Office of the Historian

331. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 18, 1958
[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • Reply to Khrushchev Letter of May 9

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary of State,
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
  • Lord Hood, British Minister
  • John Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy
  • Foy D. Kohler, EUR
  • Philip Farley, S/AE

The British Ambassador called at the Secretary’s request at his home at 4:30 p.m.

The Secretary handed Sir Harold the revised draft reply to the Khrushchev letter of May 9. After reading the draft, with apparent approval, the Ambassador said he supposed we wanted it submitted to the British Government as rapidly as possible. The Secretary confirmed this, adding that he hoped we could receive their views tomorrow. The Secretary indicated that we were open-minded about including Canada in the draft. The Ambassador suggested that the draft be put up to the Canadians with their names specifically mentioned; they could then indicate what they wanted. In response to the Ambassador’s inquiry, the Secretary confirmed that we contemplated putting the letter to the French and the Canadians first, before submitting it to the North Atlantic Council.

The Ambassador observed that the words “at least partially” in the first paragraph met the British Government’s first point, and that the new formula removed the danger of affronting the French. In this connection he observed that it looked like it would be deGaulle anyway and that in France it would be said that we pushed the French into it. The Secretary said that in view of developments in France it would be too dangerous to appear to exclude the French at this time.

[Facsimile Page 2]

The Secretary went on to say that we recognize that the new formula involves some risks. We could expect that the Soviets would designate technicians from East Germany, Communist China, Hungary—indeed from practically every objectionable area from our point of view. He said, however, that he had discussed the problem with the President and we were disposed to accept such designations provided the individuals were competent experts.

In conclusion, Sir Harold commented that he thought the new formula was very good psychologically and that it would give us an advantage with public opinion, especially in the U.K. He said he would give the Secretary the British Government’s views as soon as possible.

  1. Source: Discussion of response to Khrushchev’s letter. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