Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

260. Draft Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 11, 1960

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President on SecDef’s Proposal to turn Targeting and the Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan over to SAC

1. Present:

The President

SECDEF Gates

Deputy SECDEF Douglas

General Twining

Admiral Burke

General Goodpaster

Colonel Eisenhower

2. The SecDef, using his written proposal as a guide, discussed in general the points in his policy paper only. He did not discuss the details contained in his TAB C, a copy of which I do not have but which was, I think, the directive for preparation of the target list and the single integrated operational plan.

3. SecDef stated that he had worked on this for a long, long time with everybody he could think of, and he had drawn it up with the help of Mr. Douglas and General Twining. He said that it did not give any Service all the things it wanted. For example, the Air Force wanted a unified strategic command, and he did not approve of that. The Army originally wanted to have the Joint Staff develop the target list but now went along with this proposal. He repeated the arguments which were used yesterday on the policy for his paper.

4. SecDef stated that everybody agreed with this but Admiral Burke and that he felt very much concerned about it and had asked to see the President.

5. I then used my handwritten paper as a basis for discussion with the President and followed it very closely.

6. The final result, after two hours of discussion, was that the President stated he did not want to make a final decision now and perhaps later have to revise it just before he left office. He did want to make the final decision before he left office if it were in any way possible. He in general agreed with Mr. Gates’ ideas, but he agreed with my concept that we should try and see what it is before a final decision was made. CINCSAC, with a joint staff and with the help of the Unified Commanders, is to draw up a national target list and a plan in the same manner, and using the same data to present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the middle of November or first of December. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and everybody else will be given an opportunity to completely analyze, check and correct this plan. After that, if there is disagreement, it may be brought before the President for a decision again.

7. Coming back in the car the people from the Department of Defense wondered how this could be done, and I stated by simply ordering the people in there and asking them to do it.

COMMENTS:

I fear there will be attempts to make the final decision now to do it, and with the idea of making corrections in the procedures in three or four months but not change the method.

8. There were a great many comments most of which I probably have forgotten. The following comments are not in the order that they were made.

9. First, the President said that this was apparently an emotional issue because he could see both from General Twinings remarks and mine that there was emotion involved in this, and he hoped that objective men could arrive at some satisfactory answer.

10. The President believed that this was not a problem which really should have come to him because he felt it was merely a procedural problem. He said Burke agrees that there should be a single integrated operational plan and he agreed that the people have to follow it. He just disagrees on who makes it out. He wants it made by the Joint Staff and the SecDef wants it made by CINCSAC.

11. I said, no, that’s not quite it. I think that if SAC makes these two there will be completely different target lists and completely different operational plans than if the Joint Staff makes it. That’s one point. The other point is that we, the Joint Chiefs, can exercise control and influence over the development of these papers if they are CIN Joint Staff, but they cannot do this if they are [illegible in the original] or any other agency. The third point is that I do not believe that all the details or routing, timing, subsidiary targets, ECM and those things should be included in a fixed rigid plan made by one commander for the forces of another commander. I felt that the Unified Commanders should have some leeway.

12. At one point General Twining said that the Navy would not let this thing work, that we would wreck it. Apparently the President has been told this a good many times by somebody. I remonstrated and said I thought that was an unfair accusation, but nobody picked it up much but me, although I think the President did perhaps not like it very much. The President talked on all sides of the problem at various times but obviously wanted to agree with Tom Gates as much as he possibly could. He said as far as who did it was concerned it didn’t seem to make any difference to him, the Joint Chiefs would be able to check it.

13. I reexplained the difficulties that the Joint Chiefs would have in checking it and emphasized that if the Joint Chiefs organization could not make the plan out in the first place they would have great difficulty in checking it, particularly if it had to be done in a hurry by the Chiefs themselves.

14. The President was not very much impressed with the NATO difficulties I pointed out because they did not have any capability now. He said of course they would want to get into the planning later on, but that can be done somehow no matter what system we adopted. I didn’t bear down on this point.

15. I emphasized many times that I felt that Mr. Gates thought there would be a short target list and an operational plan which would be easily followed, but I suspected something considerably different from this and I thought it was very important that we see what came out of it before we buy it. We went [illegible in the original] this ground over and over and over again. Most of my stuff was in the original paper I wrote, repeating it.

