Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

417. Memorandum of Conversation Among John Foster Dulles, Department of State Officials, and Nuclear Advisory Panel Members¹

Washington, January 30, 1959

SUBJECT

• [illegible in the original] Arms Control Negotiations and Policy

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Herter
• Mr. Holmes—S
• Mr. Farley—S/AE
• Mr. William Foster
• General Gruenther
• Mr. Lovett
• Mr. McCloy
• General Smith

1. Nuclear Test Suspensions Negotiations.

The Secretary said that the Soviet Union was currently taking a rigid line on matters relating to inspection and control, but that U.S. and U.K. negotiators were holding firm against the veto and self-inspection. The position is awkward because of the new U.S. technical data indicating uncertainties in detection procedures for underground nuclear explosions. If there is a breakdown in the negotiations, however, we want it to come as a result of an unreasonable Soviet attitude toward sound control procedures, not as a result of a shift in the U.S.–U.K. objective of suspending nuclear weapons tests under effective control. If we were to abandon the Geneva experts’ report, agreed to this summer after technical discussions held at the initiative of the United States, we would be in a very bad posture.

Mr. Lovett observed that the technical basis on which the U.S. was negotiating appeared to be undermined and it might be desirable to clarify and change the U.S. position rather than rely on our ability to handle the negotiations in a way which would lead to a Soviet break. Mr. Foster said that he understood the U.S. scientists believed that the capabilities of the Geneva control system could be restored. Mr. McCloy said that it appeared to be a case of normal scientific chance and uncertainty rather than error in fact or judgement. The Secretary said that the problem was under active study and that after the scientific restudy is completed any necessary Presidential review of our position would be made.

Mr. Lovett said that he felt there was a growing concern among the sophisticated public that we might be in an untenable and possibly dangerous position and that any control system which could be negotiated might have unacceptable risks and loopholes. Mr. Dulles said that unfortunately this public impression was difficult to deal with since the real answer to it had to be given by explaining our negotiating position and tactics with the Soviet Union, which in turn would prejudice the position of our negotiators as it became public. We are presently in the position of a poker player with someone standing behind him holding up a mirror to show his hand to the opposition. However, our situation is sound and we will play out the negotiation despite the criticism. Mr. Farley pointed out that we were not relying merely on the likely Soviet rejection of effective control and inspection procedures. The Geneva experts’ report provides a basic principle which has not been challenged: namely, that seismic events which cannot be recognized as earthquakes through scientific equipment alone must be checked on-the-spot by inspection teams. The only thing that has been questioned is their estimate of the number of seismic events which scientific instruments could identify as earthquakes, an estimate which apparently was too optimistic. However, that factual estimate, which was accurate on the basis of the then available information, has no binding force; the binding principle is that on-the-spot inspection must decide the cases which are unresolved by reading the instrument. Thus we are protected and the Russians if anything are under greater pressure arising from the greater number of on-the-spot inspections.

All four of the advisers strongly endorsed the principle that we must keep the pressure on the Soviet Union to show its basic position on international staffing of control posts, on majority vote in the Control Commission, and similar issues, and that we should not let them escape this pressure by prematurely changing our proposals.

2. Surprise Attack Safeguards.

Mr. Foster said that it was wrong to think that the Geneva discussions on surprise attack safeguards were futile because they failed to reach agreements. He urged study of the key documents published by the United Nations. Among the mains he listed were:

a. Some useful intelligence on Soviet military thinking;

b. Exposure of the Soviet thinking on inspection techniques, which was accomplished by their tabling of a proposal for obviously inadequate inspection measures in a zone 800 kilometers on either side of the dividing line in Europe;

c. The complete unanimity achieved among the five Western states which participated, and the very considerable education of many of the experts from other countries;

d. The greater appreciation we ourselves achieved of the value of inspection, whether partial or comprehensive.

Mr. Foster said that he thought Soviet attitudes as revealed during the discussions gave us useful information as to what the Soviet Union attaches value to, and thus as to where we may be able to bargain with advantage in future discussions. The Soviets attach great importance to secrecy. This is not just a psychopathic attitude toward the outside world but a very valuable military asset. In effect their ability to keep their missile bases secret is the equivalent of being able to harden them against attack. The Soviet Union also feels very strongly about Germany and the threat a reunified Germany might come to constitute for the Soviet Union and its security.

