Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

42. Draft Paper¹

Washington, April 7, 1958

Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability

1. Because of the incalculable destructiveness, general war affords a means of achieving only one important national objective; i.e., use as a last resort to prevent Soviet imposition of its will on the U.S. by force.

2. Only when convinced that a Soviet all-out attack is imminent will the U.S. consider launching a preventive war.

3. The purpose of maintaining a capability for massive nuclear retaliation is deterrence.

4. Because U.S. strategic nuclear capability is intended almost entirely for retaliation . . . .

5. . . . .

6. Strategic nuclear capability, in contrast to tactical nuclear capability, . . . .

7. . . . .

8. The U.S. must oppose limited aggression with whatever weapons are necessary and suitable, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Should the Soviet Union or our allies come to suspect that fear of general war would prevent us from effectively opposing limited aggression, such aggression would become inevitable and would not be resisted by our allies.

9. (I disagree with this thought.)

10. (I disagree here, as well, on the same grounds; i.e., that the Soviets are emboldened by weakness and deterred by strength, in my view.)

1. Source: “Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability”; attached to print Document 19. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Nuclear Policy.