340. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Killian1
One of the most important aspects of disarmament negotiations is the question of measures to detect and discourage surprise attack. This aspect of disarmament is one on which the Soviet Union may be willing to enter into serious negotiations.
Several preliminary studies have been done for the Government in the past three years concerning inspection methods to be applied within any surprise attack zones. None of these, however, has adequately treated the problem of specific inspection and control systems designed to minimize the possibility of surprise attack, nor has any taken into account missiles capabilities. It would therefore be most helpful if the Science Advisory Committee could explore in a preliminary way some of the general facets of the surprise attack problem, with particular reference to its scientific and technical aspects.
What I have in mind is an examination of the ways of obtaining, through an international agreement, significant enhancement of early warning abilities and capability to detect preparations for a major surprise attack, as well as reduce the chances of accidental war, both in the current period and in subsequent years when strategic missiles would have been developed in large numbers. I should think that such study would endeavor to explore the question of just what are the critical areas of the Soviets’ military and industrial activities, from the point of view of providing advance warning of a surprise attack, and thus what would be the most important objects and means of inspection and control in any such inspection system.
In making this preliminary analysis you may wish to consider United States capabilities to detect a surprise attack that could be utilized to strengthen reliance on an agreed [Facsimile Page 2] international inspection system. You may also wish to comment on the extent to which an international inspection system could meet the problems of surprise attack detection which the Science Advisory Committee’s Technological Capabilities Panel raised in its February 14, 1955 report to the President, entitled “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack”.
On the basis of the above, I would hope that you could give a tentative evaluation of the degree of contributions to surprise attack [Typeset Page 1388] protection which the United States would receive from implementation of the various proposals for surprise attack inspection which have been presented in the disarmament negotiations and/or which were discussed in the Second Interim Report of the Working Group on Disarmament Policy, dated April 18, 1958.
If there are other measures which have not been considered in our past proposals, or measures requiring further study, which you conclude might form a basis for international agreement to lessen the chances of a successful surprise attack and/or lessen the danger of accidental war, I would appreciate your including them in your report.
Because of the Soviet proposal of July 2 that a conference of experts be convened to discuss the technical questions concerning surprise attack, and also because of the requirement that the United States be in a position to discuss these matters with our allies in the very near future, it would be most helpful if the preliminary report could be made available by July 31, or earlier if possible.
I am aware that in such a short period of time analysis and conclusions of the Science Advisory Committee might be useful in assuming the validity of some of our present proposals, advancing our preparations for possible technical discussions with the Soviets, and deciding on further studies needed for policy decisions.
Mr. Philip J. Farley and members of his staff will be available to assist you in any way you may wish in formulating and developing such a study.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Request for exploration of surprise attack issues. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology Files, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.↩