Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

489. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

JCSM–337–59

Washington, August 21, 1959

SUBJECT

• Study on Nuclear Tests (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, dated 23 July 1959.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the resumption of nuclear testing to be so vital to the security of the United States that a reiteration of past positions is timely in view of the study now under preparation by Dr. Kistiakowsky. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. An adequate military posture for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems, which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat.

b. To attain an adequate military posture, further testing is essential in the following development programs:

(1) Small, low-yield, highly mobile weapons for tactical and ASW uses.

(2) Modern, light-weight, and instantly ready weapons of sophisticated design for use against hostile aircraft.

(3) Warheads for anti-missile uses.

(4) Deterrent and retaliatory weapons, including warheads for second generation IRBM’s, ICBM’s and FBM’s.

(5) A family of clean weapons.

c. The investigation of weapons effects through testing is also extremely important because effects information is essential to weapon design and employment. Weapons effects information is particularly needed in the following fields:

(1) Anti-Submarine Warfare

(2) Surface War at Sea

(3) Coastal Defense Against Large Yield Weapons Burst at Sea

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense

(5) Communications and Radar Systems

(6) Air Defense

(7) Structural Design of Military Installations

(8) Tactical Land Warfare

d. Without nuclear testing, the inevitable result must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present weapons systems and the building of a stockpile of weapons of questionable reliability and confidence. Stagnation will become evident as improved strategic missiles must be fitted with older warheads at a cost in missile performance in order to insure reliability. Weapons of untested effectiveness, particularly small tactical weapons, will have to be manufactured in greater numbers as a substitute for assured effects and performance.

e. The over-all long-range effects of a test cessation will be to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. Of equal and more immediate disadvantage would be suspension of the production of weapons and weapons material with the resultant progressive physical deterioration of the stockpile.

3. In the referenced memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised that Dr. Kistiakowsky would work with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in coordinating a study to review the priority, validity and timing of weapons tests. In view of the potential impact of this study on the future effectiveness of U.S. military forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a most vital interest and should be kept informed of all aspects of the study. In order to insure adequate consideration of the military aspects involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the service of their representatives to assist in preparation of this study.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you forward this memorandum to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: JCS views on necessity of nuclear testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.