Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

219. Memorandum From JCS to Commander in Chief, SAC¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions (S)

1. The President has authorized certain Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands to expend nuclear weapons in defense of the United States, its Territories, possessions and forces when the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead. Such commanders will be called Authorizing Commanders.

2. This authorization by the President is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by an attack (as defined in the Enclosure). Each Authorizing Commander must insure that such delegation of authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. Further, it should be regarded as an authorization effective only until it is possible to communicate with the President or other person empowered to act for him.

3. [text not declassified]

4. [text not declassified]

a. For the defense of the United States, its Territories, and possessions:

In the United States, its Territories and possessions and in international waters adjacent thereto as defined in Section “A” against attack by sea—(Special Additional Instructions in Section “A” below).

b. For the defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section “A” below).

c. In the event of nuclear attack upon the United States, in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section “B” below).

3. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. Because of the serious international implications of the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. military forces, it is essential that particularly strict command control and supervision be exercised, and that the use of nuclear weapons be limited to circumstances of grave necessity. [text not declassified]

4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES. [text not declassified]

[NOTE: Pages 4–6 of source text denied in full.]

Section “B”

Special Additional Instructions Regarding Retaliation in the Event of a Nuclear Attack Upon the United States

1. PURPOSE. These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event of nuclear attack upon the United States in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. POLICY. In the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States, it is assumed that the President would have approximately the same information as the Department of Defense regarding the strength and character of the attack and the identity of the nation launching it. Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on order of the President, except in circumstances where immediate communications have become impossible between the President and responsible officials of the Department of Defense. In such circumstances, [text not declassified] applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. [text not declassified]

b. In the event that a nuclear attack has in fact occurred, as authenticated through prescribed procedures as approved by the President, on the United States and it is impossible to communicate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [text not declassified].

4. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. [text not declassified]

1. Source: Instructions for use of nuclear weapons in emergencies. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.