435. Telegram Supnu 323 From Geneva1
Supnu 323. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. On assumption that no firm decision on recess will be agreed with British until after Macmillan’s Washington visit we face here a difficult tactical situation. We have been keeping focus on control issues for a long time. And in the course of the past two weeks we have also been filling out the U.S. position by tabling articles. We expect to table the last important articles, duration and review, Monday. There is not much that we can say now about the control issues that does not get us into danger of either erosion of our position or premature discussion of dangerous issues. There are already pressures from the British for compromises on staffing and inspections and for ways around the veto. In connection with inspection we are already skirting the edges of the tricky issues of threshold and phasing. And in all of this we are hampered right now by difficulties in our local relations with our British colleagues. We are clearly at [Typeset Page 1590] a point where we must find ways to avoid the dangers to which we are exposed. Essentially it is a problem of how to mark time until the basic decisions are made in Washington and London.
There are three different ways of marking time which we might follow. The simplest would be to call for a recess of two or three weeks with a definite date set for resumption. We could do this on the basis that Macmillan’s discussions in Moscow need to be considered in Washington before the conference here can go ahead. I do not think this course would prejudice whatever decision off may be adopted with respect to stopping or going on with the conference.
[Facsimile Page 2]It is, of course, not probable that the Soviets would agree to such a course without a good deal of propaganda as to why we are suggesting it. It is however pretty clear to the public already that the conference is in fact awaiting decisions which will defend upon the outcome of discussions while Macmillan is in Washington and it might therefore not be too difficult to justify a temporary recess publicly, by frank recognition of this fact.
The second possibility is to reduce our schedule of meetings over the next three weeks as much as we can. We have in fact already begun to do this. We secured Soviet agreement to having no meeting Friday and we can do this from time to time in the coming fortnight. Even if the Soviets refused to cancel particular meetings, this tactic still has an advantage since their refusal puts the responsibility of talking on them. However this course gives the Soviets the choice of what we talk about and to that extent is disadvantageous. Even with a reduced schedule we might be faced with eight to ten meetings during the next three weeks in which Western initiative and control would be difficult to maintain.
Finally we could relax somewhat our present sharp focus on control issues and begin talking about the minor things involved in the draft treaty articles that we have already tabled. This would help to avoid the danger of getting prematurely into too detailed discussions on control but would at the same time relax pressures on the Soviets on the key control issues. It would also involve the risk that the Soviets might agree to some of the minor articles which could create a misleading impression of progress in the negotiations and create some awkwardness if our decision is to end up soon.
On balance I believe that from our point of view here a recess of two or three weeks would be the least disadvantageous course of action. I realize that of course you have [Facsimile Page 3] to take into consideration factors broader than those which influence our thinking here.
Whatever course of action we follow there is one difficulty which I hope we can resolve just as soon as possible. We have of course been careful not to say anything to our British colleagues here about the possibility of a wind-up of this conference. I believe, however, they clearly [Typeset Page 1591] sense the fact that we in the past two weeks have not been able to talk with them as frankly as we previously have. We have the impression that as a natural consequence the British delegation here is holding out some of their thinking and not telling us everything that is going on. In spite of some differences of approach we have, during these negotiations, enjoyed the advantage of full and frank cooperation with our British opposite numbers. The fact that we cannot be completely frank with them at this juncture is hurting us now. I hope that in the next day or so we can be authorized to tell them something which will enable them to understand why we must wait for further decisions before we get into some of the questions which they are eager to discuss. I should think it would be at least possible for me to say that we cannot really do anything at all here until after Macmillan’s Washington visit. I would hope it would also be possible for me to tell them that there is serious consideration going on in Washington as to whether it is worthwhile to continue the conference at this stage.
- Source: Seeks advice on tactics in nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3–859.↩