Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

387. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, October 16, 1958

SUBJECT

• Surprise Attack Negotiations and Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• • Dept of State
  • Under Secretary Herter
  • Mr. William C. Foster
  • Mr. Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AF
  • Mr. Haker—S/AF
  • Mr. Weiler—S/AE
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
• • White House
  • Dr. Killian
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Bromley Smith
  • Mr. Keeny
  • Mr. Minshull
• • CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
• • Atomic Energy Commission
  • Mr. McCone
  • General Starbird
  • Dr. Kavanaugh
• • Dept of Defense
  • Mr. Quarles
  • General Byers
  • Mr. Irwin

Mr. Herter said the issue to be decided regarding the terms of reference paper for U.S. delegation to the Surprise Attack Safeguards Conference was whether the delegation should be completely barred from discussing the question of limitations on armaments as it affects the surprise attack question. He said there was no disposition in the Department of State to discuss limitations in the form of specific numbers.

Mr. Quarles expressed the thought that once we engaged in any discussion of what additional protection might be gained from limitations on armaments, or generally any changes from the present arms situation, we give the Soviets opportunity to discuss all their old proposals such as “ban the bomb”, and this would sow the seeds of destruction of the Conference, as well as place the U.S. at a propaganda disadvantage. He said it was quite true that disarmament measures with inspection would gain greater security for the U.S. but this Conference should not get into such questions. He commented that, in this regard, the language on Page 3 of the terms of reference paper was too broad.

Mr. Herter said the issue centered particularly in the wording to be used for Section III C of the agenda. He had hoped that it would be possible to have developed some specific suggestions from the delegation with respect to limitations that might be discussed but this had not proved possible.

Mr. Foster said he was the servant of whatever the Committee of Three decided, and that the possibility of some fruitful discussion with the Soviets existed even if we did not get beyond Section II of the agenda. However, he said, Sections III A and B are progressive in nature and when you get to qualitation discussions, we can assess the value to the surprise attack problem of various types of hypothetical limitations, and this could be of real value to subsequent political negotiations. He said you could discuss variables in general terms or as percentages, or as “minimum cuts” and “substantial cuts”.

Dr. Killian inquired as to views of the delegation on any exclusion of a discussion of limitations, and said that any technical analysis he had seen shows that as far as missiles are concerned, there would be little value in more observation and inspection. He noted the views of the Interagency Working Group which expressed this view.

Mr. Quarles said he did not believe there would not be some value in observation and inspection.

Mr. Foster said we should aim at an assessment of the effectiveness of measures relating to various levels of armaments.

Mr. Quarles said he did not object to the technical discussion having a range of conditions which must be faced, but that this Conference should not get into a discussion of the value of reaching agreements on various disarmament measures.

Mr. McCone said we might start in the discussions at a zero assumption for certain armaments, such as missiles, and work upward rather than back in terms of reductions and limitations.

Mr. Foster commented that he had never liked the word “limitation” for use in the terms of reference paper and perhaps another word could be found.

Mr. Herter said there was always a danger that public opinion would view any technical recommendations of the experts as something that should be adopted by their governments, considering related political or military factors. However, he said, we have an able delegation and while he would be surprised if the talks ever got beyond Sections I and II, the fact remains that the Soviets have proposed the talks and a mutual interest does exist in reducing the dangers of surprise attack. If we refuse to consider the problem of nuclear weapons, both sides will be faced with it, and if we restrict the delegation in a way that will hamper their exploration of Soviet thinking, we will restrict the potential value of the Conference and will also place ourselves in a disadvantageous propaganda position.

Mr. Foster noted that there was a possibility of fruitful exploratory discussion on methods that might reduce the likelihood of accidental war.

Mr. Quarles said the propaganda victory we had gained at the Geneva technical talks on nuclear testing resulted from our standing firm against Soviet efforts to make the Conference political in nature.

Dr. Killian expressed the view that the delegation should be allowed maneuverability in the talks, and Mr. Foster said it must at least have the opportunity during the preparatory work to look at the question of the effects upon the surprise attack problem of limitations and of variables in armaments.

Mr. Quarles said the delegation could study the question of the effects of limitations in their preparatory work, but that discussion of limitations in Geneva should not be undertaken without reference back to Washington. Mr. Quarles then proposed that Section II be changed in a manner that would limit discussion to technical problems that would have a range of variables to be concerned about. He said he would not object to the terms of reference paper stating that if the delegation felt that it had to discuss limitations, it should request instructions from the Committee of Three.

There was then some discussion to the effect that perhaps there was a meeting of minds on the issue of what should be discussed. It was agreed that the Department of State would redraft Section III, with appropriate changes in other parts of the terms of reference paper, in an effort to reflect the apparent agreement. The Committee of Three would then review the redraft.

Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations

The meeting next considered questions relating to the nuclear test suspension negotiations scheduled to begin on October 31 in Geneva. The Third Report of the Working Group on Disarmament Policy (TAB A) served as a basis for the discussion.

