Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

476. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, Geneva, July 8, 1959

SUBJECT

• Visit of Congressional Group to Geneva to Observe Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• State:
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Macomber, H
  • Mr. Farley, S/AE
• AEC:
  • Mr. McCone
• Senators Gore and Hickenlooper
• Representatives Holifield and Van Zandt

The Secretary expressed interest in the reactions of the Congressional group during their recent trip to Geneva to observe the nuclear test suspension negotiations. All agreed that it had been very useful and informative.

The Secretary observed that he had never become reconciled to the fantastic elaborateness of the control system which the United States is proposing. In addition to its complexity and cost, much of its operation would involve unproductive activities which would make it extremely frustrating for the personnel engaged. From the point of view of simplicity as an initial step, he would be pleased if an initial agreement could be worked out for suspension of atmospheric tests. However, it was firm U.S. policy to exhaust all possibilities of reaching agreement on an effectively safeguarded suspension of all weapons tests.

Senator Hickenlooper said that the Congressional advisers were acquainted with Mr. McCone’s letter of July 7 to the Secretary, and that they agreed in general with the report and recommendations in that letter. He commented particularly on the fact that the British were eager for any kind of agreement. The Soviet Union, while it talks of the concessions it has made, has actually not agreed to a thing of any substance in the months of negotiations to date.

In response to the Secretary’s inquiry regarding Soviet attitudes, Mr. Holifield said that he had explored the inspection quota proposal with Mr. Tsarapkin. When Tsarapkin was unwilling to say what quota he proposed, Mr. Holifield had asked him whether he would accept 100 (?), 50 (?), 25 (?), 15 (?)—at which point Tsarapkin had broken in to say “not 25, not 15, but a few”. Mr. Holifield observed that he generally agreed with Mr. McCone’s July 7 letter. He said that he had urged Dr. Fedorov to join in nuclear detonations to test out the possibilities for detection of underground explosions, and had received an evasive but negative response.

Mr. Van Zandt said that Tsarapkin had said repeatedly to him that the Soviet Union did not trust the U.S. approach to these negotiations and considered our introduction of new data as an effort to prevent agreement. Mr. Holifield said that he had asked Usachev how the participation of Red China might be arranged, as was essential if the agreement was to be enforceable, and Usachev had stated that this was the problem of the United States. Mr. Holifield said that he recommended that in the “white paper” proposed by Mr. McCone the problem of Red China be fully treated.

The Secretary said that he believed one very important concession had been made by the Soviet Union in agreeing to the U.S.-proposed duration article which was our principal safeguard in the agreement. Senator Gore observed that even in this case the United States made the major concession by giving up the year-to-year condition it had originally stipulated.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he wished particularly to endorse Mr. McCone’s proposal for a responsible, objective re-examination of U.S. objectives in these negotiations and our continuation of them by people not previously involved. He thought that the negotiations should be recessed while this re-examination was under way and while the Foreign Ministers Conference continued. The Soviet Union clearly knew where it was going, and the U.S. could not afford to continue without a clearer definition of its own objectives and minimum requirements. He was confident that the Soviet Union would not in the end agree to a sound and effective control system and urged that we begin to bring to the fore the substantive questions which at present were not being discussed, in order to expose the true Soviet position.

The Secretary observed that it was clear the Soviet Union recognized the great military advantage the present secrecy of the Soviet regime constituted. They could not be expected to give up this secrecy for any less than a very high price.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he doubted that it was technically possible to police underground tests. Fortunately, there was a way out of a comprehensive agreement which the United States might take: This would be a voluntary stoppage of tests in the atmosphere. The Secretary said that he was reluctant to give the Soviet Union anything unilaterally. He recognized that there was a widespread concern, whether soundly based or not, regarding fallout. Mr. Holifield said that his Committee had looked very carefully into all the facts concerning the danger from fallout from nuclear tests, and these facts showed that there was no present global danger.

Messrs. Hickenlooper, Holifield, and Van Zandt all commented that of course the United States should not walk out of the negotiations and thus take the crushing propaganda loss that would result for the country that broke off the negotiations. It is a familiar Russian tactic to try to outlast us and wear us down. We must be prepared to continue negotiating, but without being trapped into an unpoliced, indefinite suspension of all nuclear weapons tests.

Mr. McCone commented that one obvious Soviet objective was to try to get us to agree in principle to the inspection quota idea, so that we would then be in the unfavorable position of haggling about numbers.

Senator Gore said that he was not unsympathetic with the over-all problem of the State Department in proceeding with these negotiations in the larger context of the Foreign Ministers meeting, our relations with allies, and our efforts to make a start on disarmament. He felt, however, that there was real danger in protracted negotiations on nuclear test suspension. He referred particularly to the risks of continuing the negotiations during an election in the U.K. The Soviet Union is also gaining propaganda advantage by playing up its pretended concessions. He urged a high-level reassessment leading to establishment of firm objectives and time schedules, and an abandonment of the present drift in the U.S. approach to the negotiations. He commented that he believed there was value to unilateral action to end atmospheric tests and thus to separate out the fallout problem from disarmament negotiations.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he wished to disagree with Mr. Holifield’s comment regarding discussion of the China problem in any “white paper” on the test suspension negotiations. He believed there should be no mention of Red China in view of the implied admission of the advantages of recognition of Red China, and in view also of his belief that a three-power agreement, the only possible first step, would be a three-power test suspension agreement among the U.S., the U.K., and the USSR.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Congressional group for making the trip to Geneva and giving him the benefit of their frank views.

1. Source: Congressional observer group’s views on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 033.1100/7–859.