487. Letter From McElroy to
Eisenhower1
Washington, August 14,
1959
Dear Mr. President:
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It is my understanding that in pursuing the course of action regarding
test cessation negotiations which you approved on 23 July 1959,
questions have arisen concerning what action should be taken with
respect to an extension of the U.S. test moratorium beyond 31 October
1959. I felt it desirable to ask the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter. Their views are inclosed herewith.
I recognize that there are many difficult and complex political problems
involved in a decision on the part of the United States to resume
testing in the near future. As I wrote you on 5 August 1959, the
Department of Defense, in recognition of the nature of the problems, has
cut can back the level of preparations for future test programs which
have been developed to advance our knowledge in several important
areas.
The one-point safety matter discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
attached memorandum presents a situation quite apart from the area of
general or specific advancements in the design and application of
nuclear weapons. I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that failure to
resolve this matter with a minimum delay could have military-political
consequences far more serious than those which might arise from
conducting the limited testing which would appear necessary to its
resolution.
With great respect, I am
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure
Memorandum for McElroy
JCSM–332–59
Washington,
August 14,
1959
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SUBJECT
- Extension of the Current Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium
(TS)
1. In accordance with your verbal request the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have examined the effects of a possible extension of the current
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suspension of nuclear weapons testing beyond the termination date of
31 October 1959 established by the President on 22 August 1958. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that the conditions prescribed by
the President at that time as a basis for further extension have not
been met. They assume, therefore, that an extension beyond the
initially prescribed one year period is a matter for decision by the
United States and is not dictated by any existing international
commitment.
2. On a number of occasions the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed
their firm conviction that it is contrary to the interests of the
United States to impose restrictions on the development of its
armaments in the absence of firm and enforceable agreements which
impose equivalent or compensating restrictions on the Communist
Bloc. The continuation of test suspension is such a restriction.
3. As applied to the broad area of nuclear weapons testing for the
purpose of developing new weapons concepts or exploring nuclear
weapons effects in unusual environments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
do not hold that a short term extension of the test moratorium
beyond 31 October 1959 is a matter of vital consequence. However,
there is a serious problem with respect to the production,
deployment, and
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employment of a large segment of the present
and early future stockpile of nuclear weapons which demands the
earliest possible solution. This is the problem of a possible
nuclear contribution in the event of an accidental detonation. It is
the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this question
can be answered only by actual tests and that it may be possible to
conduct such tests without nuclear detonation.
4. For the following reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it
imperative that nuclear weapons testing to the extent necessary to
resolve the one-point safety question as regards weapons currently
stockpiled and weapons under development for early stockpiling be
initiated and completed as soon after 31 October 1959 as technically
possible:
- a.
- As a result of recent calculations of the probabilities
and consequences involved, the Atomic Energy Commission has
cut back production of the weapons in question and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have placed certain restrictions on
deployment and movement of these weapons which degrade the
state of readiness of both strategic and tactical
forces.
- b.
- There is a real danger that information as to the
questionable nuclear safety of certain U.S. weapons will
become widely known through inadvertent disclosure. The
longer the present uncertainty obtains the higher the
probability of such a disclosure. The U.S. public and our
Allies have been repeatedly assured that our weapons are
one-point safe. A rumor to the contrary could have a
catastrophic effect on our ability to maintain overseas
storage bases, to maintain strip alerts of air defense and
retaliatory forces, to continue air alert exercises, and to
continue logistic movements.
- c.
- In the event that safety tests should have positive
results, the earliest possible appraisal of the consequences
of such a finding on our entire nuclear weapons posture will
be essential. Involved in such an appraisal will be the need
for redevelopment and refabrication programs which, in turn,
may require further tests for confirmation of the
results.
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5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense
make known to the President their views as to the seriousness of
this problem and their concern as to its earliest possible
solution.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F.
Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
