287. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC 1

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SUBJECT

  • U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCES

  • A. NSC Action No. 1419
  • B. NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto
  • C. NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto
  • D. NSC 5707/8
  • E. NSC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, is transmitted herewith for preliminary consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.

Also enclosed for the information of the Council are Annexes A, B and C (consisting of maps referred to in the enclosed report); and Annex D, “Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament”, made by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

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Attachment

Memorandum From Lay to the NSC

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MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF: Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments”, dated December 26, 1957

The attached revised Memorandum for the National Security Council is transmitted herewith for attachment to the above-mentioned memorandum, superseding that memorandum presently attached thereto. The memorandum has been revised to include the Director, Bureau of the Budget, in the cc’s at the bottom of the page.

It is requested that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

Report Prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament

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REVISION OF U.S. POLICY ON DISARMAMENT

I. General Considerations

Need for Review of U.S. Disarmament Position

1. Present basic policy states that the United States should “actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments”. (NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955; NSC 5707/8, June 3, 1957)

2. It is clear that the major developments since the last U.S. comprehensive review of detailed positions on disarmament require an essential revision of such detailed positions in order to form a reasonable foundation for actively seeking a sound and safeguarded agreement with the USSR on disarmament.

3. The U.S. net evaluation studies conducted by the General Thomas Committee; the Security Resources Panel Report (Gaither Group); and the U.S. joint intelligence estimates; all point to the high degree of devastation which would result from a modern general war and thus confirm the soundness of the basic U.S. policy to actively seek a sound safeguarded agreement.

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4. One feature of the August 29th Western proposals2 widely criticized at the recent United Nations General Assembly sessions by Free World nations as well as by the Soviet Bloc countries, has been the “inseparability clause”. This clause is contained in Section XI of the August 29th proposals. It states: “This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable.”

5. The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow recently has reported: “I continue to believe that the Soviets genuinely seek a first step agreement on disarmament and believe it is this they have chiefly in mind in pressing for high-level talks” (November 23, 1957). However, he considers that the Soviets from their standpoint regard the August 29th proposals as so heavily weighted in the West’s favor that the United States should not realistically expect the Soviet Union to accept them, nor should the United States consider the Soviet rejection of them to be a fair test of whether or not the Soviet is genuinely seeking an agreement. (Cable of Ambassador Thompson, September 3, 1957)

6. [text not declassified]

7. The only feasible way to ascertain whether or not the Soviet Union will enter into an inspected and safeguarded agreement which is reasonable and which would be mutually desirable because of a resultant reduction in the dangers of war, is to make an offer of such an agreement.

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8. Making such an offer is also the only reliable manner in which the cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations and of the uncommitted states can be maintained by the United States. This cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations is vital to the security of the United States.

Separate Test Suspension

9. The United States has consistently held to the position that inspection is necessary for each step in each provision of any disarmament agreement. Thus when the Soviet Union proposed the suspension of nuclear testing, the United States insisted upon the requirement of inspection. In the informal bilateral discussions, carried on with full knowledge of the other Western partners at London, the Soviet Union on June 7, 1957, agreed to inspection stations inside the USSR to monitor the suspension of nuclear testing.

10. The United States has also consistently maintained that a first step should be carefully measured and should guard against a disadvantageous result in the event of violation by the Soviet Union. Thus the United States insisted that a first agreement for test suspension should be of limited duration so that laboratories could be maintained [Typeset Page 1218] in the event of a breach of the agreement. The Soviet Union finally responded in the informal bilateral discussions conducted in London with a counter-proposal of an initial period of two or three years of nuclear test suspension.

11. Leading U.S. atomic scientists state that they could hold their laboratories and scientists together for a two-year period if it was explained as being in the national interest, and they could during this period conduct highly desirable nuclear research without conducting test explosions.

12. [text not declassified]

13. At the UN General Assembly session on November 19, 1957, the key vote in the test suspension issue was taken on an Indian resolution which provided for an inspected suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The vote was 24 in favor, 34 against, and 20 abstentions. The make-up of this 34 voting with the United States was 27 nations in the NATO and Latin America groups, plus Australia, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Spain, the Philippines, Israel, and New Zealand. New Zealand with its new Government has since changed its position and now favors a test suspension. Six Latin American countries did not follow the U.S. lead—but even more significant was the fact that 24 Asian-African countries did not support the United States. As indicated above, no African countries supported the United States on this vote, and only 4 Asian countries (Nationalist China, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Israel).

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14. It is widely recognized that Asia and Africa are principal competitive battlegrounds and may probably swing the decisive weight between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. The two leaders of two most influential Asian nations—India and Japan—have repeatedly and strongly spoken out in favor of a separate test suspension. Nehru, on December 10, 1957, said: “I feel that suspension of atomic explosives is a valid first step (in disarmament). It is a dramatic step. It would not change the power of any country but would give it a tremendous lead. It would come as a tremendous relief to hundreds of millions all over the world.”

