Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

383. Memorandum From Minshull to Killian¹

Washington, September 23, 1958

SUBJECT

• Policy Decision re Terms of Reference for Surprise Attack Delegation

On Thursday, 25 September 1958, you are tentatively scheduled to attend a meeting with Secretary Dulles and Secretary McElroy to discuss the Terms of Reference for the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming surprise attack discussions in Geneva. The major question to be resolved at this meeting is whether the U.S. delegation will be instructed to discuss only the techniques and value of inspection per se, or whether they will also be allowed to consider limitations on force readiness as well as disposition and level of force as methods to safeguard against surprise attack.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken a formal position on this matter, contending that the discussions must be limited to inspection per se. They argue that limitations or controls on readiness, disposition and level of force are problems of disarmament, a topic not under consideration at these meetings. In this regard it is interesting to note that although Mr. Quarles forwarded the JCS position on this matter to the Secretary of State on August 30th, he did not specifically endorse the JCS views as the position of the Defense Department.

The State Department, on the other hand, has taken the view—as did the Interagency Working Group—that it is also necessary to consider the effect of arms limitation or control in discussing safeguards against surprise attack if the meeting is to yield useful results.

The means for bringing this basic policy difference to the attention of yourself and the two Secretaries is a draft of the proposed Terms of Reference for the November Conference (Attachment A). This document was prepared by the State Department (after informal and private consultation with this office) and was the subject of a meeting of staff personnel from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, CIA and this office on September 19th. At this meeting the participants came to general agreement on the contents of the draft with one exception: the Defense Department representatives (Lt. Gen. Byers and Col. Rhea of ISA) insisted that Items III.C, IV.B.3, and IV.B.4 of the proposed agenda be deleted. (All of these items are on page 5 of the attached document and are starred in red.) However, the State Department representatives (Ambassador Holmes, Phillip Farley and Lawrence Weiler) insisted with equal determination that these items were essential to a productive discussion of the surprise attack problem.

In attempting to resolve this major policy difference, two points are particularly pertinent:

(1) The U.S. National Security Policy² clearly states that this country should seek with particular urgency an international system for inspection and regulation of armed forces and armaments. The NSC policy also states, almost parenthetically, that an inspection system within the Soviet Union assumes, in and of itself, significance to the U.S. security because of its intelligence value. Unfortunately, the JCS would like to recognize only the latter statement of U.S. policy as a basis for the forthcoming Geneva discussions. (Gen. Byers argued persistently during the staff level review of the Terms of Reference to have the entire statement of National Security Policy deleted, and was finally voted down by all others present at the meeting.)

(2) The Report of the Interagency Working Group on Surprise Attack should also be considered in resolving this major policy difference. This report concluded that the Geneva discussions must consider limited arms control in order to deal effectively with the surprise attack problem. Specifically, comments on this matter are contained in paragraphs B 1 and B 2 (pages 6 and 7 of Document No. K–TS–2509) of this report, and it states in part:

“Our examination of the appendicies leads us to the view that a major reduction of the threat of massive surprise attack cannot be achieved by observation and reporting alone. Limitations on the disposition and readiness of forces, or on size and type of forces, appears to be necessary to create more effective safeguards against the possibility of massive surprise attack. It is unlikely that the October talks can deal effectively with the threat of surprise attack unless they are extended beyond discussion of inspection and related limited measures. . . .”

This report was prepared by Richard M. Bissell, Phillip J. Farley, John N. Irwin, II, General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, Gerard C. Smith, J. R. Zacharias, and G. B. Kistiakowsky, Chairman.

Although JCS has not to my knowledge made a formal defense of their position which precludes the discussion of any matter relating to disarmament, there are certain arguments that keep re-appearing in private conversations with military personnel on this matter. They run something like this:

This country depends upon great strength in a few types of weapons to deter the over-all more diversified military threat of the Soviet Union. Thus, US–USSR bilateral arms control of a few weapon types (or to be more specific, manned bombers and ICBM’s) would leave this country at a severe military disadvantage. Furthermore, if this country discusses controls on individual weapon systems with the Soviets at Geneva, we are likely to be drawn into such an agreement by Soviet propaganda and public opinion. If such an unfavorable agreement were to materialize, the situation would probably become even more serious since Congress, as a result of a false sense of security, would probably reduce military funding.

If one tries to counter such an argument by stating that the forthcoming talks are only technical discussions, and that any actual agreement would be realized in later political negotiations where this country would pursue disarmament on a comprehensive basis, they answer: This is the same story that was given to us on technical test cessation discussions! They continue by noting that our policy prior to the Geneva test cessation talks stated that we would entertain test cessation only as part of a comprehensive program that included a monitoring system, the control of fissionable material and the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. They then point out that because of the “technical success” at Geneva and as a result of world opinion and Soviet propaganda, we have now been forced into a test cessation yet we do not even have an inspection system to monitor it.

I feel that the JCS are sufficiently dogmatic in their position on this subject that they are likely to exercise their prerogative to take this basic policy decision to the President. In the light of this possibility, I wonder if it would be advisable to invite Gordon Gray to the meeting on the 25th so that he may be apprised of the situation at the earliest possible date.

Over and above the major policy question that needs to be resolved, there are three other minor points that you may wish to bring up for discussion. The first involves the identification of “space vehicles” as instruments of surprise attack. Inasmuch as this country does not have such an exotic weapon capability, it does not seem reasonable to discuss an inspection system for space vehicles at the Geneva meeting. The technical discussions should point out, however, that modifications of the inspection system may be necessary as weapon technology changes.

The second item involves the wording of the footnote on page 3 of the attached document. I believe the footnote should read: “At this point, it is not essential that agreement be reached among the two delegations as to the objects of control as long as the ability to discuss the objects of control of interest to both delegations is assured.”

The third point is a suggested change in wording for agenda item II.4. I believe it should read: “Acoustic and infra-red detection techniques” rather than “Acoustic and infra-red detection, rocket launchings.”

W.H. Minshull, Jr.

1. Source: Outlines JCS view that readiness, disposition, and level of forces not be included in Surprise Attack talks. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.
2. NSC 5801/1, Paragraph 40, dated 5 May 1958 and quoted on page 1 of the attached document. [Footnote is in the original.]