Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

39. Memorandum of Discussion at the 360th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1958

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 27, 1958

Present at the 360th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Judge Lawrence E. Walsh for the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Item 1); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Item 1); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Brig. Gen. Carey Randall, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Ralph E. Spear and Mr. Robert Stokley, Federal Civil Defense Administration (for Item 1); The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Public Works Planning; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; Mr. Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee”, dated January 22, 1958; NSC Actions Nos. 1877 and 1878; NSC 5807; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 24 and 26, 1958)

General Cutler briefed the Council at very great length on the background of the subject report (NSC 5807), as well as the report’s content and recommendations, including also the comments and recommendations by the NSC Planning Board with respect to the report, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, he distributed at the meeting an extract from the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of January 16, 1958, which he said described the framework of the Council’s considerations today. (A copy of General Cutler’s briefing note and the aforementioned extract are filed in the minutes of the meeting, and are also attached to this memorandum.) Thereafter, General Cutler called on Governor Hoegh to summarize the contents of NSC 5807.

At the beginning of his remarks, Governor Hoegh referred to the simulated attack upon the United States in Operation Alert 1957, and indicated the difference between the effect of the use of “clean” nuclear weapons and “dirty” nuclear weapons in such an attack, with respect both to casualties from blast and thermal effects and casualties from radioactive fallout. His chart indicated that the total casualties (dead and injured) would have amounted to 51.3 million people if “dirty” nuclear weapons had been used by the enemy, and to 30.4 million people if only “clean” weapons had been used.

Thereafter, Governor Hoegh summarized the contents of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee (NSC 5807), including the terms of reference, the recommendations, and the conclusions.

When Governor Hoegh had completed his summary, General Cutler briefly commented, first, on the recommendations and the comment of the NSC Planning Board. He pointed out that the majority of the Planning Board had endorsed the report by the Interdepartmental Committee; but, in addition to the measures to carry out the concept of shelter in the report itself, the Planning Board had also called for the preparation of three additional studies beyond those contemplated in NSC 5807. General Cutler also referred briefly to a fourth proposed study suggested by the ODM Planning Board Member, which neither the Planning Board nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had viewed with favor at this time. He then pointed out that while the majority of the Planning Board had endorsed the measures set forth in NSC 5807, the Treasury, Defense, and Budget Planning Board Members had confined their recommendation to the research studies and the public education programs in NSC 5807, and recommended that the Council defer a decision on the remainder of the recommendations in NSC 5807. He noted that the Treasury Department, in explanation of this view, had submitted an Annex to the Planning Board report, in which it advocated deferring measures which would commit the nation to a network of large public shelters. He thought it appropriate at this point to call on Secretary Anderson for further explanation of the Treasury’s point of view.

Secretary Anderson said that officials of the Treasury Department have given very careful thought to the report of the Interdepartmental Committee. He agreed with these officials that the decision with respect to the proposed measures was as significant a decision in the realm of domestic policy as the Government could take. First, he said, he wished to commend Governor Hoegh for reducing the broad and general recommendations of the Gaither Panel with respect to shelter, to something which was clear, tangible, and susceptible of being dealt with. The problem posed by a shelter program, continued Secretary Anderson, was not only a grave financial problem or merely a grave financial problem. The main problem lay in the fact that we simply do not know enough at present to determine whether to go ahead with a large Federal program of shelter as a means which will really contribute to the survival of the United States in a terrible nuclear war. While the Treasury Department agreed with the Interdepartmental Committee that the Government should go ahead with the proposed educational program for the American people on shelter, the Treasury also put very heavy emphasis on the creation of home shelters by private individuals, as well as on the research programs which the Interdepartmental Committee and the Planning Board had recommended. On the other hand, the Treasury Department did not believe that the Government could proceed to build prototype shelters all over the United States (as recommended in NSC 5807) without involving a serious popular and Congressional reaction which would eventuate in a hugh and costly Federal shelter program. If we proceed now to commit ourselves to such a program of prototype shelters, we shall presently find that we have committed ourselves to an economic program of such magnitude that it would be bound to have a significant bearing on the economic strength of the nation. In conclusion, Secretary Anderson stressed the point that the Treasury was not prepared to oppose such a program of shelter-building, but it was urging that we defer a decision until we know more about the implications of such a construction program.

