Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

355. Memorandum From Keeny to Goodpaster¹

Washington, August 15, 1958

Attached for your information are three documents on the Nuclear Test Cessation problem. Dr. Killian thought that you might find them useful as background for the Monday afternoon meeting with the President on this subject.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology

POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED BY DISCUSSION OF TEST CESSATION OR LIMITATION

In weighing the pros and cons of some form of test cessation announcement or agreement, it seems desirable first to examine certain questions of basic national policy. The decisions with respect to these matters of national policy may be conclusive in determining whether we depart from our present policy of testing, and if so in what way. Some of the policy questions involved are:

1. If the NSC policy on disarmament seems to be unachievable, is the U.S. prepared to seek some partial solution in an effort to ease world tensions?

a. Should the nuclear provisions of our present disarmament policy (test suspension and cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons production) be made separable from the other elements of the disarmament package?

b. Should the suspension of nuclear testing remain linked, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off of weapon materials production?

c. Present policy states that the acceptability of any international system for the regulation of armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions. What degree of reliability of detection is required for a “safeguarded” system for the detection of nuclear tests?

d. What should U.S. policy be toward agreement on suspension vs. limitation of nuclear testing: (1) “complete suspension” of nuclear testing (although there would not be a good probability of identifying underground tests of less than 5 kilotons); (2) cessation of all testing except for devices of very few kilotons’ yield below the limit specified by the monitoring agreement, such tests to be conducted without radioactive fallout; (3) cessation of such nuclear testing that can be satisfactorily monitored by the agreed system, contingent on progress for the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons; or (4) a restricted testing agreement limiting the amount of annual offsite fission fallout or banning offsite fallout.

2. Would a nuclear test cessation operate to the net disadvantage of the U.S. considering its military, political and economic implications? Is it to U.S. advantage to seek to hold at present levels the nuclear weapons capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR; or should the U.S. strive to achieve every possible military advance and refinement in nuclear weapons while the USSR does the same?

3. Is the U.S. willing to accept political arrangements necessary to extend the nuclear test detection and identification system to Red China?

4. Are we willing to accept an international inspection system in the U.S.? Are there constitutional questions?

5. Is it our conviction that a sound and adequate inspection system would be of advantage to the U.S. by bringing about a massive penetration of the iron curtain and subsequent benefit in intelligence and exchange of information?

6. What should be U.S. policy with respect to the international means required for monitoring a nuclear test cessation agreement, including organization and personnel?

7. Should the U.S. “seek to prevent the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons capabilities” by means of a nuclear test suspension agreement?

8. Should the U.S. agree to abide by a test ban prior to the installation and operation of an adequate detection system?

9. Should our policy anticipate Soviet acceptance of the inspection concepts agreed at Geneva and seek to make it difficult for the Soviets either to resume nuclear weapons testing or to derive world-wide acclaim for unilaterally practicing a test ban?

10. Is it a national U.S. policy objective to seek now to diminish world-wide fears about the hazards of radioactive fallout and to take action which will reassure those who hold these fears?

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology

PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR A TEST CESSATION

1. Military Security of the USA: Relative Position vs. the USSR

Test cessation now or in the near future would be to the military advantage of the U.S. At the conclusion of the Hardtack tests, the U.S. will possess a tested series of nuclear warhead prototypes covering a very wide range of application, and probably with superior performance in all categories compared to the USSR. While it is evident that continued U.S. tests would increase U.S. nuclear weapons strength in an absolute sense, further tests will not increase our relative strength, and may even decrease it in the light of rapid Russian advances and the increasing maturity of nuclear weapons technology on both sides.

[text not declassified] According to intelligence estimates, USSR does not have a warhead in this weight class and is, therefore, restricted to very much larger ICBM’s and may encounter difficulties developing a submarine-launched IRBM.

Similarly, there is no evidence that the Soviets possess tactical weapons of small size and yield comparable to those possessed by the U.S. Evidence on the Soviet test program indicates that it has not followed the most promising avenue for the development of weapons of small size and good yield.

