Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

422. Telegram Secto 9 From London¹

London, February 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

Secto 9. Re Secto 7. Secretary this morning discussed with Lloyd and Ormsby-Gore, and subsequently with Macmillan, tactics in nuclear test negotiations. The Secretary noted our “basic charter” on controls matter is as President had expressed it to Macmillan, that central issue is whether Russians will accept a real controls system, and re duration that we can accept in principle that ban on tests would be indefinite, withdrawal from or suspension of treaty being possible if controls system not being installed on schedule or not being operated properly.

Although Ormsby-Gore initially suggested US and UK committed to introducing duration article, and failure to do so might permit Russians to evade discussion on controls, Secretary read Supnu 243 as indicating we are not, repeat not, so committed.

Reviewing language of draft duration article Secretary and Lloyd agreed it questionable whether necessary to specify right of withdrawal, because this an inherent right in any agreement in event of its violation. Secretary said State Department legal experts would study whether Article One, as now agreed in Geneva does not cover point adequately, obviating need for reference to withdrawal in any duration article.

In the end the British agreed that the object of our agreeing to break the link between testing and disarmament had been to focus on control; therefore we will now concentrate on that issue, deferring introduction of duration article until we see whether Soviets will move from their present position on controls and veto; meanwhile on standby basis reexamining between ourselves draft duration article. It was also agreed with the Prime Minister that if conference comes to breaking point on control issue we must find effective ways to dramatize the point, such as taking it to the United Nations or considering letters from Prime Minister and President Eisenhower to Khrushchev.

Regarding the “fall back position” the Secretary mentioned last night re reciprocal forebearance with continuing negotiations on control, it was also agreed that this matter will have the further urgent study that it needs.

Dulles

1. Source: Account of John Foster Dulles’ discussions with Ormsby-Gore and Lloyd on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2–559.