368. Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower1
My dear Friend,
I promised a second message on the political considerations about the statement which you are thinking of making when the report of the Geneva Conference appears.
I fully agree that we must make some public response to that report but I doubt whether it justifies us in going as fast as you propose in the draft statement which Foster gave to Selwyn in New York. It is true that the report will demonstrate the theoretical possibility of controlling a suspension of tests, and we ought to welcome it on that account. But we cannot yet say that we can see our way through the practical difficulties of putting this theoretical system into operation.
There is an enormous prize to win. Both you and I have always felt that through the Geneva Meeting we might move towards the establishment on Soviet territory of some system of international control. Even though that system might be unsatisfactory and inefficient, it would at least have gained us a foothold which we could exploit. If we [Typeset Page 1429] now suspend all tests, the Russians may well think that they have got substantially what they want without having to pay any price for it. What I mean by this is that they might refuse to agree to any [Facsimile Page 2] genuine international control, calculating that the West would never be able to resume the tests which they had voluntarily suspended.
If we felt that we must make some forward move on tests at the present time, I would much prefer to see it limited to those tests which we know can be detected by existing national systems—say, everything above 25 kilotons. A proposal on those lines would be consistent with our past insistence on linking suspension to control and would also go a long way to meeting public criticism of tests on grounds of injury to health, since it would eliminate all tests which release fission products into the stratosphere.
A limited suspension of this kind would also make things much easier for the French. I am seriously troubled about their attitude. I feel that after all our difficulties with de Gaulle over recent events, while he is still suspicious of our intentions towards him, it would be a serious mistake to force the French Government into a position of dissociating itself from our proposals. The trouble which we are having with them already at Geneva shows how suspicious they are on this question. We really must consult them fully and give them time to come to a conclusion. But de Gaulle will be in Africa for at least a week from now. I do [Facsimile Page 3] feel strongly that the whole economic future of Europe, and perhaps its political future too, may be jeopardized if we allow the French to feel isolated or roughly treated over this question.
For myself, I should much prefer that any statement we may agree to make on future policy in relation to nuclear tests should be related, not to the end of the Geneva Conference, but to the opening of the General Assembly. We shall all be under acute pressure there to make some forward move with a view to getting the maximum benefit from it in the Assembly. If we play this card sooner we shall be bound to be asked for more when the Assembly meets.
Finally, I ought to tell you that the test series which we have just announced will not in fact be completed, at earliest, until the middle of October.
May I ask you, my dear Friend, to take these points into account. They seem to me to merit serious consideration. This is a very important decision. I agree with you absolutely as to your purpose, but I am anxious that we should make no mistake as to method and timing.
With warm regards,
Yours ever,
- Source: Urges postponement of statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.↩