15. The prompt negotiation of an inspected two-year test suspension, because of the time necessary to work out the inspection agreement and obtain Senate approval, could not at best be made effective as a ratified treaty prior to September 1, 1958, and therefore the next series of U. S. tests would be completed before the suspension became effective. [text not declassified]

16. A temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests would bring into being a United Nations supervisory organization which could be the forerunner of an organization to regulate and control armaments and armed forces in the decades ahead.

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17. A temporary suspension of nuclear tests would establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on successive steps of armaments regulation and control.

18. A temporary nuclear test suspension would: (a) inhibit the development of more powerful new types of weapons at a time when the United States would have a relative superiority in nuclear weapons; (b) deter the spread of the production of nuclear weapons to other less responsible countries; (c) break the 12-year stalemate in the disarmament negotiations and establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on further steps of armaments regulation and control; (d) carry with it an inspection system which would begin the opening up of the Soviet Union and other Communist areas to international regular observation and would assist in the evolution of the Soviet system toward a more liberal and peaceful form.

Inspection Zones

19. Another consideration resulting from the recent London and New York disarmament discussions is that there is reason to believe that the Soviet might separate out from its proposals and negotiate a reasonable European inspection zone. The USSR would prefer to have a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe (Bulganin letter of December 10, 1957) but would also consider a European inspection zone as a first step.

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20. The latest intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that the Soviet leaders are “acutely concerned over the potential threat of a revived and nationalistic Germany backed by the United States.” The USSR has tended to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as the ban on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals in Europe. According to the intelligence estimate: “Their (Soviet) interest in inducing a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe would probably lead them to go even further (than inspection for a test ban) in allowing mutual inspection in Europe.” (NIE 11–4–57, November 12, 1957)

21. General Norstad has recommended to the NATO Council that it would “enhance the security” of NATO to establish a European inspection zone against surprise attack. Norstad said that the “minimum area” he had in mind was Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

22. The present Western position (August 29, 1957) states that provided there is agreement by the USSR to either a North America-Soviet Union zone or an Arctic Circle zone that the United States, with the concurrence of its allies, would agree to a European inspection zone including all of Europe to the Ural Mountains (60 degrees East longitude) and in the south to latitude 40 degrees North. If the Soviet reject this zone (which they have), the policy provides that under the same proviso as above a more limited zone of inspection in Europe would be “discussed”, but only if a significant part of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, was included.

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23. The Soviet has rejected the August 29th European zone proposals. However, they did evince interest in earlier informal U.S. suggestions based on a 5° E–30° E zone running from a line east of Paris to a line just west of Leningrad-Odessa. In response to this informal U.S. probing, the Soviet on April 30, 1957, responded with a proposal for a zone running from 0 degree (Greenwich) to 25° E (Lvov-Brest-Wilna).

24. The Soviet likewise has rejected the August 29th Arctic Zone and the North American-USSR zone. In response to informal earlier probing by the United States during the London talks, the Soviet on April 30th responded with the suggestion of an Eastern Siberia-Western United States zone running from 108° E to 90° W.

25. The Western European UN Subcommittee members (UK and France), in line with the May 25, 1957 Presidential decision3 that the European zone should be left to the initiative of Western European nations, did take the initiative in advancing in the NATO Council the concept of a 5°–35° European zone. The NATO Council then left to the Western UN Subcommittee members (U.S., UK, France, Canada) the manner in which this zone should be advanced. During the 4-Western Power meetings at the end of July with the Secretary heading the U.S. Delegation, it was decided not to advance 5°–35° European zone but to advance for “discussion” and only under conditions of complete inseparability a small but undefined European zone.

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Outer-Space Objects

26. Particularly in view of the recently apparent Soviet strides in satellite-missile technology, it is in the U.S. interest now to make separable from the rest of the package and to agree to the August 29th proposal for the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would assure the use of outer-space objects for peaceful purposes.

27. The Soviet during the London discussions did not react to the U.S. missile proposal except to indicate that their proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons included all “rockets”.

Armaments Regulation Organization

28. The setting up of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the UN Security Council would be in the U.S. interest. Agreement on such an organization by itself would have certain value in breaking the atmosphere of stalemate and thereby improving the chances for agreement on subjects on which the two sides are not now far apart. Such an organization also could begin to make the [Typeset Page 1221] control studies that would be basic to agreements on any additional steps of disarmament.

29. The Soviet have repeatedly indicated their support for some kind of international control organization under the UN Security Council.

Other August 29th Proposals

30. The remaining proposals in the August 29th paper are separable and can be practically implemented in successive steps if agreed upon.

II. POLICY OBJECTIVES

31. Actively to seek a safeguarded disarmament agreement, beginning with a partial agreement and subsequently extending the initial step or steps into a more comprehensive agreement. In negotiation of the foregoing, the United States should seek either individually or in combination measures which would:

a. Break the present deadlock, gain experience in inspection and regulation, and at the same time be careful not to impair the security of the United States in the event that further progress in developing wider disarmament agreements was not forthcoming.

b. Reduce the danger of great surprise attack and thereby give continuing vitality to the nuclear deterrent.

c. Inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of “fourth countries”.

