should be noted that
the detection and identification of underwater tests would be based
primarily upon the hydroacoustic method and the subsequent collection of
radioactive debris. Although it is stated that techniques for the
concealment of underwater explosions are feasible, there is no
indication as to how this might be accomplished or the possible
magnitude of the concealment.
If there is concern about this matter on behalf of the Department of
Defense, it might be useful, as a first step, for an appropriate
technical group within the Defense Department, such as AFTAC, to undertake a careful
examination of those aspects of this problem which are raised by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of such a technical study, it would
be possible to determine whether there are reasons for questioning the
conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts.
Sincerely,
