Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

457. Letter From Herter to McCone¹

Washington, April 8, 1959

Dear John:

I appreciate your bringing to my attention the points in your letter of April 4, which are very important ones in our thinking about the next steps in the Geneva negotiations.

You ask the intent of the sentence in my letter to the President of March 28 which states “A limited program for underground testing, perhaps under international participation, might be undertaken as part of this effort to see whether the problem of detecting underground tests might be simplified.” This sentence was included in order to record the principle that, in event of an atmospheric test ban, there should be underground nuclear experiments in order to learn more about the detection problem. There was absolutely no intention to imply that we had agreed tests would be conducted for no other purpose. If there were to be a limited agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests, the United States would of course retain freedom of action to conduct any underground tests which we found necessary.

Your second point, which relates to the question of what constitutes an adequate policing system for a test suspension agreement, appears to reflect some misunderstanding of our view. Certainly we do not support what you refer to as the “principle of accepting a very inadequate monitoring system”, nor do we believe that “deterrence” is different from “adequate policing.” Any acceptable agreement must provide for an adequate and effective monitoring and inspection system. In devising an “adequate” monitoring system, however, we believe that we cannot aim for an unachievable 100% fool-proof system but rather for an effective system which will deter any other nation from attempting violation by the knowledge that there is a high probability that the system would detect any effort to violate.

Having learned of your concern on this point, I took the occasion of my call on the President on the morning of April 6 to tell him about it. You will be reassured to know that he too considers an adequate and effective monitoring system to be one which has a high enough probability of detecting any attempted violation that it deters a potential violator.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Chris
Acting Secretary

Enclosure

Memorandum From Gray to Goodpaster

Washington, April 9, 1959

You no doubt have copies of this further exchange of correspondence. However, please note Mr. Herter’s statement about having informed the President.

Do you think that the President is sufficiently informed about the potential serious difference of view in this matter? I agree with Mr. McCone that there may be a great difference between a system of “deterrents” and a system providing adequate inspection and control.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Memorandum From Calhoun to Gray

Washington, April 8, 1959

There are enclosed for your information copies of AEC Chairman McCone’s letter of April 4 to the Acting Secretary of State and of the latter’s reply of April 8 concerning nuclear test suspension. A copy of the Acting Secretary’s letter of March 28 to the President is also enclosed.

1. Source: Response to McCone letter: U.S. would retain right to conduct underground tests, detection systems. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.