357. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Testing (U)
1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 15 August 1958, which enclosed a copy of the Department of State’s draft proposal on the revision of the U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament, and an alternate proposal prepared by the Department of Defense.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the two proposals, in the light of their memoranda to you of 13 March 1958 and 30 April 1958. They wish to re-emphasize and reaffirm their views expressed in their previous memoranda to you on this subject, that a nuclear test suspension or cessation should not be agreed to apart from a larger disarmament proposal which would include the termination of the production of nuclear weapons and weapons material. They consider that an essential prerequisite to any agreement to test suspension or cessation is an operational inspection and monitoring system in being. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that, in the foreseeable international political situation, any agreement to suspend nuclear testing would be tantamount to a permanent cessation, and that any escape clause that would seem to permit the resumption of testing would probably be ineffective in the light of world opinions, even if the United States was satisfied that the Soviet Union was not abiding by the agreement.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the present military position of the United States, in the light of recent world developments, fully justifies a continuing requirement for nuclear testing. The results at HARDTACK demonstrate the absolute necessity of testing weapons both from the standpoint of furthering development and also from the standpoint of proof-testing prior to stockpiling. [text not declassified] [Facsimile Page 2] This is but one example of the need for testing in the development of warheads for new applications. In the area of weapon effects, additional data concerning the optimum kill mechanism for AICBM’s are required. Also, experiments concerning new and important high altitude phenomena were conducted for the first time at HARDTACK and are only in the exploratory stage. It is increasingly clear that in the national interest nuclear testing must continue. Without testing, the inevitable result must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present weapons systems. In addition, cessation of testing would preclude the [Typeset Page 1417] introduction of essential new weapon systems requiring new warheads and lead to the stockpiling of unproven weapons.
4. Nothing that has taken place in the recent past has, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, been cause for a basic change in the military factors which influenced the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in earlier memoranda. Rather, a strong adherence to the present United States position on the subject of Nuclear Testing seems plainly indicated. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you convey the views expressed in this memorandum to the President.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Source: Conveys negative JCS views on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Nuclear Testing.↩