254. Memorandum for the Record of Meeting Between Sprague and Merchant1
Manny Sprague came in to see me yesterday afternoon for about half an hour to ask my unvarnished comments on the OCB and its operation. He has similarly privately and alone interviewed every other member of the OCB.
In sum, I told him that I thought the OCB was a necessary coordinating mechanism, given the complexity and size of our government and its responsibilities. I said that with officers in the Department concerned with its functioning I emphasized that they should give it their best efforts and not resent the time demands of chairing working groups since, if the OCB did not exist, their lives would be far more difficult.
I said that I thought OCB by reason of its wide membership and cumbersomeness had the potential of slowing up and making more difficult the function of coordination. However, I said, under Gordon Gray’s chairmanship this had not been the case because he was openminded and reasonable and not seeking to bring into the OCB orbit problems involving two or more members of the Board which were already being adequately coordinated by direct informal procedures.
I made three suggestions. First, I thought the weekly activity report insofar as it comprised summaries of Departmental telegrams on various problems not under current OCB scrutiny provoked needless and time-wasting discussions on matters on which few, if any, of the members were currently informed. These extracts I thought could be usefully dropped from the weekly agenda. Secondly, I said I thought that the OCB luncheons were probably the most valuable aspect of the entire organization and that I would favor seeking to establish a ratio of two luncheons to one full-dress meeting rather than [Facsimile Page 2] the present one to one ratio. Thirdly, I said that I thought the luncheons would be even more stimulating and useful if they were agendaless and if members did not try to use them for quick clearances, particularly where only a fraction of those present were directly concerned. In other words, I said, I thought the opportunity for unguided, unrecorded discussion of the major problems in the forefront of our minds was the best way to generate ideas or suggestions which could then be worked out and refined or rejected in staff channels.
Finally, we discussed the “P” factor. I reiterated my basic point, which is that good policy makes good propaganda. Hence I believe [Typeset Page 1067] that the public relations aspect of actions or policy decisions is one of insuring imaginative, effective presentation. I said that the State Department’s function, as I saw it, basically is to formulate the soundest possible policy recommendations to the Secretary and the President. In the process there has to be in the policy makers’ minds an awareness of the impact of a particular course on public opinion, be it domestic or foreign. The emphasis, however, should be overwhelmingly on the side of the soundness and appropriateness of the policy insofar as it contributed to the national security. It would be wrong to approach any decision from the point of view of seeking something which would have a spectacular effect on public opinion. On this general note our conversation ended.
- Source: Operations Coordinating Board. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 100.4–OCB/5–2560.↩