Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

459. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, April 15, 1959

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • G—Mr. Murphy
  • EUR—Mr. Kohler
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley
  • Mr. Baker
  • Mr. Morris
  • S/S—Mr. Berg
• The White House
  • Mr. Gray
  • Dr. Killian
  • Mr. Beckler
• Department of Defense
  • Mr. Quarles
  • General Fox
• Atomic Energy Commission
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. Gardner
• Central Intelligence Agency
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Dr. Scoville

In Mr. Herter’s absence Mr. Farley explained that during the course of consultations with the U.K. last week regarding the phased approach to a test cessation agreement presented by Amb. Wadsworth in Geneva on Monday, Prime Minister Macmillan had proposed to President Eisenhower that we supplement our proposal for a first step inspected agreement on the cessation of atmospheric tests by offering a unilateral moratorium on testing underground and in outer space for a finite period while further negotiations on extension of the agreement to these areas are in progress. The State Department felt that such a move at this time would not be wise from a negotiating point of view and Mr. Herter had so recommended to the President. The President accepted Mr. Herter’s recommendation but noted agreement with Prime Minister Macmillan that such a course of action might have to be reconsidered at some point. The President had therefore directed that the British proposal receive urgent and objective consideration within the US Government.

Mr. Farley said that staff personnel of the agencies concerned had attempted to identify the considerations bearing on this question as reflected in the paper which had been distributed to each of the principals as a guide for this morning’s discussion.

Mr. Quarles said that, speaking for the Department of Defense, he found the considerations outlined in the staff paper appropriate but felt that the conclusions reflected an overly sympathetic attitude toward the British proposal. Mr. McCone said that the AEC would have considerable concern about any such proposal which would stop our testing underground or in outer space in the absence of adequate assurance that the Soviet Union was likewise refraining from such tests. He explained that the effect on the weapons laboratories of any temporary one or two-year suspension of nuclear tests would be quite far-reaching. Whereas if a permanent cessation of tests came into effect, new missions could be assigned and the staffs could be reorganized, temporary cessation would make such reorganization extremely difficult. It would be almost impossible to retain the teams presently working together at the laboratories in the absence of firm goals for their work. Once these groups had dispersed it would be extremely difficult to reassemble them.

Mr. McCone noted that the proposed Humphrey-Fulbright joint resolution concerning the negotiations had been discussed at an executive session of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy yesterday. Some members of the Committee had felt that the language of the resolution and particularly that of the preamble seemed to give the impression that the U.S. was headed toward nuclear disarmament rather than overall disarmament including conventional forces. Some members also had felt that it would be highly unwise for the U.S. to stop underground and high altitude testing until our present needs for weapons development in the anti-missile and small-weapons fields had been satisfied and that therefore we should agree now only to a cessation of atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone said that he had notified Senator Fulbright, and had so informed the Joint Committee, that the AEC supports the proposed joint resolution but felt that the specific language should be reviewed carefully in order to avoid any wrong impressions. He said he mentioned this matter at the present time to indicate that the Macmillan proposal would probably meet resistance among some members of Congress.

Mr. Farley suggested that it might be more forthright if the staff paper could quote AEC and possibly DOD judgement as to the relevant factors pertaining to problems with the laboratories, necessary research and desired weapons tests in relation to the Macmillan proposal. It was agreed that the AEC and the DOD would undertake to prepare suitable language for inclusion in the paper.

Mr. Quarles said he felt the tactical situation with regard to any unilateral action such as proposed by the U.K. should be considered before any firm conclusions as to its desirability were drawn. He felt that the U.S. should not join with the Soviet Union in any suspension of nuclear testing for which no control is planned. He would suggest that the U.S. adopt the position that as long as the negotiators are continuing to seek controls for a total agreement we will continue to abstain from all nuclear testing until the October 31, 1959 date previously announced by the President, and that we will examine our course of action at that time in the light of the situation which then exists. He believed that this would be as far as the U.S. should move without risking damage to its own overall security position.

Dr. Killian suggested that urgent consideration be given to the question of what would be our policy toward future tests in the atmosphere in the event we do not reach agreement with the Soviet Union at the present negotiations to ban such tests.

Mr. Farley noted that we had not pressed for any firm understanding within the Government on this question because we felt that the Soviet reaction to the April 13 proposal and the course of these negotiations as well as the Foreign Ministers meeting during the next month or two would have considerable bearing an any decision we might make.

Mr. Quarles said that he felt that we should continue our unilateral abstention until October 31 and then if no progress toward agreement is evident we might announce that we will abstain unilaterally from atmospheric testing indefinitely but that we consider ourselves free to conduct such non-contaminating tests as our security interests may require. Such a move would seem to be the best combination of cold war tactics and technical requisites. It would undoubtedly be more expensive to do all our testing in the underground and outer space environments, but he felt it would be better to bear such expense than to continue to bear the onus of contaminating the atmosphere. If such a policy were too difficult in terms of development requirements it might be modified by limiting atmospheric tests to a certain amount of radiation. Mr. Quarles said that in any event he felt we should reserve any such announcement until October 31.

Dr. Killian said he wished to emphasize the importance of obtaining better and more solid factual information on the usefulness of underground tests. He noted that there was considerable difference of opinion between Los Alamos and Livermore on this question and that AFSWP was skeptical of the usefulness of tests in this environment. Similar attention should be given, he felt, to the question of testing beyond the 50 kilometer altitude limit now being discussed for our atmospheric proposal since there seems to be a real problem of fallout from explosions beyond this altitude. Mr. McCone and Mr. Quarles agreed that these questions should be urgently studied and that the mechanics for such study would be discussed further with Dr. Killian. Similarly, the problem of further exploratory programs to further our knowledge of detection of underground and outer space tests would be coordinated with Dr. Killian.

Mr. McCone noted that he was often asked whether a total cessation of nuclear tests would not involve foreclosing the possibility of development of an anti-missile missile system.

Mr. Quarles said that “foreclose” was perhaps too strong a word but that he felt that if we could make no further nuclear tests we would seriously prejudice the possibility of developing an effective anti-missile missile system. Dr. Killian pointed out, however, and Mr. Quarles agreed, that the primary technical problems now standing in the way of an anti-missile missile system were engineering rather than nuclear and that we do now have a warhead which could be used with such a system.

Mr. McCone said that if the U.S. depends to a large extent for its security on defense against incoming missiles he wondered how we could justify any stoppage of nuclear tests in the high altitude area. He thought that the public had been convinced of the need for protection against attacking aircraft and that an anti-missile system would be looked at in the same light.

1. Source: Macmillan proposal to offer unilateral moratorium on underground and outer space testing while negotiations on those issues are underway. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4–1559.