Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

239. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–4–59

Washington, February 9, 1960

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES 1959–1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• THE PROBLEM
• SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE
• ESTIMATE
• I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
  • Khrushchev’s Position as Leader
  • Change in Soviet Society under Khrushchev
  • Problems for the Future
• II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
  • Main Emphases of Soviet Economic Policy
  • Prospects and Problems of the Seven-Year Plan
    • The Labor Supply Problem
    • Investment and Labor Productivity
    • Management Problems
    • Planning Problems
    • Problems in Agriculture
    • Consumer Expectations
    • The Level of Military Expenditures
  • Foreign Trade
  • Prospects for Growth
• III. SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
  • Role of Science in Soviet Society
  • Resources and Administration
  • Level of Achievement
  • Political Implications
• IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
  • Basic Soviet Ideas Concerning the Role of Military Power
  • Evolution in the Structure of Soviet Forces
  • Soviet Views on the Current Balance of Military Power and on Strategy
  • Probable Developments in the Structure of Soviet Forces
  • Military Policy Toward Other Bloc States
• V. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES
  • Soviet-Satellite Relations
  • Sino-Soviet Relations
• VI. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
  • Current Soviet View of the World Situation
  • Main Emphasis of Soviet Policy in the Period 1960–1964
    • Attitude Toward General War
    • Some Alternatives for Soviet Policy Short of General War
    • Probable Line of Soviet Policy
  • Policy Toward NATO and the US
  • Policy Toward Underdeveloped Countries
• ANNEX A: SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
  • Forces for Strategic Attack
    • Long Range Aviation
    • Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
    • Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
    • Submarine-Launched Missiles
    • Capabilities for Long Range Attack
  • Air Defense Forces
    • Weapon Systems
    • Radar and Control Equipment
    • Air Defense Capabilities
  • Soviet Ground Forces and Tactical Aviation
    • Strength and Disposition of Ground Forces
    • Ground Forces Weapons
    • Air Support
    • Capabilities for Land Warfare
  • Naval Forces
    • Strength and Equipment
    • Submarine Programs
    • Capabilities for Naval Warfare
  • Special Weapon Developments
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Chemical and Biological Warfare
    • Electromagnetic Warfare
• ANNEX B: TABLES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY FORCES

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1959–1964

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting the USSR’s internal political situation, economic, scientific, and military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet policies and actions over about the next five years.²

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY

1. Over the last year Soviet policy toward the West has veered from extreme provocation in connection with the Berlin issue to a warmly expressed willingness to seek new avenues of accommodation through negotiation. We believe that, fundamentally, this change of tone is derived from tactical considerations and that the principal objectives of Soviet policy vis-a-vis the West remain unchanged. The Soviet leaders currently show great confidence that the trend of events, in what they continue to think of as an inevitable struggle with the non-Communist world, is in their favor. Their rate of economic progress, their scientific and space successes, their advances in missile development, their estimate of the political tendencies in the underdeveloped countries (despite setbacks in some areas) all suggest to them a growing shift in world power relations favorable to the Communist cause. These considerations as seen by the Soviet leaders permit their policy to be less rigid than formerly. From the position of strength which they believe they now have they see themselves as able not only to engage the West vigorously on disputed issues when they wish to do so, but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness. They consider themselves able at the same time to pursue their programs of internal development, including the betterment of living standards and the furtherance of rapid economic growth.

2. We believe that, over the next five years, neither a policy single-mindedly directed at eliminating East-West tensions nor a policy of pressure with a steadily belligerent tone is likely to be followed by the USSR. We expect to see elements of both pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest. For the nearer future the present emphasis on negotiation and accommodation seems likely to continue; later the motif of pressure and struggle will probably reappear. Whatever alternation of emphasis may occur, however, the swings are likely to fall within a range which excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war, and, on the other, abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.

