Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

433. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

JCSM–71–59

Washington, March 2, 1959

SUBJECT

• Surprise Attack Study Group (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum, dated 23 January 1959, by the Military Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate and submit comments on a proposal by the Secretary of State concerning the formation of an inter-governmental ad hoc group to prepare a study of the problems of surprise attack and related disarmament proposals.

2. The recent Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack was suspended with recognition that revised terms of reference were needed before the Conference could reconvene. The State Department proposes that the U.S. approach on the surprise attack problem should be broadened to include arms control measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that U.S. preparations for a new series of meetings require different terms of reference than those proposed by the Secretary of State.

3. The national security implications of the various arms control measures, that could be considered in a new and less restricted conference on surprise attack, appear to demand, as a first step, a broad U.S. review of disarmament matters from a wider viewpoint than that of surprise attack alone. Such a review would provide a basis for evaluating the surprise attack threat in terms of other threats to U.S. security, and for determining what effect the attainment of safeguards against surprise attack would have upon the over-all U.S. defense posture.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that:

a. In view of the actions separating the Arctic Zone proposal, outer space considerations, suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and technical discussions on surprise attack from the August 29, 1957 Four Power disarmament package, there is an urgent need to review existing U.S. disarmament policy for consistency with these actions and national security requirements. The Disarmament Policy Review Working Group, which initiated such a review on 7 April 1958, should complete its action and propose necessary revisions. Within the framework of the revised policy, U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures including safeguards against surprise attack, could be developed by the proposed ad hoc study group. If, however, political considerations preclude completion of an over-all review of our present disarmament policy, by the Disarmament Policy Review Working Group, within the apparent time limitations, it may be necessary to develop U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures within the framework of existing disarmament policy.

b. The objective of the study proposed by the Secretary of State should be limited to the development of recommended U.S. positions on disarmament measures within current U.S. disarmament policy. The surprise attack problem should be considered within this context. The reverse approach would be unwise since the surprise attack problem is but one element of U.S. disarmament policy. Such an approach might lead to conclusions which are unacceptable within the framework of over-all basic national security policy.

c. Current U.S. disarmament policy does not include limitations on combat readiness of U.S. forces and limitations on deployment or operations. The Study Group proposed by the Secretary of State should restrict its considerations of measures which might place limitations on the combat readiness of U.S. forces to the development of data necessary to counter proposals of this nature that have been or are likely to be made by other parties.

d. The draft terms of reference for a Study Group on Disarmament Measures, attached hereto, should be substituted for the terms of reference for a Study Group on Increasing Protection Against Surprise Attack, proposed by the Secretary of State.

e. In the event that Mr. William C. Foster is not available to direct the Study Group, a senior U.S. Military Officer should be appointed. However, if Mr. William C. Foster, or an individual of similar stature, should assume the responsibility of the Chairman of the Study Group, a senior U.S. Military Officer should be designated as the Director of the Study Group Staff. In any event, the consultants should include at least one military officer.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/S/ Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Appendix

PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE AD HOC STUDY GROUP ON DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1. The objective of the Study Group is to develop detailed proposed U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures for possible use by a U.S. delegation to an international conference.

2. The study group will be guided in its work by the following:

a. U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures will be developed within existing U.S. disarmament policy.

b. U.S. positions on disarmament measures will maintain, as a minimum, the relative U.S. national defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc.

c. U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures which might reduce the combat readiness of U.S. forces and their weapons systems will be developed only for the purpose of countering such measures should they be proposed by other nations.

3. Specifically, the Study Group shall accomplish the following tasks:

a. Identify specific and verifiable disarmament measures which might reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, to include reductions of armed forces and armaments. These measures should be applied to each type of weapons system, together with its using organization; first within limited geographic areas where friction exists or is likely to develop, and then to progressively enlarge geographic areas, finally encompassing all militarily significant nations.

b. Design systems for verifying adherence to the measures identified under subparagraph 3 a above. Specify the type numbers, and source of verification personnel, their organization for verification duties, the conditions required to be met in order for verification personnel to be effective, the equipment requirements, and the initial and recurring costs of the verification systems.

c. Evaluate the possible impact of the measures and systems discussed in subparagraphs 3 a and b above on U.S. national security interests. Assess the effect of such measures and systems on U.S. deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Identify those measures and systems which are inimical to U.S. national security; those which are conditionally acceptable and the conditions for acceptance; and those which are clearly advantageous to the United States.

d. Identify U.S. unilateral measures which would be required to avoid a reduction in the U.S. national security position relative to Soviet Bloc nations in the event the measures and systems discussed in subparagraphs 3 a and b above, were incorporated in an international agreement and implemented.

4. The Study Group shall be furnished necessary military and technical data pertinent to this study and shall receive all necessary assistance and cooperation from the Departments and Agencies of the Government.

5. The Director of the Study Group shall submit a final report of the work of the study group to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group by _______________ 1959.

1. Source: Conveys JCS views on formation of a group to study problems of surprise attack. Secret. 5 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman’s File.