Mr. Gray inquired whether there was yet a statement of the U.S. objective in the forthcoming negotiations; was it, for example, to eliminate tests, was it to get off the propaganda hook or was it to eliminate fallout as a potential health hazard.

Mr. Herter said that he considered the U.S. objective was not to eliminate testing per se as this was not very important one way or the other. It was instead to test the bona fides of the Soviets in following through on the recommendations of the Geneva experts and thus to test their willingness to subject themselves to inspection, which is the sine qua non for disarmament. There was, of course, much public sentiment on the basis of possible health hazards but this factor is not basic from the U.S. point of view.

Dr. Killian added that there was of course a public opinion factor to be taken into account.

Mr. Gray asked if agreement could have been reached in Geneva by the experts without a Soviet political decision to reach agreement. If such a decision were taken by the Soviets in August he wondered why their present attitude toward agreement had changed.

It was generally agreed that the Geneva experts’ report was based upon a political decision by the Soviet Government that it desired to reach this agreement.

Mr. Farley suggested that one possibility that might account for a change in Soviet position was that our August 22 statement of willingness to proceed to political negotiation took the Soviets by surprise. They may have hoped by reaching agreement at the expert level to increase pressure upon the U.S. position rather than move toward real agreement. Another factor that might be responsible for a change in their attitude could be that the Soviets came to realize in the course of the Geneva discussions that they still had much to learn about nuclear weapons and their effects. This might account for their resuming tests promptly after the Geneva talks.

Mr. Herter raised first for discussion the threshold question. He said he understood the Secretary’s position to be that the U.S. would take no stand at the beginning of the Geneva talks on the threshold question but that if the Soviets came to see the disadvantages to them of the extensive inspection required for a full cessation of tests, the alternative of a threshold might be introduced.

Mr. McCone said that he agreed with the Secretary that we let this evolve and begin by discussing the geometric rate at which on-site inspection increases as the threshold is lowered. He understood, for example, that in the case where a hundred inspections would be required for a 5 kt threshold, 1800 would be required at 1 kt level.

Mr. Quarles said he agreed that we should leave the threshold question to be handled in this way. He thought: 1) that we should leave no ambiguity as to what the capabilities and threshold of any agreed system would be; 2) that we should agree to discontinue all tests above the threshold; and 3) that we might unilaterally renounce, subject to certain conditions, tests below the threshold of reliable detection. Then, if we catch the Soviets testing, we could withdraw our unilateral renunciation.

Dr. Killian said he agreed in general but would raise the question of whether we should in fact renounce even unilaterally tests below the threshold.

Mr. Gray said that the approach the Secretary had suggested and Mr. Quarles had emphasized of making clear the limits of any agreed inspection system would have considerable educational value. It would point up the idea not generally understood that the system agreed at Geneva would not reliably monitor all tests.

Mr. McCone said that for purposes of discussion we might separate the problem into two components:

(a) what is the importance of tests below 5 kt and what would we give up by unilaterally renouncing all such tests.

(b) what is the importance of our public posture in the propaganda aspects of the negotiations.

Leaving aside the second field, he had no doubt as to the importance of tests below 5 kt. So long as U.S. military plans anticipate the use of ground forces, small tactical weapons would seem to be required and there is in this area a large field not yet explored.

Dr. Killian said he would be reluctant to forego tests below the threshold, and in this connection, he read the following sections from a staff paper incorporated as ANNEX 3 of the Third Report of the Working Group.

This problem could be resolved directly by permitting continued “safeguarded” testing below 1 kt or 2 kt by all nations. One method of “safeguarding” such testing would be to have Commission representatives make yield determinations of each test to determine that it was in fact below the permitted threshold. If the Commission retained the right of inspection which was not limited to a particular minimum yield, there would be little incentive to conduct clandestine tests below the threshold of the system. The incorporation of this concept in a test cessation agreement would have the following advantages:

1. It would close a significant loophole in the proposed system which could be exploited much more easily in the USSR than the US.

2. It would maintain the concept of fully “inspected” agreements.

3. It would permit the US to continue small-yield weapon developments which are of particular interest to the US for limited war and defense applications. The US is now probably in a period of more rapid development in this field than the USSR.

4. It would tend to establish a differentiation between small-yield nuclear weapons for tactical purposes as opposed to large-yield nuclear weapons for mass destruction.

5. It would make the overall system more workable by greatly reducing the number of inspections required to give an acceptable level of confidence in the capabilities of the system below 5 kt.

Mr. Quarles said he preferred the position mentioned in the staff paper but in his previous comments stated his preference on the basis of the Secretary’s proposal as outlined by Mr. Herter. At this point Mr. Herter was called to another meeting.

Mr. Farley said that the Secretary’s position was simply that he did not want to go into the negotiations appearing to add to the two conditions in the President’s statement of August 22 a third condition as to the size of explosions which would be suspended. This question could better be handled at a later stage of the negotiations on the basis of the extent of inspection the Soviets were willing to accept.

Mr. Farley raised the question of whether an authoritative study had been made on the military value of tests in the various ranges below 5 kt.

