Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

359. Draft Presidential Statement¹

Washington, August 18, 1958

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AT TIME OF RELEASE OF REPORT OF GENEVA MEETING ON NUCLEAR TESTS

We welcome the successful conclusion of the Geneva discussions on technical requirements for monitoring testing agreements. The substantial agreement which has been reached on the technical aspects of this problem is cause for encouragement that disarmament negotiations can be fruitfully resumed. Since effective inspection is an essential element of any meaningful disarmament agreement, progress toward disarmament measures should be facilitated by this agreement of experts as to the technical requirements of a nuclear test monitoring system.

Important questions remain to be resolved before such a test monitoring system can be established. These include the organization of the control system and its relationship to the United Nations and national governments, the implementation of staffing, and on-the-spot inspection, and the participation of the authorities on whose territories control posts should be located. We stand ready to join in negotiations on these questions. We hope that such negotiations can be speedily commenced and carried through to a successful conclusion.

We have constantly pointed out during the course of recent disarmament negotiations that a suspension of nuclear tests in itself will not end the present arms build-up or the ability of the nuclear powers to wage devastating war. The heart of the nuclear armament problem is the tremendous destructive power now at the disposal of both sides, together with the means of delivering this destructive power. Unless the production of additional fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons is halted, and a gradual equitable reduction of present armaments is begun, the threat of mutual nuclear destruction will continue to mount. For these reasons we have urged that action should be taken simultaneously on nuclear testing, nuclear weapons manufacture, and other major arms control steps.

There is the possibility that mutually monitored of tests suspension might be a first step which would make it possible to reach other and more substantial agreements relating to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to other essential phases of disarmament. We are encouraged also by the statements of Soviet leaders indicating that a nuclear testing agreement might be an important first step toward halting the arms race and toward agreements in other areas of disarmament.

The United States is prepared to join with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, in negotiating an agreement for an effectively inspected cessation of nuclear tests. There could be drawn in on an ad hoc basis others who would assume obligations under the agreement, including those having authority over areas within which control posts are to be established in accordance with phased arrangements. The progress and results of these negotiations might be duly reported to the United Nations and its organs with disarmament responsibilities, through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

For our part we are prepared, unless testing is resumed by the U.S.S.R. or the U.K., to withhold further testing of nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958, while agreement is being reached both as to the terms of the cessation and the detailed arrangements for inspection. Further, if agreement on the terms of an effectively inspected cessation of nuclear tests can be achieved, we are prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year of extension that satisfactory progress is being made (a) in installing and operating the agreed inspection system, and (b) in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures.

1. Source: For release after successful conclusion of Geneva talks on detection of nuclear tests. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.