3. Given Khrushchev’s unchallenged personal ascendancy, his views are likely to be the primary determinant in Soviet policy for the present. His attitudes are marked on the one hand by a strong sense of the growth of Soviet military and economic power and by a crude and truculent pride in asserting the claims of that power to the world’s attention and deference. He has been free in his vigorous use of missile threats. On the other hand, he apparently thinks it possible to win recognition for Soviet views through persuasion rather than by force alone. He clearly understands the horrors of nuclear war and his proclaimed dedication to economic advance appears to be sincere. He probably genuinely believes that the Soviet system can prove its superiority in “peaceful” competition, although he recognizes that Soviet power plays a vital role in this competition. Thus, the contradictory tendencies toward belligerence and accommodation in Soviet policy are probably in some degree a reflection of the attitudes and personality of Khrushchev, and may persist so long as he is the commanding figure on the Soviet scene.

4. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. A period of partial detente presumably serves a number of useful purposes from Moscow’s point of view. First, it enables the USSR to ascertain through negotiations what positions the West is now willing to take in view of increasing Soviet strength, and provides a suitable and superficially alluring framework for possible Western concessions. Secondly, even barring specific agreements with the West, Moscow probably views high-level East-West talks as an acknowledgment by the West of the permanence, legitimacy, and equal status of the Communist Bloc. Finally, during such a period of detente the Soviets would hope to improve their relative power position still further, since they would expect Western military programs to be carried on with less urgency.

5. Beyond this phase the outlook is less certain. The main influence shaping Soviet policy is likely to be the Soviet leaders’ sense of their improved power position relative to that of the West. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long-range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. At some stage, they will almost certainly wish to test the chances of drawing advantage from this situation if it emerges as they expect. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than at present. The Soviet leaders may think it possible to undertake more provocative behavior in areas where they are in contention with Western power and influence. In their view, the emerging stand-off of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

6. Although the Soviets have allowed the Berlin crisis to diminish in intensity, the issues involved in it will remain of high concern to their policy. They will continue to seek an arrangement about Germany under which both sides would accept at least tacitly the indefinite division of the country. To this end, they will continue to press for some form of Western recognition for East Germany. They see such a development not only as a contribution to the stability of Communist power in Eastern Europe as a whole, but also as a blow against West Germany’s relations with NATO which it is their consistent purpose to undermine. On the Berlin issue itself, we believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims in Germany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access to Berlin and from making a separate peace treaty with East Germany. If they decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin.

7. In the coming phase of negotiation, the Soviets are likely to continue to give priority to disarmament. By taking the initiative in this field they will expect to earn broad political dividends since hopes for peace throughout the world are associated with a desire for disarmament measures. The Soviets may actually wish to see a freeze or even a cutback in some armaments in order to improve their potentialities for long-run political and economic competition, but we do not believe that they are obliged for economic reasons to seek a far-reaching arms reduction agreement. They would probably not even regard such an agreement as desirable since they consider that their great military strength is an essential ingredient in the challenge they pose to the non-Communist world. Moreover the Soviet aversion to extensive foreign controls and inspection in the USSR persists, and will almost certainly exclude anything more than limited agreements.

8. Even if Soviet policy seeks stabilization in Europe and a reduction of tensions in relations with the Western Powers, it will probably be increasingly active in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviets see in the political ferment in these areas growing opportunities for eliminating Western influence, and ultimately the likelihood of a revolutionary turn which will bring Communist controlled forces to power. The policy of appealing to governments in such areas through trade and aid and other conventional forms of diplomatic influence will probably continue to provide the general framework for Soviet actions. From time to time, however, the Soviets will probably have to decide whether the prospective gains of a local Communist attempt to seize power in one or another country would justify compromising this policy and undertaking the risks and difficulties of supporting revolutionary action. During the period of this estimate there are likely to be cases in which the Soviets will be more disposed than they have recently been to support such militant action by local Communist parties, although they would probably be cautious about involving the Bloc in military support to such action.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SOVIET POWER POSITION

9. The challenge which the USSR will pose for the West over the next five years will rest upon a continuing growth in the bases of Soviet power—military, economic, and scientific. Advances in these aspects of national power can be expected in a great state which has reached a stage of development in which it can for the first time realize its full potentialities. But this process is accelerated in the USSR by the presence of a political leadership which is single-mindedly committed to the aim of aggrandizing the power of the Communist system. It is always possible that the upward trend in the growth of Soviet power internally could be arrested by the appearance of political instabilities, either within the USSR or in its relations with other Communist states, but at present we see no basis for estimating that this is likely to be the case.

