420. Letter From McCone to John Foster Dulles1
With further reference to our letter of December 23, 1958, addressed to the Under Secretary of State and signed by Acting Chairman Vance, and to the press release of January 5, 1959, by the President’s Science Advisory Committee, and to the report of January 7, 1959, by the Panel on Seismic Improvement chaired by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, the Atomic Energy Commission believes that it should convey to you at this time our views with respect to the position of the U.S. in the negotiations now in progress in Geneva.
There seems to be complete agreement within scientific circles in this country that the detection system proposed last summer by the Conference of Experts in Geneva is inadequate in the light of data subsequently developed from the HARDTACK series of tests in Nevada in October. However, there is a difference of opinion among informed scientists as to whether the system can be improved sufficiently by additional, better and different types of stations and instrumentations so that it can with assurance detect and identify nuclear explosions of the proportions indicated by the Geneva Conference of Experts in their Report.
The improvements recently suggested by the Panel on Seismic Improvement unquestionably would improve the capabilities of the system, but many of these proposed improvements are as yet only theoretical. The Panel listed ‘‘four promising approaches” that are “within the present limits of technology” and pointed out that vigorous research in seismology is indicated. With respect to one of the recommendations, namely, placing seismometers in holes at depths of several thousand feet, it said:
“The method offers possibilities for improving the detectability of small signals by a factor of the order of ten, provided that the technological problems of operating instruments at the required depths can be solved.” (Underscoring supplied).2
Also, the Panel made, inter alia, the following statements:
“It is noted that the data on nuclear Shots used in these estimates was from Rainier and HARDTACK II and thus has all the limitations of that small sample of nuclear test conditions. The PSI has not concerned [Typeset Page 1554] itself with the possible seismic effects of nuclear tests under different conditions or the possibilities of concealment by decoupling of other techniques.”
“The PSI urges that sample detection networks be established without delay as representative systems to disclose operational and design problems and provide a firmer basis for the assessment of detection capabilities.”
The Commission hopes that an experimental and testing program to prove or disprove the feasibility of the improvements suggested by the Panel could be conducted and evaluated in less than a year.
Additional reports from further studies by the PSI will further develop the views of experts on the capabilities of the system as improved. However, there are several areas of uncertainty recognized by the PSI in its first report which only additional tests or firings can clear up. An example of great significance is the whole question of the effect of shots in differing geological formations and geographical areas. All tests to date have been in volcanic tuff in the Nevada test site and hence tests in other areas are clearly indicated.
The Atomic Energy Commission has consistently held, as indeed have all Departments of the Government, that the keystone of any acceptable international arrangement must be dependable assurances through effective detection, identification and inspection that all parties to the agreement will live up to its terms. The Commission believes that the technology of detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions is not sufficiently proven at this time for us to enter into arrangements with the Soviets now for the discontinuance of underground test explosions; and the same is true of nuclear test explosions in outer space.
[Facsimile Page 3]The Commission believes that: first, the U.S. position in the current negotiations in Geneva should be directed so as to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations on minor or purely technical issues and, second, avoidance of our being placed in a position of acceptance of an agreement based upon a seriously inadequate detection system.
To this end we urge your consideration of the following:
First, we would propose that we seek agreement with the nuclear powers to discontinue atmospheric nuclear weapons tests forthwith and to establish promptly an adequate detection and identification system to insure compliance. To consider that such a system could be relatively simple, and acceptably dependable, and its adoption would involve fewer serious issues than are now under debate in Geneva. The discontinuance of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests would eliminate the fallout issue and thereby deprive the Soviets of one of their most effective propaganda themes.
Second, we would propose that we would agree to collaborate in improving the capabilities of the Geneva control system looking toward the inclusion at a later date of underground and outer space tests in the Treaty. In the meantime, nuclear weapons testing in outer space and underground would be permitted without restrictions. Additionally, a [Typeset Page 1555] series of special underground tests in diverse geographical and geological environments and a few tests in outer space would be carried out as promptly as possible. These special tests in outer space and underground could be a joint effort by the nuclear powers or they could be carried out unilaterally by the nuclear powers under international inspection; in either case, all data developed should be shared among the nuclear powers.
From such a special test series, together with an intensive program for the improvement of seismic and outer space detection techniques, we could determine the dependability of a detection and identification system in which we would have sufficient confidence to negotiate for a broader test cessation over an indefinite period of time.
[Facsimile Page 4]My fellow-Commissioners and I feel that we would be remiss in our duties if we failed to inform you of our views as outlined above. In so doing, however, we wish to reaffirm our recognition of the fact that the formulation and direction of the foreign policies of our Government are the responsibility of the Secretary of State.
Sincerely yours,
Chairman