Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

334. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1958

SUBJECT

• Meeting with U.S. Experts for Geneva Technical Talks on Nuclear Test Detection

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. James B. Fisk
• Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence
• Dr. Robert Bacher
• Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
• The Secretary
• S/AE—Mr. Farley
• S/AE—Mr. Spiers

Dr. Fisk, who called at his request, introduced Drs. Lawrence and Bacher, who had been designated to serve as U.S. experts at the proposed Geneva technical talks on nuclear test detection, and outlined some of the preliminary work that the experts had been doing in preparation for the talks.

The Secretary emphasized to the group the importance which he and the President attached to the work the experts were to do in Geneva. He expressed gratification that men of their caliber were willing to undertake this assignment. He stressed also that he saw the group’s mission as being purely technical in character: the purpose of the meeting would not be to reach political conclusions or to determine whether a given system with a specific level of capability would be sufficient. These decisions would be reached in Washington, on a political level, but the work done by the scientists and their views on the technical issues involved would weigh heavily as considerations. We had no idea, of course, whether the USSR would approach the meeting with serious purpose, or whether they would be willing to accept the inspection which we thought, at minimum, was necessary. The Secretary did not feel that a technically perfect system would be necessary, and that a lesser system which created an unacceptable risk for the USSR in undertaking violations might be adequate.

Dr. Fisk gave the Secretary a copy of the draft outline of points to be covered in the talks (attached) which he hoped the Department of State would be willing to send to the USSR to put them on notice about the extent of our preparations and to increase the possibility of having the Soviet experts similarly prepared. In response to the Secretary’s questions, Mr. Farley said that he thought the suggested procedure was a good one.

Attachment

Draft Outline

June 9, 1958

Technical Factors Which our Delegation Considers Relevant to a Discussion of Monitoring a Nuclear Test Suspension

• I.
  • A. Detection and identification by techniques and procedures, including:
    • 1. Acoustic
    • 2. Seismic
    • 3. Electro-magnetic
    • 4. Nuclear (air samples, ground samples)
    • 5. Visible light (high alt.)
    • 6. Mobile inspection teams
  • B. In physical environments:
    • 1. On earth’s surface and at low altitudes
    • 2. At very high altitudes
    • 3. Underground, also underwater
  • C. For yields of:
    • 1. less than 1 KT
    • 2. 1 to 10 KT
    • 3. 10 to 100 KT
    • 4. above 100 KT
  • D. Carried out in locations including:
    • 1. USSR
    • 2. US (continental North America)
    • 3. Pacific and Australia
    • 4. Arctic and Antarctic
    • 5. Far East
    • 6. Southern Hemisphere oceans
    • 7. Africa and South America
• II. Some special questions to be considered:
  • A. Are there methods of evasion; e.g. can a 50 KT test (underground) be made to look like to 10 KT? 1 KT?
  • B. Possible interference with detection systems; e.g. introduction of excessive noise in seismic systems;
  • C. Need for additional information in such areas as:
    • i. Observed seismic effect vs yield in underground tests;
    • ii. Variations in seismic coupling between a nuclear explosion and various underground environments.

1. Source: Agenda for talks with Soviet Union. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6–658.