390. Telegram Supnu 45 From Geneva1
Supnu 45. Following summary appraisal first ten days nuclear weapons test conference.
1. Soviet position. Soviet delegation after quickly coming terms on minor points such as private rather than public sessions, and use of “discontinuance” in conference title, immediately assumed rigid position on agenda. Soviet position on agenda has remained consistent that first act of conference be “conclusion” agreement on “cessation” weapons tests. This p.m. informal meeting three delegations proved inconclusive in changing Soviet position. Soviets have indicated wish continue informal discussions on agenda.
In spite of Soviet delegation rigidity on agenda Soviet position in meetings has not been one of complete avoidance substance. They have, of course, focused on their own draft treaty, but from time to time have engaged brief discussions on controls. Soviet challenge to U.S. [Typeset Page 1475] and U.K. delegations to table own versions draft agreement obviously calculated further center attention conference on first item of Soviet agenda, i.e., conclusion of agreement. Nevertheless may have had some element of attempt get substantive discussion going without formal adoption agenda. Moreover, generally low key at which Soviets have conducted conversations and meetings, even in face of occasional fairly stern lectures from Western delegations seems indicate [Facsimile Page 2] Soviet delegation interested in prolongation of conference rather than early break, at least prior arrival Kuznetsov, and probably for some time.
2. U.K. position. U.K. delegation reflects preoccupation U.K. Government with securing treaty even if this means corners have to be cut. U.S. delegation gets general impression U.K. delegation will from time to time try to act as “honest broker”. However, to date, cooperation of U.K. delegation has been good. Agreed tactics have been carried out with minimum of free-wheeling, and agreed positions maintained. U.K. delegation is noticably silent in defending link with disarmament leaving this to U.S. delegation but we were on notice as to U.K. attitude before we reached Geneva.
3. U.S. position. Heaviest Soviet attack has been on “year-by-year” element of U.S. position, link with disarmament, and link with effective performance of controls. We expect attack on “year-by-year” and disarmament link to continue without let-up. One element of U.S. position already made public in President’s August 22 statement has drawn no fire, namely reference to peaceful uses. Agreement by Soviets that conference should deal “weapons tests” and use of same term in Soviet draft treaty have made it possible consider peaceful uses item as means plugging loophole in commitment stop weapons tests rather than exception. Tactical position on this item therefore improved although U.S. delegation has yet to discuss it.
4. Conclusions. It is far from clear this stage whether Soviets have come under instructions find best propaganda method avoiding treaty and inspection or whether they are under instructions seek some sort of agreement with minimum of controls and these preferably more or less left to wither on vine after agreement actually signed. Actions Soviet delegation thus far seem indicate only that Russians did not come here looking for immediate break. Agenda deadlock does not give completely accurate picture of conference in which there has been some give and take on matters of substance. Our best guess on outlook is for protracted negotiations with or without adoption final agenda and with outcome very much in doubt.
- Source: Summary of first 10 days of nuclear test conference. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11–1158.↩