Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

275. Record of Meeting Between Burke and Aurand¹

November 25, 1960

ADMIRAL BURKE’S CONVERSATION WITH CAPTAIN AURAND, 25 NOV 60

CAPT AURAND: Dr. Kistakoswky saw the President this morning and he really gave him a charge. I didn’t even mention it—and when I got up stairs he said, “Pete I’m hearing some things about this Omaha deal that really frighten the devil out of me”.

ADM BURKE: Did you get a copy of my letter to Lemnitzer?

CAPT AURAND: No sir. He says this thing will over-kill and what not. He said they are going to make a hell of a lot more bombs than we have now and I think we have too many already. I said those would be relatively cheap if you’re going to have to buy a lot more missiles and bombs. He said that’s right. Then he started talking about how to knock-off this being sure—you know, times 10 business.

ADM BURKE: That’s why I want you to take this memorandum.

CAPT AURAND: He said, you know what I think we could do—he said POLARIS may be the solution to this whole thing, he said what we can do is take the POLARIS boats and say “alright, you’re the back-up” and we will let everybody just have one whack—not ten whacks and then we will get a report from these satellite and whatever other reconnaissance we can get and tell the POLARISES to clean up what isn’t done. He said that maybe that will cut—

ADM BURKE: Through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CAPT AURAND: Well he wasn’t—Now, one thing that Kisty told him and he told me this too—I think it’s a cover for Kisty and I think I would do this if I were in his place too—he told the President that he recommended that he not disapprove the plan but say that the next plan has got to be brought up along these guidelines.

ADM BURKE: Give the President a copy of this memorandum.

CAPT AURAND: I told him that if he ever approved this plan it would be a prescription for everything you ever heard of. He said, yes the other night when Kisty told him that Powers told him that this thing would never be used as a thing to increase forces and he said that if he said that, he’s crazy. He says the plan calls for more forces and if he believes in the plan, he ought to ask for more forces—he says, that’s the damnest thing I ever heard, I never did think much of that guy Power, he didn’t shut up when I told him to. For 20 minutes all I was doing was saying yes sir, that’s right.

ADM BURKE: Have you ever seen my book?

CAPT AURAND: No sir.

ADM BURKE: You can borrow it tonight if you want to. I want it back though on Sunday. Its a good thing to look through. This is a short summary of the whole works—written by Burke, primarily. This is something that I told Lemnitzer and that is something that is written very restrained.

CAPT AURAND: One other important remark the President made, he said they told me there were 483 targets and he said, God. I said, Mr. President, I have seen and heard of plans that have many times more than that—and he said, well we’ve got to get this thing right down to the deterrence.

ADM BURKE: Maybe you can show the President this thing.

CAPT AURAND: Well, Kisty sure gave him the ungarbled word. I think it was the first time he ever got it from somebody who, in his estimation, is in a position to make a —. You know, he had one session with Tom Gates and Gates was so interested that he asked him to come back and he also asked him if he wouldn’t give this to the Chiefs and Kisty said no, that I told my President that I would take a reading for him and that I’m perfectly willing to give it to you—it’s just the principle of advising, that I didn’t go to look at it from a military view.

ADM BURKE: What you might want to do Pete, is to show this book to Kistakowsky—this is my book—and I have said things about Power in here which I believed—it’s not quite true now because this was written over a period of weeks, but essentially, it is true. Ask Kistakowsky what he thinks of it and maybe the President would want to take a look at parts of that. You can tell him that it’s my book and you got to looking at the thing and you got interested in the thing. That’s my notebook that I carry in my pocket when I talk about it.

CAPT AURAND: Now he almost said that he thought that we ought to go to POLARIS entirely but he revealed the thought by saying, “You know I never have believed that we ought to have one weapon system but” and he never finished the sentence of what else he was thinking but the obvious fill in for that was “POLARIS ought to be it”. He was really steamed up. Fortunately I had it on my check off list to mention it to him and I didn’t even have to say word one. Here is this thing on Theodore Roosevelt. He said that he was glad to find out that Navy was honest enough to say that things they have tried didn’t work just right and was positively for you making sure you knew where the target was before shooting.

ADM BURKE: Yes, they don’t know where the target is unless you shoot into these.

CAPT AURAND: I brought up this nuclear sub problem of going into Japan. . . He said that I’m not sure that doing that would solve the problem and in fact, I’m not sure it wouldn’t cause more trouble than they had in the first place. He said particularly with the Emperor. And, I got a . . . . on the Emperor. The Emperor’s safety is the highest priority thing they have. They wouldn’t think of letting him ride in an open car, even before the riots.

ADM BURKE: Well, maybe the Emperor’s son, the Crown Prince—

CAPT AURAND: I don’t think you’re going to get much action out of ……

ADM BURKE: I’m going to write him a letter myself. MacArthur is just a little bit afraid that I had upset his apple cart when I was out there.

