379. Memorandum From Cumming (INR) to John Foster Dulles1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note—Khrushchev Statement on Nuclear Test Suspension
Khrushchev’s “interview” in today’s Pravda (attached) constitutes the first official Soviet response to the Western proposals of August 22 for negotiations on nuclear test suspension. Presumably a note forwarding Khrushchev’s statement, or recapitulating its main points, will shortly be received in formal reply to our note of August 22.
Khrushchev accepts the date of October 31 for the beginning of negotiations and apparently also the participation of only the three powers (United States, Britain, Soviet Union) suggested by the West, although the latter point remains to be clarified. But he stipulates what in the Soviet view must be “the purpose” of the negotiations: the conclusion of an agreement to end “for all time” tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons “of all kinds” and “by all states.” References to “all” or “any” kinds of weapons and to “all states” or to a “universal ban” have been standard in Soviet statements since May, when the USSR agreed to [Typeset Page 1442] hold technical talks on controls, and appear designed to cover France. Communist China would presumably also be affected.
Insistence on a cessation “for all time” would represent a change from last year’s Soviet negotiating position which provided for a suspension of “two or three years.” It also implies rejection of the Western view that each yearly extension of a test suspension would depend on the effective operation of an inspection system and satisfactory progress toward major and substantial disarmament measures. Khrushchev states explicitly that “we cannot agree” with these Western “reservations and conditions”, claiming that (1) controls can be easily established and (2) that the West itself has been responsible for failure to agree on disarmament measures and therefore advances the condition of “satisfactory progress” as a means of sabotaging a suspension of tests. (These points had also been made in Soviet propaganda reaction since August 22.)
It remains to be seen whether Moscow will insist on Western acceptance of the Soviet concept of the “purposes” of negotiations as a pre-condition to the actual beginning of negotiations. It will be recalled that Moscow sought Western agreement to a similar set of “purposes” prior to the Geneva [Facsimile Page 2] technical talks but sent its delegation despite Western failure to comply. At the same time, it has long been the Soviet position that a test ban must be “unconditional” and independent from other disarmament measures and Moscow can be expected to maintain this position in negotiations. Khrushchev’s suggestion in Pravda that the USSR will seek United Nations approval of a test ban at the 13th General Assembly and his demand that negotiations last only two or three weeks indicate his intention of generating maximum pressure on the West to agree to a “simple” test ban.
Khrushchev’s other major point was the statement that continued Western testing “relieve the USSR of the obligation it had assumed unilaterally” regarding a suspension of tests. The Supreme Soviet decision of March 31 and several statements by Khrushchev and Gromyko had provided for such a move and strengthen the view that, knowing the United States had scheduled a series of tests during the summer, Moscow was exploiting a normal interval between Soviet tests for political purposes. August and the autumn months have traditionally been a Soviet testing season. Khrushchev did not state explicitly whether the USSR actually intends to resume testing; nor did he indicate whether Moscow would join the United States and Britain in suspending tests for one year once negotiations begin. Khrushchev’s acceptance of the October 31 date for the opening of talks, despite earlier Soviet propaganda complaints that this date was too late, suggests an intention to conduct tests in the interim. In such an eventuality Moscow would apparently calculate that world opinion can be persuaded that the USSR is entitled [Typeset Page 1443] to further tests in order not to be left at a disadvantage by intensive Western testing this summer. It may also estimate that popular anxieties concerning the effects of testing would be further stimulated in this way and that hence pressures on the West to accept Soviet terms for immediate and permanent cessation would mount.
Khrushchev did not deal with the question of “peaceful” nuclear explosions. There has been only one Soviet comment since August 22 criticizing the Western position on this point. The reference to ending tests of nuclear weapons of all kinds would appear to leave the Soviet position flexible.
In sum, the USSR appears ready to undertake negotiations with the West but appears intent by diplomatic means, through popular pressure and UN action to put the West under maximum pressure to meet Soviet terms in such negotiations.
A similar memorandum has been prepared for the Under Secretary.
- Source: Intelligence Note: Khrushchev Statement on Nuclear Test Suspension. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/8–3058.↩