16. Tom got awfully close to accusing me of disloyalty. He didn’t quite say it. I don’t think he mentioned it. Although I’m not so sure now because this happens too often. Not quite disloyalty, it isn’t that, it’s just that I’m not a member of the team. The Navy is always the shouter. Nate made no bones about it. He said: Mr. President, unless we make a decision to do this now, an irrevocable decision, the Navy will wreck it. He said if you delay this I am sure Tommy White will come over here and not like it at all. Now the President took him apart on that a little bit gently. He said he didn’t see any reason why they couldn’t wait and make a final decision sometime later.

17. I left all of my notes over with Andy Goodpaster and he’s going to send them back. I didn’t quite read them all and he can get them all down in his notes, see some of the points I didn’t make. I didn’t quite get finished. The discussion got so hot I never came back to the paper.

18. Goodpaster never entered into the argument. He never does. Mr. Douglas entered into the argument. Everybody did, all three of them did. I have forgotten what points Douglas especially made, except that SAC has this great capability. Of course Polaris entered into it. Service positions entered into it.

19. The President insisted over and over again we’ve got to have a single plan and people have got to follow it. Don’t you agree with that, Burke? Yes, sir, Mr. President, I do agree with it, but the plan has got to be right. It can’t be detailed and it’s got to be made with the full realization of the other things that have to be done other than this, and to do these things most efficiently there must be enough leeway left to the commanders so that they do them most efficiently, but certainly you are absolutely correct. There must be a list of targets which must be struck at a certain specific time.

20. The President made the point that all he was looking for was the first strike. He said this is the first strike, the first 24 hours. After that of course the Unified Commanders must use their forces the way they see fit under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

21. I thought a couple of times that Tom implied that they had to get somebody, if people were objective, they would accept his plan, that’s what he was really saying. People who didn’t accept the plan were not objective, too much Service bias. Nate picked up right after that and talked about the awful Navy. I thought sure “there goes the whipsaw”. I was just about ready to say “if that is your opinion then obviously I shouldn’t be here.” I just started to say it. I counted and I didn’t, but it very nearly came out. Maybe I should have. That was pretty serious.

22. We have got to get the word around somehow that the Air Force is wrecking the hell out of this joint. This is one of them. Either you do it my way or I won’t play. That’s the Air Force, and they got their way completely on this, except for this one thing—the final decision is not made yet. That’s the only thing we got and we’ve got to throw some of our very best people in this because in this decision Tom Gates, Douglas and Twining have all made up their minds absolutely what they will do in January no matter what decision is made. They talked about it. If the thing doesn’t work in January, then what should we do, get a new SAC commander? Maybe it’s the man. That’s not it. Douglas said that.

23. The President listened. I really don’t know whether I made the points well or not. There’s no doubt about it, after two hours you get tired of clawing your way up the cliff over and over again.

24. I think the President was the only one there who would listen at all. The other people, they just don’t want to see—I’m afraid. Our job now is to get this paper ready. I suspect they’ll call a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gates and Twining will probably go over this, [illegible in the original] “copy everything down that you can”. The only thing I care about is the final result, that the final decision will not be made until the two [illegible in the original] been tested and checked and analyzed by every agency that knows how to do it, and everybody that wants to do it. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to do this thing, they can do it, but it must be done quickly. So we’ve got to get our corps of experts here and this is the most important thing we’ve got to do. Not to tear it to pieces. We want to make this thing work because if it does work, it will be helpful, but I don’t think it can work. But if it does God bless us, let’s make it work. What I didn’t say to Twining was: Supposing this thing is lousy (and I think it will be) in January, that’s the reason why you don’t want to give it a trial, that you want to make the decision now because you feel you don’t want to let it all show the light of day.

25. I am afraid I used my quota of mercy with the President— which is all right. I think he took the only decision he could take under the circumstances because he could not decide to throw this into the Joint Chiefs of Staff now. He could not have decided that with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman all against it. What disappointed me a little bit was he used so many of their arguments back in trying to persuade me. I know that’s a technique.

26. I came away with the same opinion I had when I went in there. I didn’t get mad. Nobody got mad. Twining got a little emotional.

27. Captain Aurand, who had been present at the debrief, made the following comments: I think one of the most important points is this business is just the first strike. From there on the Unified Commands do their own planning and also consideration must be given in the initial plan for this posture that it will leave and which the Unified Commanders will be left. Twining cannot ignore that. It can’t be that all out.

1. Source: Record of a meeting among Eisenhower, Department of Defense leaders, Twining, and Burke on turning over responsibility for targeting and SIOP to SAC. No classification marking. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing. Drafted by Burke.