If one looks back over the history of U.S. and Soviet weapons development, one has to conclude that a test cessation at an earlier date would have left the U.S. in a position of much greater relative military advantage. It is likely that the Soviet Union will continue to progress more rapidly than the U.S. and will approach the capability of the U.S. in nuclear warheads if testing is continued.

2. Military Security: Actual Requirements

a. The Hardtack test series has been very successful and has met essentially all important military requirements. [text not declassified]

b. In defending the U.S. against attack, particularly a ballistic missile attack, the major technological problems are not in the area of nuclear weapon development, but in the non-nuclear aspects of these defensive weapons—particularly electronics. If we can solve the electronics problems of these weapons systems, we can construct effective systems around nuclear weapons available after the Hardtack tests. In the case of ballistic missiles, while an increase in yields would be useful, we could gain much more by the improvement of guidance and thereby accuracy of delivery.

c. Although we do not now have small-yield “clean” weapons which unquestionably would have tactical applications, there are now available conventional weapons or air-burst fission weapons to accomplish equivalent objectives. It is also significant that radioactivity induced by “clean” weapons in ground burst is substantial and may produce radioactivity equivalent to 20% of fission yield.

3. Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Tests

There appears to be little question that it is technically possible to design a control system to monitor a test cessation agreement. The current Geneva Conference will probably result in agreed-upon conclusions concerning a control system which can effectively detect and identify nuclear explosions of between one and two kilotons and above in the atmosphere and above five kilotons underground and which would have at least deterrent value for lower yields. In addition, recent theoretical calculations have indicated that it is considerably more difficult to hide underground weapons tests by reducing the coupling to seismic waves than had previously been believed.

4. Test Cessation is an Important Step in Disarmament

A test cessation would be an important step in easing world tensions. It would create an atmosphere in which further disarmament missions which are considered more important from our point of view could more easily be negotiated. We must start somewhere seeking ways to slow down this armaments race and it is unrealistic to expect the early achievement of over-all disarmament agreements. It will be easier to reach agreement on a small problem, like test cessation, than on a large one, like prevention of surprise attack. Unless we reach agreement on this small problem, we cannot expect to be successful in concluding agreements on the larger problems.

The Geneva Conference will probably result in agreement that both control posts and the right of rapid, unimpeded inspection are required in an effective control system. The Soviets have also agreed to limited overflight of the USSR in case there is suspicion of nuclear explosion on its territory. Even though these concepts will require clarification in a political agreement, they constitute a precedent for the acceptance of inspection by the Soviet Union.

5. Nuclear Disarmament

U.S. policy calls for a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapons as a second step in nuclear disarmament. A test cessation agreement could be tied to a future agreement on the cut-off of production. It will be our choice whether we wish to proceed further in nuclear disarmament.

6. International Relations

a. General—The position of the United States in the society of nations will deteriorate if we continue testing. We will increasingly be considered as warlike and as obsessed with aggressive military objectives, while the Soviets will seek to gain support as a nation with peaceful objectives.

We are now engaged in a technical discussion with the Soviets to determine if an agreed-upon system of effective inspection of nuclear explosions can be achieved and the make-up and capability of such a system. If there are agreed-upon conclusions upon the control of test cessation and if the U.S. then fails to seek a test cessation agreement, it may well subject us to world-wide criticism for bad faith, even though we carefully stated before the start of the Geneva talks that such talks did not commit us to any policy with respect to cessation.

b. Fallout–Even though the actual radiation hazards from fallout from nuclear tests may be relatively small, the uncertainties and warnings that have been expressed by scientists on radiation hazards have caused fear and apprehension throughout the world and a strong emotional opposition to testing. We cannot ignore or escape this growing world apprehension and/or escape damage to our position in the world which will result from our disregard of worldwide fears.

7. Peaceful Applications

If peaceful application tests are excluded by the test cessation agreement, it may be possible to re-introduce tests for peaceful application, after the issue of tests has lost its present controversial nature. Such a delay would be acceptable since these applications are of small importance compared with the stopping of the armaments race.

1. Source: Forwards three papers on nuclear test cessation. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.