Military Developments

10. The single most important development affecting the structure of Soviet military power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the US in nuclear strategic attack capabilities, as it was unable to do with bomber aircraft. Because of the uncertainties, risks, and high economic cost involved in acquiring ICBM capabilities which would permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that the USSR could win a general war without itself incurring unacceptable damage, we do not believe that the Soviets will attempt to build an ICBM force sufficient for this purpose. Nevertheless, they will probably build a substantial long-range missile force. They will almost certainly wish to have a high degree of deterrence, and beyond this, should deterrence fail, a force offering as much promise of success for a pre-emptive attack, or indeed for a retaliatory attack, as can be bought within acceptable margins of economic cost. Also, and again consistent with acceptable cost, the Soviets will probably build up their planned force rapidly in order to capitalize through political exploitation on their lead over the West in missile development. On the basis of these criteria, we estimate that the probable ICBM program will provide in mid-1961 a number of missiles on launcher on the order of 140 to 200.³ More tentatively, because of technical and political factors which may affect Soviet plans in the interim, we estimate that Soviet ICBMs on launcher are likely to number in the range of 250–350 in mid-1962 and 350–450 in mid-1963.⁴

11. Despite the effort which we estimate that the USSR will make to build long-range attack forces, it will almost certainly not do so at the cost of sacrificing its other military capabilities. The Soviets consider that their military policy requires a range of nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities permitting flexibility in the choice of means and the scale of operations in accordance with the political objectives sought in a particular area. The Soviet leaders probably believe that such varied capabilities become even more important under mutual deterrence from general war when, in their view, pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further than in the past.⁵ Thus we believe that the Soviets will continue to maintain substantial ground, air, and naval forces, and that to the maximum possible extent these forces will be dual purpose, capable of employing nuclear or nonnuclear weapons, as circumstances dictate.

12. In addition to the buildup of long-range missile capabilities there will be a number of other major developments in the Soviet forces over the period of this estimate. The effectiveness of the air defense system against bomber aircraft will be increased by the new surface-to-air missiles now being installed on a considerable scale for the defense of vital areas, and by additional control and warning systems to improve reaction times. The most significant developments in the ground forces will be the widespread introduction of missiles for tactical use and the achievement of greater mobility resulting from new motorized equipment, transport aircraft, and helicopters. The Soviet Navy will probably continue to give priority attention to the development of submarines, and the buildup of a nuclear-powered and missile-launching submarine force will be the most important addition to Soviet naval capabilities.

Economic Developments

13. Although the continuing rapid expansion of the Soviet economy aimed at in the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965) will encounter a number of serious problems, we believe that the goal of an 8.6 percent annual increase in industrial output will in the main be achieved. As in the past the plan in agriculture will not be achieved, and net output is likely to rise by about one-fifth in the seven-year period as against a proclaimed goal of about 55–60 percent. The position of the Soviet consumer will continue to improve, though at a somewhat slower rate; consumption goods and services per capita will probably increase about 26 percent during the plan period as compared with a 40 percent gain over the preceding seven years.

