Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

45. Presentation to the NSC by Holaday¹

Washington, April 24, 1958

Mr. President:

At the 27th February meeting of the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense agreed to report to the Council his recommendations concerning the following three points given in the Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee. These are:

(1) Report on whether decisions should be made now:

(a) To produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed, to be operational prior to the end of FY 1963;

(b) To build additional launching sites required to make operational any additional first-generation ICBMs so produced; and

(c) To harden such additional launching sites.

(2) Report on whether to order now production of more than 3 POLARIS submarine missile systems; and on possible further acceleration of production.

(3) Report on whether to install interim defense against ballistic missiles attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified available anti-aircraft missiles.

The Secretary of Defense agreed at the 16 January meeting to report on whether to increase the number of operational IRBMs beyond the 8 squadrons (120 missiles) now approved.

In arriving at our decisions it appeared appropriate to consider these questions in the light of the over-all missile capabilities which the U.S. would have during this time period. Presented on this chart are the following missiles:

JUPITER

THOR

ATLAS

TITAN

POLARIS

MACE

REGULUS

SNARK

The basic chart shows those programs specifically approved by the President in black. The programs recommended by the JCS as a part of JSOP 61 are shown in blue on the first overlay.

Although the three additional programs here indicated, the MACE, the REGULUS II and the SNARK are aerodynamic missiles somewhat more vulnerable to enemy defenses than are the ballistic missiles, we consider that these missiles will be effective weapons for some time to come. The capability which they represent must be considered as complimentary to the several ballistic missile programs.

On the basis of the information available, the Department of Defense does not at this time propose an increase in the ATLAS program over the 9 squadron approved program. While ATLAS bases are currently planned to be soft, latest studies indicate that the effectiveness of these missiles can be improved by diversification of deployment. Plans call for 1 squadron at Camp Cooke, 2 squadrons at Warren AFB, Wyoming, 1 squadron at Offutt AFB, Nebraska and 1 squadron at Fairchild AFB near Spokane, Washington. Considerations are being given to a semi-hard, 20 1b. base deployment method for the 6, 7, 8 and 9 squadrons.

With respect to the TITAN program, the 1959 budget augmentation request includes 50 million additional dollars for this program. Total will now be $454.5 million. This funding will permit the deployment of three TITAN squadrons on a hard base by CY 1961. The 4th squadron will be deployed in CY 1962, using later funding. These squadrons will be deployed outside of Denver, Colorado and will be serviced by the Martin plant located at Denver.

We are at the present time reviewing the TITAN program to determine whether it will be practicable to substitute a storable propellant combination instead of the current liquid oxygen-kerosene combination. There are several factors in favor of making such a substitution, including a significant reduction in logistics and reaction time. On the other hand, there are certain engineering problems which must be resolved before we can be assured that this simplified technique can be used. It is expected that these studies will be completed this summer. While we are not recommending an increase in the TITAN program over the approved level of 4 squadrons and 40 missiles, we believe that if the fuel work is successful we will need additional squadrons and would ask for an increase to a total of 8 squadrons as part of the 1960 budget.

With respect to the POLARIS program, the FY 1959 budget augmentation request included funds for two more POLARIS submarines and the necessary missiles. This will provide 5 submarines plus missiles as the approved program. It is not practicable to program, at this time, for additional submarines and missiles until the development program proceeds into the test phase and a better measure is established of system performance and the projected availability dates. The present Navy plan is to continue the production of POLARIS submarines at a rate of about 1 per quarter. If the program continues to show promise, it is likely that additional funds will be included in the 1960 budget request to finance 3 additional submarines.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the number of operational IRBMs be increased to a total of 16 squadrons (240 missiles) by FY 1963. On the basis of a review of the possible deployment locations suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comments on these locations by the State Department, and progress at the NATO meeting, it appears that we can make reasonably firm plans for the following deployments:

United Kingdom	4 squadrons
France	3 squadrons
Italy	2 squadrons
Turkey	1 squadron
Alaska	1 squadron
Okinawa or Near East	1 squadron
Total	12 squadrons

Accordingly, at this time the Department of Defense recommends that the total number of squadrons for the first generation of IRBMs be held for planning purposes to 12 squadrons (180 missiles). On the basis of a review of the THOR and JUPITER programs and even though we have only had sporadic successes in both programs, we would not have any reason to believe that either program will result in a complete failure. Because of the inherent differences between the two missile systems, particularly the ground support equipment, we do not feel that it would be desirable to place both JUPITER and THOR in the same overseas deployment locations. Accordingly, we have allocated the first three squadrons of JUPITER to France and would propose that the fourth JUPITER squadron be dropped from the program. We would propose that the remaining requirement of five squadrons be met by the THOR to achieve the program objectives at the lowest cost. To meet the schedules for deployment shown on the chart and the needs of the space program, it will be necessary to increase the THOR production rate from 6 to 8 missiles per month. We also propose to arrange with the Army for a finite program for a total of 3 JUPITER squadrons. This is essentially a buy-out type program. We feel it is necessary to pursue this course of action so long as we do not have proven weapon systems, but are at the same time proceeding with the assumption that both programs will be successful.