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d. Reduce the probability of weapons systems, particularly missile systems, from developing in a way as to increase the danger of major nuclear conflict being initiated either by accident or by actions of other than the responsible national officials, particularly with regard to the growing problem of dispersion of authority to take action which would initiate world war.

e. Enhance the political position of the United States with regard to its allies and the uncommitted nations.

f. Facilitate within the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries the rise of “non-Stalinist” elements and ultimately the evolution of the Soviet Bloc countries into more liberal and democratic societies, including the true independence of the satellite countries.

III. POLICY GUIDANCE

32. The United States, after consultation with the NATO states and other free countries as appropriate, should propose the following separable measures as a basis for an initial agreement:

a. (1) Immediately following ratification of the agreement, the installation of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations with appropriate agreed scientific instruments, in the USSR, a like number in the United States, and suitable numbers of such stations in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary [Typeset Page 1222] locations, as agreed by competent scientists and as specified in the agreement. (See attached map, Annex A.) The inspectors to have the right to make prompt on-the-spot observations at any point indicated by their instruments as being a probable site of a nuclear test explosion in violation of the agreement.

(2) Subject to the satisfactory agreement on the inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection system, and further subject to the right to end the test suspension before expiration of the 24-month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement upon any important particular; a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on September 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the agreement is effective. This agreement would take effect as soon as ratified by the United States, the USSR, the UK, and any other state, such as Australia, whose territory might require inspection. This agreement would be open to adherence of additional states.

b. Establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in Western USSR and Central Europe. (See attached map, Annex B.) This zone would be from approximately 3° East longitude to 28° East longitude and from 45° North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone described in c.

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c. Establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United States, and Western Canada. (See attached map, Annex C.) This zone would include all of Siberia east of 108° East longitude and the additional Soviet Arctic Circle territory including the Murmansk area. The West would submit to inspection the Arctic Circle area of Norway, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, and in addition a sufficient proportion of Northwestern United States and Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of square miles as the Soviet area and to include the same percentage of U.S. and USSR area.

(NOTE: The zones referred to in paragraphs b and c would have aerial and limited ground inspection of the type proposed in the Four-Power proposal of August 29, 1957.)

d. The establishment of a technical committee to study the inspection requirements of a system to assure that outer-space objects would be used and maintained only for peaceful purposes. This committee would limit its study to the technical problems.

e. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise any of the foregoing measures that are agreed, as well as to prepare for the supervision of future additional agreed measures.

f. An undertaking by all signatory states to make an early and sustained effort, during the initial 24 months of the test suspension, to reach agreement upon, and begin to implement additional steps of, disarmament and arms control, including all of the other measures contained in the August 29, 1957, Western proposals.

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Annex A
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Annex B
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Annex C
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Annex D

Working Paper

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CANADA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Paper: Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament

I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following States will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

France 750,000
United Kingdom 750,000
Soviet Union 2,500,000
United States 2,500,000

The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, these States will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an International Control Organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other States to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The States listed in paragraph I–A will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1.
Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.
2.
There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.
3.
Other essential States have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.

E. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less [Typeset Page 1227] than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

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F. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

G. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these States will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to the armed forces determined in paragraphs E and F above and will be completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

H. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraph A and B above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

II. Military Expenditure

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of paragraph I, and looking forward to the reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the International Control Organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

III. Nuclear Weapons

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.

IV. The Control of Fissionable Material

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1.
That all future production of fissionable materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after [Typeset Page 1228] the International Board of Control described in paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.
2.
That they will co-operate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.
3.
That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a progress report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.

B. The parties which are producers of fissionable material for weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connexion

1.
To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
2.
To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV–A–1:

1.
Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.
2.
Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissionable material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.

V. Nuclear Weapons Testing

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the Governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

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C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international inspection.

D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V–A is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes agreed to under paragraph IV–A–1 above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total energy to be released therein; to provide for limited observation of them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

VI. The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will co-operate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.

B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following: [Typeset Page 1230] [Facsimile Page 17]

1.
That all the territory of the continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.
2.
If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the States concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described in paragraphs C–l and–2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement with in all cases the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their [Typeset Page 1231] fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.

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I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

VIII. The International Control Organization

A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.

B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an International Control Organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.

D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.

E. Other matters relating to the Organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the Organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.

IX. Movement of Armaments

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.

X. Suspension of the Convention

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control [Typeset Page 1232] Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

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B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfill any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the request of any party.

  1. Source: Transmits memorandum on revision of U.S. policy on disarmament: test suspension, reduction of military personnel, protection against surprise attack. Secret. 19 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meeting Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A.
  2. See Annex D hereto. [Footnote is in the original.]
  3. NSC Action No. 1722. [Footnote is in the original.]