Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

487. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 14, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

It is my understanding that in pursuing the course of action regarding test cessation negotiations which you approved on 23 July 1959, questions have arisen concerning what action should be taken with respect to an extension of the U.S. test moratorium beyond 31 October 1959. I felt it desirable to ask the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter. Their views are inclosed herewith.

I recognize that there are many difficult and complex political problems involved in a decision on the part of the United States to resume testing in the near future. As I wrote you on 5 August 1959, the Department of Defense, in recognition of the nature of the problems, has cut can back the level of preparations for future test programs which have been developed to advance our knowledge in several important areas.

The one-point safety matter discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the attached memorandum presents a situation quite apart from the area of general or specific advancements in the design and application of nuclear weapons. I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that failure to resolve this matter with a minimum delay could have military-political consequences far more serious than those which might arise from conducting the limited testing which would appear necessary to its resolution.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil McElroy

Enclosure

Memorandum for McElroy

JCSM–332–59

Washington, August 14, 1959

SUBJECT

• Extension of the Current Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium (TS)

1. In accordance with your verbal request the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the effects of a possible extension of the current suspension of nuclear weapons testing beyond the termination date of 31 October 1959 established by the President on 22 August 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that the conditions prescribed by the President at that time as a basis for further extension have not been met. They assume, therefore, that an extension beyond the initially prescribed one year period is a matter for decision by the United States and is not dictated by any existing international commitment.

2. On a number of occasions the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their firm conviction that it is contrary to the interests of the United States to impose restrictions on the development of its armaments in the absence of firm and enforceable agreements which impose equivalent or compensating restrictions on the Communist Bloc. The continuation of test suspension is such a restriction.

3. As applied to the broad area of nuclear weapons testing for the purpose of developing new weapons concepts or exploring nuclear weapons effects in unusual environments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not hold that a short term extension of the test moratorium beyond 31 October 1959 is a matter of vital consequence. However, there is a serious problem with respect to the production, deployment, and employment of a large segment of the present and early future stockpile of nuclear weapons which demands the earliest possible solution. This is the problem of a possible nuclear contribution in the event of an accidental detonation. It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this question can be answered only by actual tests and that it may be possible to conduct such tests without nuclear detonation.

4. For the following reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it imperative that nuclear weapons testing to the extent necessary to resolve the one-point safety question as regards weapons currently stockpiled and weapons under development for early stockpiling be initiated and completed as soon after 31 October 1959 as technically possible:

a. As a result of recent calculations of the probabilities and consequences involved, the Atomic Energy Commission has cut back production of the weapons in question and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have placed certain restrictions on deployment and movement of these weapons which degrade the state of readiness of both strategic and tactical forces.

b. There is a real danger that information as to the questionable nuclear safety of certain U.S. weapons will become widely known through inadvertent disclosure. The longer the present uncertainty obtains the higher the probability of such a disclosure. The U.S. public and our Allies have been repeatedly assured that our weapons are one-point safe. A rumor to the contrary could have a catastrophic effect on our ability to maintain overseas storage bases, to maintain strip alerts of air defense and retaliatory forces, to continue air alert exercises, and to continue logistic movements.

c. In the event that safety tests should have positive results, the earliest possible appraisal of the consequences of such a finding on our entire nuclear weapons posture will be essential. Involved in such an appraisal will be the need for redevelopment and refabrication programs which, in turn, may require further tests for confirmation of the results.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense make known to the President their views as to the seriousness of this problem and their concern as to its earliest possible solution.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Conveys JCS concerns about extension of nuclear test moratorium, safety of nuclear weapons. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, 1959.