Also apparent, Mr. Foster said, was a broad acceptance by Soviet experts of the belief that there must be a concentration of ground forces before a major surprise attack is launched. General Gruenther and General Smith were skeptical that this represented the real thinking of Soviet policy makers. It might be the belief of the experts who were chosen to go to the Geneva talks, but it appeared unlikely in view of Soviet missile achievements that this position was taken for any reason other than as an attempt to evade inspection of missiles.

Mr. Foster continued that the Soviets also showed great self-confidence and even arrogance regarding their missile achievements and their economic growth. It was possible in view of this growing strength that the Soviet interest in the surprise attack problem was no more than an effort to keep us talking while they keep gaining. It is also possible that there is some possibility of agreement on mutually advantageous measures. Otherwise the future over the next ten to fifteen years is bleak. Even many of the officers from the Department of Defense who were on the staff of the U.S. delegation are now interested in exploring possibilities of agreement.

Mr. Dulles said that he had been disappointed that so little progress toward agreement was made in the December talks. He thought that the area of surprise attack safeguards was one which offered some prospects for agreement. He did not expect that there would be substantial reduction of armaments by detailed agreement. There must be confidence before arms can be reduced. Surprise attack safeguards might contribute to mutual assurance that an attack was unlikely, and thus lead indirectly to reduction in the arms burden.

Mr. Foster said that it was a consensus among participants in the discussions that it would be useless to resume the talks on the narrow technical-military basis to which the delegation had been restricted in its instructions. He thought, however, that broader exploration of possible limitations on armaments in conjunction with inspection and observation measures might be fruitful and in the U.S. interest. This might include, for example, analysis of a hypothetical basis of political agreements such as the proposed Rapacki plan. We should be able to show the unsoundness of such schemes, and at the same time make progress toward mutual understanding of the characteristics of sound measures.

Mr. Lovett questioned whether surprise attack talks could be resumed at this time on the broader basis recommended by Mr. Foster. The Berlin and German questions are now crucial ones. He was finding in his contacts with European business people that many of them were looking sympathetically at the Rapacki plan. The Secretary thought that any U.S. studies preparatory to possible resumption of surprise attack talks might take account of and be pointed toward problems of Germany and European security. General Gruenther agreed that studies should be undertaken promptly and said that he assumed such studies were under way in connection with missile negotiations on Berlin and on proposals for “thinning out” in Germany. The Secretary said that there had been studies but only by the Department of Defense and General Norstad rather than by a broader and more flexible group. It was conceivable in present circumstances that some kind of zone in the middle of Europe might be acceptable if that was the price for a reunified Germany.

Mr. Foster pointed out that we might well be thinning out our forces in Europe on economy and if this was the case we ought to consider how we could bargain in such a way as to get something in return. Mr. McCloy pointed out that the study so far of the Draper Committee had not shown any disposition on the part of Norstad or the Department of Defense to reduce force requirements in Europe.

Mr. McCloy, having just returned from a trip to Europe, gave an assessment of his impressions as follows: He found the situation in England uncertain and in some ways reminiscent of the tendency toward compromise so prominent in the days of Neville Chamberlain. He realized that Macmillan is himself a strong and able man but that he was being strongly influenced at this time with respect to the problems of Europe because of impending elections and his preoccupation with retaining power.

He has looked into the situation in France, and particularly that of NATO, and held a rather pessimistic view of the present effectiveness of the alliance because of the remote and difficult attitude of General de Gaulle. He remarked that Chancellor Adenauer had not recovered as quickly from his recent illness as he had in previous instances in the past, that he was somewhat remote from public opinion in Germany and that the men surrounding him were loath to tell the Chancellor unpleasant things because of the risk of displeasing him and hence lessening the chance of any one of them becoming Dr. Adenauer’s heir apparent. Mr. McCloy remarked that there was no government in Italy and that recent shifts in Italian political parties had disrupted the precarious balance which has maintained middle-of-the-road and pro-Western governments for some time. He felt that in the light of this situation the Russian attitude toward Germany, and particularly Berlin, represented a serious and even dangerous situation.

The Secretary expressed general agreement with Mr. McCloy’s assessment and posed the question as to whether or not the United States should exert vigorous leadership in order to pull the West together to meet the situation. All of the members of the Advisory Committee and Mr. William Foster emphatically advised in the affirmative.

1. Source: Nuclear test suspension negotiations, surprise attack safeguards. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1–3059.