General Cutler thereafter briefly summarized Secretary Anderson’s view with respect to what portions of NSC 5807 Treasury did favor and the objections of the Treasury Department to the proposed program to construct prototype shelters. Secretary Anderson concurred in General Cutler’s summation, and warned again that proceeding with the prototype construction program might commit us to a wholesale Federal shelter program whether we really wished to undertake such a program or not.

General Cutler then asked General Twining to comment on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the comments and recommendations of the Planning Board regarding NSC 5807. General Twining stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked with favor on the three additional studies proposed by the Planning Board, but that the Chiefs did not agree with the proposal of the ODM Planning Board Member for a study “appraising what level of active defenses and of shelter, in any projected combinations, is required to limit casualties to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation.” In general, said General Twining, the Chiefs felt that such a study was too vague in its present terms of reference, and in particular that if such a study were to be made in the future, it should be done by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group rather than by ODM, FCDA and the Department of Defense, as had been suggested by the ODM Planning Board Member.

General Cutler then summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs as consisting of agreement with those recommendations of NSC 5807 which called for programs of research and of public education, but that the Chiefs had certain reservations with respect to proposals to construct shelter in military facilities.

General Cutler thereafter requested the Secretary of State to present his views to the Council. Secretary Dulles stated that he wished to commend the authors of NSC 5807 just as Secretary Anderson had a while ago, for bringing the subject of shelter out of the ether and down to earth where we could observe and understand it. Beyond this commendation, he added, he had a few observations to make.

In the first place, it seemed to Secretary Dulles to be a serious question whether the emphasis in the program set forth by the Interdepartmental Committee in NSC 5807 was actually in the right place. In the United States today there are millions and millions of basements which could provide a shelter which would reduce the hazard of radioactive fallout to as much as one-tenth. On the other hand, we have no basements which would actually enable people who sought refuge in them to survive over a considerable period. There seemed to Secretary Dulles no sense whatever in providing basements where people merely died of radiation sickness more slowly than they did outside. Accordingly, the obvious first thing to do was to improve existing basement facilities to a point where people seeking shelter in them could have a real hope of surviving. This would include provision for what comes after the nuclear exchange—the provision of food, water, heat, medical supplies, and the like—in these improved basement shelters. The kind of program that he was suggesting, said Secretary Dulles, made use of widespread existing house shelters all over the nation. To achieve such a shelter program wouldn’t cost the Government anything significant, and would add greatly to the chance of national survival in a nuclear war. In short, the measures he was advocating would provide the population with a high degree of protection while at the same time avoiding the problems and dangers which so worried Secretary Anderson.

Continuing, Secretary Dulles stated his firm opposition to the construction of massive shelter in the basements of public buildings. A measure like this must be approached gingerly. Programs calling for the addition of massive basements in new Federal construction would certainly involve very large costs to the Government and might not add significantly to our survival capacity. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles thought it would seem desirable to carry out the public education program recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee and programs which would convert existing facilities into shelters rather than into living tombs. Accordingly, he was inclined to cut the program of the Interdepartmental Committee further.

Secretary Dulles also said he assumed that the Interdepartmental Committee had given careful thought to the experience of the European countries in the matter of building prototype shelters. These countries have had much more experience than we have in this field, and we could probably obtain this information from them for nothing.

In conclusion, Secretary Dulles stated that his own Planning Board Member (Assistant Secretary Gerard Smith) had gone along with the recommendations in NSC 5807 100 percent. He, Secretary Dulles, didn’t go quite that far. He would cut out the construction aspects of NSC 5807, and would stress the use of private funds. He strongly opposed any massive shelter construction program.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his observations, General Cutler said he understood that Secretary McElroy had some rather special reservations with respect to the Interdepartmental Committee’s report, and that these probably related to the possible impairment of active defense measures if a large-scale shelter program were adopted by the United States. He called on Secretary McElroy to express his views.

Secretary McElroy said that of course he was concerned about the costs of a shelter program in relation to other programs deemed vital by the Department of Defense. This, however, was not the point that he wanted to emphasize at the present time. He then explained that the several research programs described in NSC 5807 were quite acceptable to him. Where he differed from the Interdepartmental Committee was on the matter of the program of public education. Secretary McElroy believed that until the Government had sufficient knowledge and information to answer the public’s questions, we should not expose them to an educational program. We don’t yet know enough to answer their questions, and we needed to undertake further research and study before we launched a program of public education as to the nature of radioactive fallout and the hazards resulting from all-out nuclear war. Furthermore, added Secretary McElroy, he was not at all sure that it was at present in the public interest for the Government to urge the people of the United States to store large amounts of food, water, and drugs in basement shelters, at a time when we may need to encourage other types of investment and consumer buying by our people. Such a proposal might hurt our economy at a serious time.

