Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

426. Letter From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, February 20, 1959

TEXT OF MESSAGE

My dear Friend,

Before I leave for Moscow, I want to tell you once again how much importance I attach to the conference at Geneva on nuclear tests, and how much I hope it may prove possible for us to reach an agreement on this subject with the Russians.

Any agreement is bound to include certain disadvantages and risks. The main disadvantage, of course, is the handicap an agreement would impose on our ability to improve the nuclear deterrent. The main risk is that the Russians would find some means of evading the agreement, which we could not do. You and I both know how serious this disadvantage and this risk would be. What we have to do, it seems to me, is to judge and balance up whether the advantages an agreement might bring to us would outweigh the disadvantage and risk it would entail.

I will not make any attempt in this message to estimate the disadvantage and the risk. But I do want to tell you that I am very deeply impressed by the advantages which an agreement might bring us. I think it would do three things, each of which would be very important. It would reduce tension. It would hinder the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. And it would provide a pilot scheme and a precedent for controls in other fields.

How much would all this be worth to us? I want to tell you that I myself sincerely believe it would be worth the extra risk involved in our accepting something less than perfect control. Perfect control is in any case almost impossible in theory and quite impossible in practice. It seems to me that if we can create a control system which involves a sufficient degree of risk to a potential violator that he cannot get away undetected with a violation of the armament, then we shall have done enough to justify our accepting the [illegible in the original] and risks involved. This seemed to be Foster’s view when he was with us two weeks ago.

I have the impression the Russians still want an agreement. The most likely explanation seems to me to be that they are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and they dislike the mounting cost of these nuclear programs. So do both of us; and to that extent we have a common interest with the Russians. Whatever be their motive, I feel we still have some prospect of reaching agreement with them, provided they drop some of their present demands and provided we insist only on such a degree of inspection and control as is necessary. While we must certainly press them to go further than they have so far shown themselves ready to go, I think we must remember that they have already come some way toward accepting foreign control, further indeed I think than either you or I would have expected a year ago. The French have a saying that the better is the enemy of the good; I think it applies to our present position in relation to this conference.

Do not think for one moment that I am ready to compromise on essentials. I agree entirely that we cannot accept the present Soviet position under which they would retain a veto over the crucial operations of the control system, in particular the despatch of inspection teams. On this, and on the related question of a veto over findings of a violation of the agreement, our people put some ideas to your people in Washington last week. They were designed to build into the agreement an automatic right for us (and the Russians) to have inspections. But as clearly neither of us will be physically able to inspect every unidentified event, we felt it would be necessary to agree on some annual upper limit of inspections.

I am sorry to say your people have expressed a good many reservations about this plan. They seem to have thought of it as a concession to the Russians. I regard it as just the opposite, because its purpose is, while protecting all our essential requirements, to nail them down on the veto, and to make their position in asking for a veto still more untenable.

I have no doubt this conference will be mentioned while I am in Moscow. You can rely on me to press Khrushchev hard about the veto.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Harold

1. Source: Extols virtue of agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.