Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

408. Memorandum From Gray to Eisenhower¹

Washington, January 13, 1959

SUBJECT

• Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Testing

The attached memorandum summarizes the views of the Executive Departments and Agencies as to Senator Albert Gore’s proposal for a position which the United States might take in the event it appeared that the negotiations were on the verge of a breakdown. However, consideration has also been given to the proposal as one of substance which might be made in the current negotiations.

In summary, Senator Gore suggested an approach to consist of a Presidential announcement of (a) “unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth’s atmosphere” for perhaps three years, (b) a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and (c) a suggestion that the Geneva Conference concentrate on the negotiation of a limited treaty for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.

You will recall that when Senator Gore made his proposal to you orally, you assured him that his suggestion would be given most careful evaluation by the appropriate Government officials. This has been done. The task, however, has been complicated by the fact that the negotiating position of the United States is being continually affected by day-to-day developments in the Russian negotiating position at the Geneva Conference. Even now, it is not clear, as Senator Gore believed at the time he spoke with you, that the U.S. Delegation seems to be negotiating toward an unattainable goal, and that therefore the U.S. must face the prospect of failure to obtain our present objectives at the Conference. This seems to me to be especially true in the light of your decision to break the link with other disarmament measures, an action which seemed vital by our delegation to continued successful negotiation.

The officials who advise you with regard to the Geneva Conference agree that the United States should not now advance the Gore proposal. All agree, however, that the Gore suggestion should be considered as one of the alternatives if the time comes when developments in Geneva necessitate consideration of a change in the existing U.S. position summarized in your statement of August 22.

It would be my hope that if you feel it necessary to reply further to Senator Gore, the reply could be handled in such a way as to discourage discussion by public officials of alternatives to our present position at Geneva, at least until the Russian negotiators have made clearer the position which they will take on the proposals we have advanced at the Conference. Senator Gore is being kept currently informed by State Department officials of discussions within the U.S. Government with respect to our Geneva position. He could be assured by you that at such time as it appears to the responsible officials that the Russians are not prepared to agree to a treaty acceptable to us, his suggestion would be considered, along with others, in deciding future U.S. policy toward nuclear testing.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Attachment

EVALUATION OF TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL BY SENATOR GORE²

1. The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position to Take in Geneva Now

a. The U.S. should not advance the Gore proposal at this time because:

(1) It would give the USSR an excuse to escape from revealing its true position on acceptance of international controls on testing.

(2) It would almost certainly lead to a break in negotiations, thereby destroying such chance as there is of obtaining acceptable international inspection within the USSR. It would permit the USSR to charge the United States with a desire to evade a test suspension and of walking away from stated basic positions in mid-negotiations.

2. The Gore Proposal as a Fallback Position

a. If the present Geneva negotiations break down, the United States may desire to announce a policy of moderation in future testing. Such self-imposed moderation may be prudent because, even if the blame for the break in negotiation lies with the Soviet Union, increased pressure of public opinion for a cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against the U.S. and the USSR. Unilateral U.S. action limiting tests would cut the ground under proposals to cease all nuclear weapons tests.

b. Further study must be given to the proper course of action. The Gore proposal contains elements which may be useful in developing a fallback position in the event that current negotiations fail.

3. The Position of the AEC on the Gore Proposal

The Atomic Energy Commission agrees with the substance of the arguments made above. However, the Commission believes that the United States should seek as an immediate, practical and enforceable objective, a multilateral controlled ban on atmospheric tests. The Commission opposes a unilateral declaration by the United States to cease all but atmospheric tests. It prefers that a cessation of atmospheric tests come as the result of a multilateral treaty which provides for agreed inspection procedures adequate to insure that the agreement will be observed by all parties.

1. Source: Advises against Gore proposal on nuclear testing at this time. Confidential. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
2. The views contained in the first two numbered paragraphs of this memorandum are those of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The views of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission are summarized in the final paragraph. [Footnote is in the original.]