The President observed that he wished to ask a couple of questions with respect to the assumptions or the frame of reference which the Committee had adopted in order to carry out its task. Addressing himself to Governor Hoegh, he said that he judged that the Committee was talking about protection from radioactive fallout rather than protection from the blast and thermal effects of nuclear detonations. But if the primary targets of the enemy are to be our U.S. cities, then such things as subways and the like won’t help to provide shelter—unless, of course, we prove to be wrong in our assumption that the Soviets will aim their attack on our population centers. Governor Hoegh replied that of course it is conceivable that we might be able to prevent nuclear bombs falling upon our cities; but we could certainly never avoid the hazard of widespread radioactive fallout in the event of a nuclear exchange.

The President likewise addressed his next question to Governor Hoegh. If, he said, we are thinking of an attack which would involve some 30 million U.S. casualties in the initial exchange, we have still not approached the casualty limits because there may be repeated attacks by the enemy after the initial attack. Such attacks might occur at a time when people were just coming out of shelter from the first attack. So, said the President, he concluded that when we talk about a vast nuclear exchange between us and the enemy, we are in fact talking about something the results of which are almost impossible to conceive of.

With respect to the psychological aspects of the problem of shelter, the President said he had got together some knowledgeable people and asked them just how much money it would take to build a fallout shelter on his farm sufficient to hold some 14 or 15 people. They had estimated the cost to be between $25 and $30 thousand, and the shelter was by no means elaborate. This posed the psychological problem. The President said that maybe, if he got a good job after he ceased to be President, he could afford to build such a shelter, but most of his neighbors would not be able to do so. In that case, won’t they argue that only the rich are managing to get shelter protection? And will they not go on from that point to insist that the Federal Government build shelters for them? The President stressed that he was all for the construction of private shelters as far as this seemed likely to go, but he confessed that he was baffled by the problem of working out a scheme that offered hope of real success. Accordingly, the over-all answer seemed to him to be for this Government to assure that no doubt whatsoever existed about the protection of our massive retaliatory capability. In summary, the President stated that he agreed with the measures which had been proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee, as modified by the comments of the other Members of the Council.

Secretary Dulles turned to Governor Hoegh and complained that no one in all these years had ever told him what he should store in the basements of his houses. Why had he not been told? Governor Hoegh explained the reasons why. Since there was no visible shelter program, anyone who was found building a private shelter was thought to be eccentric. Secretary Dulles pressed the question as to what kind of food should be stored in his basement. Governor Hoegh replied by asking the Secretary what he liked to eat.

Secretary McElroy commented that in his opinion it would be necessary to terrify the people of the United States before they will do what Secretary Dulles was suggesting—namely, to build and stock shelters in their basements. Secretary Dulles disagreed with Secretary McElroy on this point.

General Cutler next called for the views of the Director of the Budget. Mr. Stans stated that the Budget Bureau believed it undesirable to proceed at this time with any more than a small part of the program recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee in NSC 5807. The financial problems were, of course, obvious, but Mr. Stans could perceive other objections as well. He believed that if we undertook the prototype shelter construction program, recommended in NSC 5807, we would be inevitably committed to a full-scale shelter program. Moreover, undertaking a shelter program would interfere seriously with vital programs for strengthening the active defenses of the United States. But above all other objections was the fact, attested to by both the Interdepartmental Committee and the Planning Board, that many “unresolved problems” existed with respect to the shelter program. Therefore, before we invest substantial sums in any shelter construction program, the Bureau of the Budget feels that further studies, such as those recommended by the Planning Board, should be undertaken. In illustration of his point, Mr. Stans cited the value of studies on human tolerance of radiation. In summary, concluded Mr. Stans, the Budget Bureau favored only the following recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee: (1) research on weapons effects; (2) research on the human tolerance level of radiation; (3) a very limited program of public education; and (4) studies as to what protection now actually exists throughout the United States. Mr. Stans added his belief that all these measures should be undertaken at a cost of no more than $25 million a year for two years, assuming some financial help from the States and the municipalities.

In reply to Mr. Stans, the President said that we could talk all we wanted about money, but if we know that shelter programs will save the lives of millions of people, money won’t matter much in the final decision.

