393. Telegram Supnu 77 From Geneva1
Supnu 77. US delegation has been giving close study to problem of how to (A) move negotiations forward into actual discussion controls, or (B) clearly establish Soviet unwillingness to deal seriously with controls and thereby place on Soviet onus for failure make progress towards treaty.
General Soviet position as reflected both inside and outside conference now seems clear. Soviets for present, and we believe for indefinite period, are willing stay on position that there must be some agreement, at least in principle, on QTE cessation UNQTE before Soviets will move [Typeset Page 1480] to serious discussion, let alone acceptance of, arrangements for control. Delegation appraises Soviet position as firm. We believe firmness stems from probability Soviets believe public attraction their call for agreement in principle cease tests for all time contrasts favorably with US–UK position of conditioning duration of treaty on year-by-year determination not only of satisfactory progress in installing control system but also of progress in the field of disarmament. Given this Soviet position, US delegation does not rpt not place much stock in tactical approach such as that proposed by UK (ref Nusup 73) as device for bringing Soviets to grips in discussion of controls. Any tactical approach, whether that proposed by UK or for that matter tactical approach preferred by US delegation itself, such as trying to operate without agenda or trying eventually to reach compromise agreed agenda appears likely fail to bring serious negotiation controls so long as [Facsimile Page 2] Soviets stand on position agreement in principle cessation tests must first be achieved. This is not to say conference will not be dealing with matters of substance. As delegation has already pointed out, conference, under guise agenda discussion, has already been dealing with central substantive question of whether Soviets willing have treaty which includes effective controls. We believe public acceptance this fact well enough established so that there is little danger imminent break by Soviets occasioned by developments connected with present state negotiations within conference.
US delegation has concluded that most profitable general approach now would lie in sharpening contrast between Soviet and US–UK attitude toward controls and at same time weakening over-all Soviet position on “cessation” by removing vulnerable points in present US position. Vulnerability US–UK position rests on short-term implication of phrase year-by-year determination and in particular on this determination as applied to progress in disarmament, which seems to many people extraneous to problem of assuring end of weapons tests.
In private discussion with UK delegation, US delegation has gained clear impression that move to simplify and bolster public support of US–UK position by making this position rest clearly but solely on inseparability of obligation to cease tests from establishment of effective controls would give UK delegation, and presumably UK Government, confidence for strong negotiating line with Soviets. We believe this would be the best way to remove temptations for UK to adopt tactical approaches which we believe are dangerous and unproductive. UK delegation has from time to time expressed hope that we could meet present situation by simplifying and clarifying US–UK position. UK views on disarmament link are already known to Department. Accordingly, delegation recommends strongly that careful consideration be given to immediate move to make US position on agreement to stop tests rest solely on satisfactory establishment, extension and operation [Typeset Page 1481] inspection system. If such US position is adopted, we believe it should be set forth publicly in joint US–UK statement.
Possibility of dealing with disarmament link by mention in a “purposes” article of treaty and further mention in duration clause of treaty has been suggested by Department in Nusup 69.
[Facsimile Page 3]Delegation has already submitted (Supnu 71) recommednation that disarmament link be dealt with by statement or purpose in preamble only for reasons given in reference message. We believe this position sound and can be explained convincingly in public statement.
US delegation realizes necessity of assuring periodic review of control system and of retaining US unilateral right of determining whether control system being established satisfactorily, coming into effect in satisfactory stages and operating satisfactorily thereafter. We believe such periodic determination can be adequately provided for by negotiating agreed phases within which specific parts of control system should be set up, and agreed standards in accordance with which control system must operate. Position can be publicly presented without short-term implications of “year-by-year” while at same time retaining right of periodic unilateral determination as to effectiveness of system.
In immediately following telegram delegation suggests draft public announcement by US and UK Governments which could give effect to recommended initiative with reference US policy on disarmament link. We believe issuance of such a statement would greatly strengthen relative public position of US–UK as against Soviets, would encourage UK to cooperate fully in probably prolonged and difficult negotiation, and would increase whatever possibilities there may be that Soviets can be brought to serious negotiation of treaty including controls.
US delegation has informed UK delegation of general nature of recommendation made this telegram.
- Source: Proposes change in negotiating position in nuclear test conference. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11–2158.↩