Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

375. Telegram Secto 13 From John Foster Dulles at USUN¹

New York, August 21, 1958, 4 p.m.

Secto 13. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. You may find it useful to have my views on the importance of the inclusion in our proposed draft statement on nuclear testing of the sentence: “The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests”.

I do not believe that any agreement to suspend the “testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons” should deny to mankind, perhaps forever, the possibility of using this vast new power for human betterment as in creating new harbors and waterways, making available underground sources of water, oil, minerals, etc. To attempt this would be to fly in the face of all human experience.

There may or may not be a mechanistic difference between the devices which are used for military purposes and the devices used for peaceful purposes. Surely there is an immense difference in the motivation. I believe that that difference in motivation justifies a distinction, although I recognize that there may be difficulty in implementing this criterion in a suspension agreement. Nevertheless it must, in my opinion, be attempted. Also I believe that during the period of self-denying and unsupervised suspension, we should be allowed in good faith to exercise our own judgment as to whether the motivation of a nuclear explosion by us is militaristic or peaceful. I believe that the statement referred to is important because it recognizes that there is a distinction between the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and for the purpose of testing weapons.

Once a distinction is pointed out and so long as our voluntary denial is limited only to weapons, then I believe that we can in good faith conduct explosions for purposes which are demonstrably peaceful and economic.

I realize that this creates a possible loophole for the Soviets during the one-year period. I understand, however, that it is the judgment of those who work in this field that they would rather take this chance than to forego the peaceful uses, and I, myself, would concur in this conclusion.

I should emphasize again my thought that this whole statement is designed as a public document which we hope will contribute to our prestige and influence in world opinion. It must therefore, in my view, be as simple as possible as to what we will and will not do in broad terms: It should not, as a policy document, set out all the complexities and considerations to be taken into account in giving effect to, or in negotiating, our basic position.

Dulles

1. Source: Transmits Dulles’ views on draft statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700/5611/8–2158.