Mr. Quarles said he had heard no disagreement on technical grounds to the position that if one side tests below 5 kt and the other side doesn’t, a significant military advantage would be lost. He said he believed the first proposition of the U.S. position should be that we should not agree to stop tests we can’t monitor, that we would agree to stop those above the threshold of reliable detection. As a second proposition we should say that if the Soviets would stop tests below the threshold on a unilateral basis, we would do likewise.

Mr. Farley said he believed this position was reconcilable with the one he had expressed. We should try to define capabilities of any system under discussion and thus we might find a common interest with the Soviets in eliminating smaller tests than the system could cover within practical limits.

Mr. McCone said we may find that the system can be improved with experience and that the testing limit could then be progressively lowered as the threshold of reliable detection was lowered.

Ambassador Wadsworth said he understood it would be the consensus that we would not go into the negotiations with the threshold as a prominent feature of our position and that we would not have to put a hard and fast threshold into the treaty itself.

Mr. Quarles said we say, depending upon circumstances, want to put the threshold in the treaty.

Ambassador Wadsworth asked how you would write it in since, as Mr. McCone stated, the system might evolve in capabilities. Mr. Quarles said one might define the stations and locations and define the capability of the system described, for example, as 90% above 5 kt.

Dr. Killian asked what would then be written in as to tests below 5 kt. Mr. Quarles said this might be handled by unilateral statements and kept out of the agreement.

Mr. Farley said we could now attempt to work out a draft position on this point on the basis of the discussion. He suggested that we proceed to the question of how the conditions in the President’s August 22 statement might be dealt with in the treaty. He thought there would be no negotiating problem in writing in the first condition, that is, satisfactory installation and operation of the control system. We would need, however, to discuss tactical variations in dealing with the second condition of progress in disarmament.

Mr. Quarles said that an enforceable agreement on testing separate from other disarmament measures in the view of the Department of Defense, would be to our national disadvantage. Defense feels that a minimum condition beyond the test suspension would be satisfactory progress toward limitation of armaments and particularly the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We could from a legal standpoint handle this by an annual renewal clause alone; but failure to renew would carry such an onus from a political standpoint that we would be unlikely to do it. For this reason he would like to see the treaty bear on the face of it a requirement for progress in disarmament, at least as a starting position in negotiations.

Mr. Farley said that he agreed this should be done as a starting position. However, to deal with the Soviet position on a permanent cessation it would probably be necessary be define our requirements for progress on disarmament. The question is only one of not having such rigidity in these requirements as to give the Soviets an advantage.

Mr. Gray said that a treaty which failed to mention the disarmament condition would be a departure from national policy; and would in effect be a separate test agreement.

Mr. McCone said that the more specifics there were in the treaty as to progress required the more defensible our position will be if we find it necessary to walk away from it. Specific conditions would also improve our position with Congress and with many elements of public opinion. Moreover, a tie to disarmament stated in the treaty would facilitate progress in disarmament.

Mr. Farley raised the question of who would decide when progress toward objectives defined in the treaty was substantial: would it be the Control Commission? If not, we would be back to a unilateral determination by each party.

Mr. McCone said that we should search for language that would define necessary progress as far as possible.

Returning to the threshold question, Mr. Brent asked if we should go into the negotiations seeking the lowest possible threshold.

Mr. Farley raised the question whether military interests suggest a desirable threshold or whether the threshold should be determined solely on the basis of inspection capabilities of the agreed system.

Mr. McCone said that we could not approach the problem on the basis of what level was to our advantage, since we could not have our cake and eat it on the threshold problem. We would not, however, want to approach it in a way which would give an important advantage to our adversary. If a system could be implemented on a 1 kt level, we should accept it. The area between 1 and 5 kt is of considerable military importance but we should not make an effort in the negotiations to reserve that area, since inspection capabilities can be brought below it.

Mr. Irwin said that he agreed.

General Starbird said that from a technical standpoint there would be a tremendous advantage in having a 1 kt exception, that there would be some additional advantage in an exception up to 5, but it was not a situation in which a 5 kt exception would be twice as good as 2 kt. The exception was progressively of less advantage as you move up the scale.

Mr. Irwin said the threshold should be as low as practicable in order to introduce as much inspection as possible in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Killian agreed, and said this was true also because we have at present a military advantage in the lower ranges.

Mr. Gray asked whether the improvement in the inspection to which Mr. McCone had referred would result in opening up the Soviet Union more. Mr. Keeny said that improvement in the system would, on the one hand, detect more events which might then be inspected but on the other hand, it would identify more events on the basis of instruments alone and thus reduce the need for on-site inspection.

Mr. Gray asked whether the threshold question applied to tests in outer space or at high altitudes. Mr. Farley said that a special study group was at work on this problem.

Mr. Keeny said that preliminary studies indicated that these would be good down to 1 kt at several hundred thousand kilometers and that a detailed report on this subject was scheduled for completion next week.

Mr. Gray emphasized the need for early decisions and it was agreed that the group should reconvene at the earliest possible time.

1. Source: Terms of reference for surprise attack delegation, nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.