Dr. Killian expressed the view that the primary task of the United States was to concentrate on developing our active defenses in order to keep the nuclear bombs away. These should have priority over passive defense measures. Secondly, said Dr. Killian, if the Government were to embark on the kind of program of public education recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee, it was quite likely that we would find ourselves obliged to go on to undertake a much larger shelter program. Thirdly, and with respect to the Planning Board recommendations for three additional studies over and above those recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee, Dr. Killian expressed doubt that any of these studies would actually bring us to as definite conclusions as the Planning Board hoped to achieve. Nevertheless, Dr. Killian advocated proceeding with the studies recommended by the Planning Board. The first and second studies seemed to him, on the whole, very reasonable. As to the third study—to wit, the problem of the survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter after a massive nuclear exchange—Dr. Killian was not sure that further study would throw much light on this problem, although he believed that it was probably worth trying. As to the fourth study, proposed unilaterally by ODM, this seemed to Dr. Killian infeasible as an undertaking. At best, it would require years to complete, and would involve an enormous effort if any conclusion were to be reached, although admittedly this was the heart of the problem.

The Acting Director of ODM, Mr. Patterson, in response to a question from General Cutler, said that he would not press for the time being the inclusion of the study proposed by the ODM Planning Board Member, although he reserved the right to bring the matter up at a later time, on grounds that ultimately it could not be passed over.

Apropos of a remark by Dr. Killian that the public education program proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee would tend to alarm the people of the United States, the President said that he must strongly disagree with Dr. Killian. He believed, on the contrary, that the program of public education would make us more effective.

At this point General Cutler reminded the Council that the Holifield (Chet Holifield, D-Calif.) Committee would commence public hearings on shelter early in April. Perhaps, therefore, it would be advisable to hear now from the Vice President as to what these hearings were likely to involve.

The Vice President replied that, generally speaking, the views that Dr. Killian had just expressed made very good sense to him, and that he would like to add that Governor Hoegh, as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, had just about the most thankless job in the world. While Governor Hoegh had done a fine job in producing the report of the Interdepartmental Committee, the Vice President said that he could not but be concerned also by the statements that Secretary Anderson had made at the outset of the meeting. The Vice President felt that if we went beyond educational and research programs in the field of shelter, we would presently generate political pressures for a Federal shelter program which might involve a serious loss in our active defenses and in our capacity for massive retaliation. He added that he shared the President’s viewpoint that there really wasn’t much difference, in terms of national survival, between casualties of 30 million and of 50 million Americans. While it might matter to the 20 million who were not killed, the Vice President believed that if 30 million Americans were killed in a nuclear exchange, there would be no hope of the United States surviving. What would really save the United States were our active defenses. While we certainly have to do something in the way of a shelter program, because the country demands it, we should do as little as we can to satisfy this demand. If we went further than that, and became too involved in a shelter program, we would be bound to lose the correct balance between active and passive defenses. This, concluded the Vice President, was the right line to take in dealing with the Holifield Committee.

General Cutler asked the Vice President if he had observed strong pressure in the Congress for a large-scale shelter program. The Vice President said that he thought not, and added that he was inclined to agree with Under Secretary of the Treasury Scribner, that the Planning Board suggestion—that a selection for pilot studies might be made on the basis of the first five cities to volunteer matching funds—was politically impractical. The Vice President counselled against stirring up the public when at the present time all they want us to do is to spend ourselves out of the recession.

General Cutler next called on Governor Hoegh, suggesting that he speak to the point of the Federal example as a necessary stimulant to the construction of private shelters. He asked Governor Hoegh how we could possibly proceed with an effective public education program if we did not set some kind of example to our citizens by building shelter at the Federal level. Had this not been the gist of Governor Hoegh’s arguments? Governor Hoegh replied emphatically in the affirmative, and enlarged on his point. It might be possible to reduce the size of the recommended program for the construction of prototype fallout shelters, but it was absolutely essential to build some such prototypes. Governor Hoegh also felt that the construction of shelter in new Federal buildings was a necessary example for the States and local communities.

At this point General Cutler undertook to describe the consensus of the meeting. He believed that this consensus favored going forward with the research programs which had been recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee and by the Planning Board. He believed also that the sampling surveys and pilot studies were approved by the Council. It likewise seemed to favor starting a program of public education and the program with respect to providing the elements of a base for rapid acceleration; but the consensus opposed adoption of the other programs recommended in NSC 5807.