CAPT AURAND: He’s the kind of guy though, that when he gets a little mad he’ll put his heels in.

ADM BURKE: Yes, and he gets vindictive. He also wants to be liked. MacArthur wants to be liked. I know his mother pretty well.

CAPT AURAND: Well, he didn’t go for that one very much. Just had the idea, I, on the dotted line, have briefed the incoming staff. I have got one with Salander and Jim Hagerty on the Presidential relocation set-up of communications and all of that but as of now we have three probable places that the President would go. He makes up his mind at the moment. I was thinking that maybe just gratituously putting in the NORTHAMPTON.

ADM BURKE: More than that. Put in the NORTHAMPTON and say that we are working on this and we will get—she could be used right now except she doesn’t have any files aboard for this sort of business—but we are going to convert her and make her a little more suitable. We won’t change her ability as far as an operating ship and then tell him that I am playing with the idea of an old conventional submarine and gutting it and putting in communications and things and a small crew up here at the Gun Factory. She would have bunks and emergency communication equipment. She would be primarily for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then she would go out in the river and sink to the bottom.

CAPT AURAND: She can’t sink very far.

ADM BURKE: Can’t sink very far but she can get out of sight.

CAPT AURAND: You don’t submerge until you get 30 miles down the river.

ADDM BURKE: You don’t steam submerged—but you can submerge in place.

CAPT AURAND: You go down to the bridge—or even past Dalgren—20 feet. I would rather get in a chopper and go to one in the bay myself.

ADM BURKE: If you don‘t have fall out.

CAPT AURAND: The chopper is perfect for fall out—1500 feet of air is as good as 6 feet of concrete—there is no inhibition on moving by chopper in a fall out situation.

ADM BURKE: Well then just put it in the NORTHAMPTON.

CAPT AURAND: I would like to see him get a good one—give him the TRITON.

ADM BURKE: Oh, hell, the TRITON couldn’t get up here.

CAPT AURAND: You can get into Chesapeak Bay.

ADM BURKE: Yes, but she doesn’t have the communication equipment.

CAPT AURAND: But she’s got the place to do it. You got a CIC in her as big as this room and you got 16 masts to play with.

ADM BURKE: Well, you [illegible in the original] the TRITION.

CAPT AURAND: And just have her hang around Chesapeak Bay.

ADM BURKE: The NORTHAMPTON is better.

CAPT AURAND: Except for the submerging.

ADM BURKE: You could put the NORTHAMPTON there and put the TRITON down as not having as good a facilities but submerging.

CAPT AURAND: Depend upon what the threat is.

ADM BURKE: Yes. Now, you might read that first couple of paragraphs there on the memorandum to Lemnitzer. I think that’s something that you can give to the President. That’s a very soft sell—that Lemnitzer has bought.

CAPT AURAND: One thing that Kisty said—he said, why the Chiefs gave a directive—the counter force targets were the highest priority and they should be attacked with heavy damage. He said this accounts for 80% of the over-kill.

ADM BURKE: Well, the Chiefs didn’t do that. It came out of the Chief’s order but Gates gave the Chiefs the choice of signing that thing or him signing it—that’s what it amounts to.

CAPT AURAND: I would like to hold this sort of in reserve. I’m sure that he’s going to follow this Omaha thing. I told him that you were going out there and it will undoubtedly come up again.

ADM BURKE: I think you should talk it over with Kistakowsky.

CAPT AURAND: Showing him this memo?

ADM BURKE: No, the book is enough—the book is the same thing, a little longer and more factual data.

CAPT AURAND: One thing on Kisty, the Air Force has sold him these low cost figures on MINUTEMAN and I pointed out to him that they had a lot of stuff in there that they called inherited assets.

ADM BURKE: Ask him this one question: “How is it MINUTEMAN which is essentially a three stage POLARIS with the same type of propellant, but more of it, the same type of material in the framework and body, but more of it, the same type of guidance system, the same type of warhead—costs less than POLARIS?

CAPT AURAND: He will admit that on a bird-to-bird ratio —

ADM BURKE: But this is their prices—overall prices are based upon about 700,000 dollars for a MINUTEMAN and we are basing ours on a million dollars per POLARIS and all the rest of the costs are the same sort of thing—I mean their costs are about 50% on the known things less than it costs a similar thing in POLARIS.

CAPT AURAND: Well, then they fall back on that you pioneered it for them.

ADM BURKE: Sure—but the research and development—they aren’t counting any research and development in that. This is a missile in production and we did do all the pioneering for them—but the missile is in production. In their figures they haven’t added one nickel of R&D—not one.

CAPT AURAND: Or security forces.

ADM BURKE: Or security forces or nothing else—and they admit that. I’ve got to go and make a speech here.

1. Source: Eisenhower’s reaction to targeting plan, dispersal sites for President Top Secret. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Transcripts and Phone Calls (NSTL).