36. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower1
I have read the draft you sent me of your proposed speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and make these comments: It seems to me to be unnecessarily somber. After all, quite a lot of your “Chance for Peace’’ aspirations have been realized.
There is the Korean Armistice. There is an Indochina Armistice. There is an Austrian State Treaty. There is an International Atomic Energy Agency. There is great progress in the development of a “European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, [Typeset Page 126] trade, and of ideas.” There was achieved at Geneva at least an agreement for the reunification of Germany by free elections—although the Soviets have now repudiated it.
The “Chance for Peace” has been greatly increased by the apparent abandonment by the Soviet leaders of methods of violence such as were used in the prewar and postwar period up to 1953. The shift to political-economic offensives is, of course, highly dangerous, but it does bring an enhanced “chance for peace”. There has been a definite evolution within the Soviet Union toward greater personal security, increased intellectual freedom and increased decentralization. This also increases the chances of peace.
As you said in Paris, “There is a noble strategy of victory—not a victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples”.
I devoutly believe in the truth of this, and that you are carrying out that strategy. The principal aspect of your April 1953 speech which has not been realized is the limitation of armament and any permanent reduction of the costs of armament. I do not think, however, that it is necessary to be despairing even as to this. I am not particularly confident of evolving any complicated, formal agreement with the Soviets, but I think that there could be perhaps parallel unilateral acts which would slow down the pace consistently with our safety.
[Facsimile Page 2]It does seem to me our security does not require us to develop every military potential, but to have sufficient to deter attack. I think in this respect we have some margin on which to operate, at least experimentally, as a challenge to the Soviets.
I am not sure but what you might not make a major point in this respect. I suspect that it might draw a positive response from the Russians if only because they must be even more burdened than we by the cost of modern weapons.
As you know, I am somewhat skeptical as to whether the proposal for the reception—or exchange of students—will make a big hit. But I certainly see no harm in trying. I do, however, suggest that attribution to democracies of “peacefulness” is perhaps not fully justified by the facts, e.g., Suez, and its statement implies that the purpose of the student exchange is not merely to import understanding but to subvert the Soviet form of government so as to make it more “democratic” and thus more peace-loving.
I would have a number of detailed suggestions, but perhaps it is not worth while to put them forward at this time in connection with this particular draft.
Faithfully yours,
- Source: Comments on draft speech. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Exchange.↩