The decision as to whether to install interim defense against ballistic missiles attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified, available anti-aircraft missiles, such as NIKE-HERCULES and TALOS has been given extensive study. It is estimated that a 25 unit land-based TALOS program, to be effective in a timely manner, would require immediate approval and obligation of nearly one billion dollars, mostly to be spent over a period of three years, with additional funds required to develop and incorporate the anti-ballistic missile capability. A lesser program, on the order of 12 land-based TALOS units, would require expenditure of approximately 600 million dollars over a period of three years. Although the implementation of this program could result in the earliest possible interim defense against ballistic missiles at a limited number of SAC bases, the expenditure of additional funds in these amounts does not appear to be justified. Since the NIKE-ZEUS system on the basis of available data will probably have a much greater capability, although it will be a year to 18 months later, the Department of Defense feels that the available effort should be devoted toward moving the NIKE-ZEUS system along at an optimum rate to achieve the earliest practicable capability with that system.

Accordingly, the Department of Defense proposes to accelerate the development of the NIKE-ZEUS system, placing particular emphasis on the electronic part of the development program.

Mr. Holaday here summarized.

In summary,

(1) We do not recommend an increase in the ICBM program above the approved 13 squadrons and 130 missiles at this time.

(2) If the development work on the TITAN missile continues successfully, we may recommend an increase of 4 additional squadrons of TITAN in submitting the 1960 budget, that will give a total of 17 squadrons and 170 missiles.

(3) Bases have been selected for the deployment of 5 squadrons of ATLAS missiles on soft bases. A study is being made on making semi-hard the remaining 4 squadrons. Selection of these bases has not been made to date; they will probably be selected to give diversification of deployment at or near present SAC bases.

(4) One hard base for the deployment of 4 TITAN squadrons has been selected near Denver, Colorado. Sufficient money is in the present budget to provide for the deployment of three squadrons. The 4th squadron will be financed in the 1960 budget request. If additional squadrons of TITAN missiles are provided, they will be deployed on hard bases.

(5) We do not recommend an increase in the POLARIS program above the 5 submarines and 80 missiles at this time. We may request additional money in the 1960 budget request to add 3 more submarines, giving a total of 8 submarines and 128 missiles.

(6) We recommend an increase in the IRBM program from 8 squadrons and 120 missiles to 12 squadrons and 180 missiles.

(7) We recommend an accelerated program using the NIKE-ZEUS system as a defense against ICBM missiles.

CALENDAR YEARS
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER
Squadrons	1	3	4	4	4	4
Missiles	13	45	60	60	60	60
THOR
Squadrons	1	3	4	4	4	4
Missiles	15	45	60	60	60	60
ATLAS
Squadrons	1	1	4	9	9	9
Missiles		10	40	90	90	90
TITAN
Squadrons				3	4	4
Missiles				30	40	40
POLARIS
Subs			3	5	5	5
Missiles			64	80	80	80
MACE (MATADOR B)
Groups
Missiles
REGULUS
Subs/Cruisers
Missiles
SNARK
Squadrons
Missiles

CALENDAR YEARS
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER
Squadrons
Missiles
THOR
Squadrons
Missiles
ATLAS
Squadrons
Missiles
TITAN
Squadrons
Missiles
POLARIS
Subs
Missiles
MACE (MATADOR B)
Groups		2	3	5
Missiles		127	233	270
REGULUS
Subs/Cruisers	2/	3/	3/1	4/4
Missiles	19	36	47	109
SNARK
Squadrons		1	2	2
Missiles		15	30	30
Blast [illegible in the original] : JCS Recommended Program

CALENDAR YEARS
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER
Squadrons		2	3	3	3	3
Missiles		30	45	45	45	45
THOR
Squadrons		4	8	9	9	9
Missiles		60	120	135	135	135
ATLAS
Squadrons
Missiles
TITAN
Squadrons
Missiles
POLARIS
Subs
Missiles
MACE (MATADOR B)
Groups
Missiles
REGULUS
Subs/Cruisers
Missiles
SNARK
Squadrons
Missiles

1. Source: Missile development and deployment. Top Secret; attached tables are Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.