Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

328. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 15, 1958

SUBJECT

• Reply to Khrushchev letter of May 9 on Technical Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• Mr. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Kohler, EUR
• Mr. Farley, S/AE

The British Ambassador called at the Secretary’s request.

The Secretary handed the Ambassador copies of the proposed US reply to Khrushchev’s letter of May 9 agreeing to technical studies of the methods of detecting violations of a possible test cessation agreement.

After reading the draft letter Ambassador Caccia said that his government had two points of interest in the Khrushchev letter. First, they did not want to seem to be dragging their feet and thus give the Soviets a propaganda advantage. On the other hand they wanted to know what we would say and would like to get together with US experts before meeting with the Russians.

The Secretary referred to the discussion he had had on this subject with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at Copenhagen on May 6, 1958. He said that Selwyn Lloyd had thought perhaps a distinction could be made between testing of small bombs and those of a megaton or more. The Secretary had then suggested the possibility that the termination of atomic testing might be approached in two phases. Detection of megaton explosions would be relatively easy. Smaller weapons required more refined and elaborate methods of detection and this might be developed in the second phase. Thus there would be more time for the testing of smaller weapons. The Secretary said he had mentioned this idea to Dr. Killian whose preliminary reaction was that some such gradual approach might be practical.

The Secretary agreed with the Ambassador that we should concert our views on the subject. While a meeting with the Soviets should be definitely scientific and technical in nature, the experts should of course not be left without guidance of experienced political advisers. In this connection he cited the experience of the Japanese trade negotiations with the Chinese Communists in which the Japanese trade experts had innocently agreed that the Chinese Communist trade representatives in Japan should be allowed to fly their flag. This had led to all kinds of complications. The proposed technical talks on methods of detecting tests would be full of political booby traps, e.g., the problem of placing control installations possibly in Communist China or Russian attempts to have such installations placed on Taiwan or in Vietnam. Certainly the head of the delegation should be technical, but must have competent political guidance.

The Secretary then went on to say that he thought it imperative that we should reply quickly, mentioning in this connection that the US draft had been acted upon rapidly following his own return to Washington and had been approved by the President, Defense Secretary McElroy, Atomic Energy Director Strauss, and Dr. Killian. Following British agreement we would propose to advise the French and the Canadians of our plans and then lay the matter before the North Atlantic Council.

Ambassador Caccia said he felt the Canadians would be quite agreeable though he feared that the French would be sensitive on the subject. In this connection he referred to a conversation of UN Secretary General Hammarskjold with the Russian UN Ambassador. Sobolev had interpreted the Khrushchev letter as meaning bilateral US–UK talks which Mr. Hammarskjold had said would be completely unacceptable. If the talks were to be convened within three weeks the Ambassador thought US and UK experts should be brought together almost immediately, probably next week. It would be useful, he said, to have an early indication of our thinking. In this connection Mr. Farley said that he would try to get the Killian study on the subject to the British tomorrow and follow up later with a fuller statement.

Ambassador Caccia remarked that action regarding a test suspension from the British point of view would be dependent upon the fate of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. The Secretary recognized that while it would be clearly stated that these technical talks were undertaken without any political commitment, obviously we would be engaged in a course which would inevitably bring us closer to suspension of tests. The Secretary then drew the Ambassador’s attention to Mr. Khrushchev’s reference to the Arctic as being the shortest route for missiles between the USSR and the USA. He felt this was a foolish slip on the part of the Russians of which we might be able to take advantage.

1. Source: Possible technical studies of methods of detecting violations of a test cessation agreement. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.