(At this point, the President announced to the Members of the Council that he had just been brought a note indicating that Khrushchev had replaced Bulganin as head of the Soviet Government.)

General Cutler went on to say that he was not sure of the attitude of the Council toward the pilot studies, but he was sure that the rest of the Interdepartmental Committee’s recommendations were not acceptable until the Council had had another look at the matter after completion of the research programs which the Council apparently endorsed.

The Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Mr. Abbott Washburn, spoke in support of undertaking the construction of at least a few prototype shelters because, he warned, without such shelters it would be impossible to launch an effective program of public education. General Cutler thought well of this suggestion, and asked Governor Hoegh certain questions about this matter.

Mr. Patterson said that he, on the other hand, was disturbed about the program for public education if this were to be undertaken prior to the completion and evaluation of the recommended research programs. He felt that the Government must be in a position to answer clearly the public’s questions. Governor Hoegh said that he believed that we were already in a position to answer the public’s questions, as a result of the knowledge and information which had been acquired by FCDA and AEC.

Mr. Patterson then expressed himself as being in favor of a matching program for building shelter in public buildings, rather than a program in which all the costs of shelter construction were borne by the Federal Government. In reply to this argument, Governor Hoegh again stressed the value of the example set by the Federal Government.

The President said that this was one of the hardest problems in the world on which to make a wise decision. General Cutler therefore suggested leaving the matter where it was. He would undertake to write a Record of Action which he would discuss with the President so that the President could make a decision after thinking the matter over at greater length.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject (NSC 5807) prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee established for the purpose by NSC Action No. 1842–e; in the light of (1) the comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board on NSC 5807, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958, and (2) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5807 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 26, 1958) and on the above-mentioned Planning Board comments and recommendations (as summarized orally at the meeting).

b. Agreed that the following measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842–d:

(1) A research and development program along the lines of:

(a) The recommendations in paragraph 1–a of NSC 5807; and

(b) The recommendations by the NSC Planning Board in paragraph 1, page 1, and subparagraphs 2–a and –b, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958.

(2) A limited program of prototype construction of relatively small-capacity fallout shelters, differing in design and type (including multiple-use) and adapted to differing conditions such as climate; appropriate tests by actual occupancy for realistic periods of time to be conducted after completion (total cost not to exceed $6 million).

(3) A nation-wide survey along the lines recommended in subparagraph 2–a of NSC 5807.

(4) Initiation of a program of public education along the lines recommended in paragraph 3 of NSC 5807, as modified by FCDA in the light of NSC discussion and as outlined in the Annex hereto (cost estimated at not over $12.5 million for FY 1959; subsequent annual appropriations to be determined on the basis of experience).

(5) The elements of a base for rapid acceleration along the lines recommended in paragraph 4 of NSC 5807.

(6) The incorporation of fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size, designed after this date, along the lines recommended in paragraph 5–a of NSC 5807. (Supplemental appropriations for such shelter in buildings for which funds have already been appropriated will not be sought.)

c. Requested that the studies recommended by the NSC Planning Board and referred to in b–(1)–(b) above, and a report by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator on the status of plans and actions to carry out the other measures described in b above, be submitted to the Council by July 1, 1958.

d. Deferred action on the measures recommended in paragraphs 1–b (except the limited program in b–2) above), 2–b, 2-c, 5–b, and 6–a and –b of NSC 5807; pending consideration by the Council of the reports requested in c above.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation as follows:

b (except b–(1)–(b)) and c to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

b–(1)–(b) and c to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Chairman, AEC, the Director, ODM, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

[Omitted here is agenda item 2.]

3. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1)

Secretary McElroy said that the presentation of the Defense Department’s proposals for reorganization would be given by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, of Boston, who was in charge of this project at the Pentagon. In anticipation of presenting these proposals to the President, and in order to obtain the best available advice, the Defense Department had employed a large group of consultants, quarterbacked by Mr. Coolidge and including Admiral Redford, General Twining, General Bradley, General Gruenther, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Foster and, on occasion (because of ill health), former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. As the Council would perceive, continued Secretary McElroy, we have moved in four directions in these recommended improvements in the organization of the Defense Department, namely: (1) the command structure, (2) elimination of interservice rivalry, (3) better direction of research and engineering, and (4) improvements of efficiency both within the Military Services and within the Department of Defense, with a view especially to speeding up decision-making.

