Office of the Historian

342. Telegram Denuc 103 From Geneva1

Geneva, , July 25, 1958, 4 p.m.
[Facsimile Page 1]

Denuc 103. For Secretary and Killian from Fisk.

I believe that evidence is accumulating rapidly here that the Russians want this conference to succeed, that they want an agreement on nuclear test cessation, that they want it soon, and that they are making and will make concessions to get it.

For example:

1)
After first three days of sharp attack involving political issue, namely “purpose” of conference, the subject was dropped and has not been mentioned since.
2)
Concessions were made by them on acoustic conclusions.
3)
Conclusions on radioactive debris collection contained three significant concessions: [Typeset Page 1392]
  • Use of any aircraft,
  • Use of aircraft over national territories and
  • Acceptance of non-political wording.
4)
Recognition and acceptance of “inspection” in seismic conclusions.
5)
Lengthy, informal discussion of inspection in connection with proper place in the agenda has committed them farther than we believed they were prepared to go.
6)
While there is pressure to complete work, there has been no recent reference to three or four weeks—or any other time limit.
7)
General tone of meetings has been better; no further political hassles re communiques, etc.
8)
In every important case they have accepted the major elements of our position, moving appreciably from their original position.
9)
Their participation, whereas generally emphasizing theory rather than experimental data, has been on a high scientific plane.

We have reported earlier evidence of their concern re 4th power problem. Observations above may be interpreted as related primarily to this problem, but we believe they may have much deeper implications. On the assumption that my estimate is correct and that we do reach satisfactory understandings here with the USSR, the pressures will be intense to make the political decisions on what the next steps will be. I suggest that this issue be carefully thought out in Washington so that the US can take the initiative shortly after conclusion of this conference, which may be only ten days or so away. Soviet propaganda will no doubt make immediate capital out of the fact that Soviet and Western scientists have reached agreement on detection and identification of tests.

The true political implications of this development are not for me to evaluate. It seems clear that there have been important revisions in Fedorov’s instructions during the course of the meeting and he is accepting points which I did not believe at the outset he would accept.

I have discussed these observations with Sir William Penney, who has similar views which he has communicated to the Foreign Office.

Villard
  1. Source: Soviet interest in agreement on nuclear test detection. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7–2558.↩