14. Even though some goals of the Seven-Year Plan may not be achieved in full, Soviet gross national product (GNP) will probably continue to grow at about 6.0 percent per annum. Such a rate of growth is impressive by any absolute standards and will bring the Soviet economy measurably closer in size and strength to that of the US. Assuming that the US maintains an average annual rate of growth in GNP of about 3.5–4.0 percent, Soviet GNP measured in dollars will increase from about 45 percent that of the US at present to about half that of the US by 1965. However, more important than this rough comparison of the gross size of the two economies is a comparison of the uses to which national resources are put. The smaller Soviet economy has in recent years supported military expenditures which, measured in dollars, were about equal to those of the US. Likewise Soviet investment in the economy as a whole is currently almost equal to that in the US, and Soviet investment in industry may be somewhat greater. As a result of this steady allocation of large resources to growth, by 1965 the absolute annual increment to GNP in the USSR will approach that in the US.

15. The Soviet leaders are aware that sustained and rapid economic growth is an important asset in the world power struggle. It will enable them to carry the burden of competitive armaments more easily. The USSR will be able to enlarge its aid programs, and perhaps ultimately compete in world markets in an important way. This will mean political leverage in many countries. If, in addition, the Soviets can finally raise living standards enough to demonstrate that their system provides for the growth of welfare as well as the expansion of national power, they will expect the influence of communism to spread even more rapidly. The Soviet leaders can be counted on to press the growth of their economy in all ways open to them, including substantial structural reforms when necessary, in order to achieve the political goals which they regard as the real aim of economic policy.

Scientific Developments

16. The achievements of its scientists have become one of the principal instruments of the USSR’s prestige and influence, and the Soviet political leadership has been astute in exploiting this fact as a demonstration of the superiority of the Communist system in competition with the West. The Soviet successes arise from a generous commitment of resources over the years to training personnel and providing research facilities, from the fact that the motivations and incentives of scientists in the Soviet environment are high, and especially from the concentration of effort in fields related to national power. The rate of advance of Soviet science appears to be increasing, and the current Seven-Year Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievements, will provide additional impetus. Thus, significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past, and over the next several years, the USSR may achieve world leadership in some additional scientific areas. It will probably add a number of “firsts” in prestige fields. In the immediate future, these are most likely to occur in the Soviet space program, but the quality and intensity of research on such problems as controlled thermonuclear reactions and direct conversion of heat to electricity may produce spectacular results in other scientific fields.

Internal Political Developments

17. The outlook on the Soviet internal political scene points to continuing stability. Khrushchev’s position as leader has become virtually unassailable, and if he lives, will probably remain so during the period of this estimate. While there may be elements within higher Party circles which mistrust his leadership, it is unlikely that, in the absence of a major failure of his policies, any effective opposition could form. Given Khrushchev’s age, however, the prospect of a new succession problem probably already figures in inner Party maneuvering. Khrushchev’s demise is most likely to be followed by another period of “collective leadership” and a phase of contention for the top position. We continue to believe that the Soviet system has an inherent tendency to revert to one-man dictatorship. The inevitable struggles for power which this produces are not likely to menace the stability of the regime, much less alter the nature of its most basic policies. However, the fact of personal government is likely always to affect profoundly the manner and tone of Soviet policy. Thus, Khrushchev’s successor might bring to the conduct of Soviet policy features quite different from those characteristic of the present dictator.

18. The years of Khrushchev’s rise to power have been marked by a series of reforming changes intended to cope with problems raised by past policies and with new conditions resulting from rapid industrialization and modernization. The relaxation of police terror and a greater concern for living standards, some greater degree of ideological flexibility, wider foreign contacts, a more pragmatic and innovating spirit applied to institutional arrangements—all these are changes of a more than transitory character which, even if there should be some reversion, will have a lasting influence on the future evolution of the Soviet system. Their main effect for the present has been to give the Soviet people a hopeful sense of forward movement, and therefore probably more satisfaction with the regime and its goals than has existed at any time in the Soviet period. But it does not follow that the changes which have taken place so far forecast a more basic evolution away from totalitarian dictatorship. A modern industrial society is not necessarily incompatible with a totalitarian political system, especially in a nation like Russia with a long authoritarian tradition. In any case, for the period of this estimate we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally.