Secretary McElroy then called on Mr. Coolidge, who spoke from notes with the assistance of a large chart of the new organization. Among other matters, Mr. Coolidge pointed out that in the revised command structure it was proposed to abandon the use of one or another of the Military Services as an executive agent of the Department of Defense. The line of command for the future under this proposed reorganization plan would be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the fighting forces. Thus there would be no intervention of a Service Chief of Staff in the line of command. Such an improvement should enable us to face up more promptly to any emergency.

Mr. Coolidge pointed out also that a great deal of time and thought had been given to the oft-mentioned proposal for the creation of a single Chief of Staff. However, it had been decided to retain the present system with certain changes which might, perhaps, appear at first sight picayune but which, in fact, Mr. Coolidge thought might prove very effective. He cited a number of such changes, of which perhaps the most significant related to Research and Development, whose head was in the future to be provided with a lot more authority than the heads of R&D in the past. Under the new system, the head of R&D would supervise all the research and engineering activities of the Department, and would be responsible for making certain that all the research and development required for the several missions of our armed forces (such as CONAD and Continental Defense) were actually being carried out. Appropriations for research and development would be made only to the Secretary of Defense, and not to the several military departments. Mr. Coolidge said that no decision had yet been made as to the precise title to be given the head of R&D, but that, regardless of title, he would rank as an Under Secretary.

With respect to the general functions of the Department of Defense, the new reorganization plan would suggest the elimination of paragraph 4 of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, which states that the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force “shall be separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.” Mr. Coolidge pointed out that such elimination would not mean that we would abolish the Service Secretaries, but the elimination of this phraseology would enable the Secretary of Defense clearly to direct the Service Secretaries. Moreover, all appropriations by the Congress henceforth would be made solely to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Services.

It was likewise proposed that the promotion of all officers above the rank of Major General or its equivalent in the other Services should be made on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense rather than upon recommendation by a Service Secretary. This move was designed to encourage an over-all rather than a Service point of view among officers of senior rank. In this connection, the proposed reorganization would seek authority to transfer an officer from one Service to another with the officer’s own concurrence.

With respect to cutting down the number of Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Coolidge indicated that the proposed recommendations had not gone as far as Mr. Vinson and other Congressional critics would like us to go. We believe that many of the demands for wholesale reduction in the number of Assistant Secretaries were not realistic. If we attempted to get rid of too many such people, we would find ourselves back in the Forrestal days, with a Secretary of Defense who was simply physically unable to carry out all the details of his responsibility. Nevertheless, according to these recommendations the Secretary of Defense would plan to review the operations of each of the Assistant Secretaries to see that there was no duplication or inefficiency. Thus far, only one Assistant Secretaryship will be abolished.

Secretary McElroy commented that whatever one called these Assistant Secretaries, their functions were necessary, and it was easier to induce better men to serve if they were given the rank and title of Assistant Secretary of Defense.

At this point the President said that he would presently he obliged to leave the Council meeting, and he would like to offer one or two thought for discussion after his departure. The President said he firmly believed that if this reorganization could achieve the elimination of the artificial roles and missions of the Services, and depend instead on the unified commands, and if, secondly, we could get rid of the concept of “separately administered” referred to by Mr. Coolidge, and thirdly, if we could achieve sufficient financial flexibility in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, the President was convinced that we would have achieved three great legislative changes which very such needed to be made. On the whole, therefore, the President seemed to indicate approval of the proposals which had been outlined by Secretary McElroy and Mr. Coolidge.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that since the recommendations which had been presented for information to the Council had yet to be formally presented to the President for his approval, the content of the proposals should not be discussed outside the walls of the Cabinet Room except under most careful security safeguards. The President agreed, and said he expected the foregoing recommendations to be coordinated, and he hoped that the Military Services would vigorously support these recommendations. If they were so supported, the President was confident that we could win Congressional approval for the recommendations.

(The President then left the meeting.)

The Vice President inquired as to the effect of the elimination of Section 202(4) concerning the separate administration of the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force by their respective Secretaries. Secretary McElroy replied that the effect of the elimination of this phraseology would be largely psychological in character. This concept of separately administered Services was used to support divisiveness on Capitol Hill more often than in the Pentagon itself. Indeed, in general inter-service rivalry on Capitol Hill was worse than it was in the Pentagon. He believed that this was as important a change as any that the Defense Department was making in its recommended reorganization proposals.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report on the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense on the subject, as presented by the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Charles A. Coolidge.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter; Agenda item 3: Proposed Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—15 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on March 28.