Soviet Relations with Other Communist States

19. The challenge which the USSR presents to the non-Communist world will be much affected by the extent to which Soviet authority over a unified bloc of the Communist states is maintained. In Eastern Europe Soviet authority appears more firmly established than at any time since the events of 1956. Poland’s potential instability continues to be an unsettling factor in Eastern Europe, although the disruptive influence of its deviations in internal policy seems to be declining as the Gomulka regime moves toward a tighter discipline. However, there are signs that Communist China is becoming less disposed to accept Soviet guidance in domestic and foreign policy, even though it has outwardly complied on a number of disputed issues in recent months. We believe that the problem of intrabloc harmony is far from being resolved. Disharmony is likely to arise repeatedly with the appearance of new issues, and in the long run will probably be one of the more critical problems with which the Soviet leaders will have to cope.

20. The main challenge to Soviet authority and unity within the Communist Bloc in the future is likely to come from China. The Sino-Soviet relationship will probably become increasingly complicated and difficult as Chinese power and prestige increase, and as Soviet levers of authority over China become less effective. Frictions have already arisen over extremist tendencies in Chinese internal policy, over Chinese ideological pretensions, over foreign policy tactics, and probably over whether the USSR should supply nuclear weapons to China. These or other frictions may be magnified in the future. The Chinese have always reserved their right to exercise independent judgment on doctrinal and tactical issues. We believe that they will increasingly exercise this right, not only in domestic affairs, where direct Soviet influence has always been minimal, but in external affairs as well. Thus each party to the Sino-Soviet alliance may come to act more in terms of its view of its own national needs and interests. This does not mean, however, that an open rupture is in sight; both parties recognize that their alliance is vital to them in confronting the hostile forces of the non-Communist world.

Note A

Views on the Soviet ICBM Program

We have concluded that the probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on the order of 140–200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Within this range, the Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to be toward the low side. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as justifying additional effort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be towards the high side of the 140–200 range.

Note B

Dissent on the Estimate of the Soviet ICBM Program

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it, warrants the judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack capability. Rather, he believes that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicable date a military superiority over the United States which they would consider to be so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the United States through threat of destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against the United States that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would cease to exist. He further believes that such an objective could be attained by the development of their overall military capabilities which would include an operational ICBM force of about 250 (185 on launcher) by mid-1961, 500 (385 on launcher) by mid-1962, and 800 (640 on launcher) by mid-1963. It is generally agreed that the Soviets have both the technical and industrial capability to produce such a force; the physical difficulties thereby entailed will almost certainly not be the limiting factor.

It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that, while Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained a capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by mid-1962 or earlier, the real objective of the Soviet ICBM program is “decisive military superiority.” He believes that the Soviets would not be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize the possibility of error in their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western pre-emption of their deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, to exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western “desperate” acts would induce them to attempt attainment of total deterrence, i.e. “delusive military superiority.”

[Omitted here is the remainder of the estimate.]

1. Source: “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959–1964.” Top Secret. Extracts—13 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.
2. The reference to a five-year period is approximate. The estimates on the Soviet economy carry through 1965, to conform to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan. Judgments on many other matters pertain to periods of less than five years, and, particularly on political questions, are intended for the most part to apply for the next year or two. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The views of the members of the USIB vary as to the most probable number within this range. See the statement of their separate views in Note A following this summary. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from this paragraph. See his statement in Note B following this summary. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, do not concur in the estimate that the USSR probably believes that it can undertake the actions described with greater freedom and can push them further than in the past. Such a Soviet judgment would, in the view of the above members of the USIB, necessarily involve an estimate by the Kremlin that Western—particularly the United States—response to their pressures and probings would lack the vigor necessary to dissuade them. They do not believe that the Soviets will make such an estimate.
   The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would revise the sentence in question as follows: The Soviet leaders probably believe that if mutual deterrence from general war eventuates, such capabilities could become even more important, when pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups, even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further than in the past. [Footnote is in the original.]