Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

211. Memorandum From Lay to Holders of NSC 5912¹

Washington, October 30, 1959

The enclosed Part 1 (The Military Program) is transmitted herewith for insertion in NSC 5912.

Part 1 has been given a special limited distribution, and access to it should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

Department of Defense Report to the NSC

NSC 5912

Washington, October 26, 1959

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT

TO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON

STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS

AS OF 30 JUNE 1959

THE MILITARY PROGRAM

CONTENTS

BASIC REPORT

MILITARY FORCES

• I Objectives of the Military Program
• II Evaluation of our Actual and Potential Capabilities
  • A. Nuclear Retaliatory Capability Continental Defense System (Covered in Section III)
  • B. Ready Forces
  • C. Maintaining Essential Sea Areas and Air Communications
  • D. Cold War Contribution
  • E. Summary Comparisons of Major Forces
• III Evaluation of the Continental Defense System

SELECTED MILITARY PROGRAMS

• IV Mobilization Base
• V Manpower
• VI Military Research and Development
• VII Areas of Special Interest
• VIII Installations
• IX Cost of the Military Program
• ANNEX “A”—Continental Defense Supplement Status of NSC 5802/1 Implementation
• ANNEX “B”—Defense Space Projects
• ANNEX “C”—Statistical Data Supplement

NSC 5912, Part 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM

I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The primary threat to fulfillment of this objective is that posed by an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism. All elements of U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this Communist challenge.

The objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are to provide:

An effective nuclear retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate action.

An adequate continental defense system.

Highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces, with the capability to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons), as required to achieve national objectives, and to carry out general war tasks.

A capability of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications.

A cold war contribution of U.S. military power to reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures.

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5810/1.

Through FY 1960, the nuclear strike forces of the United States will continue to provide a capability to inflict such loss and damage upon an enemy as to achieve a significant margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its Allies to prevail in general war. Despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of the nuclear retaliatory forces of the United States and its Allies, as presently programmed, and within current expectation for Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962, Soviet technological advances will probably continue to diminish the present margin of U.S. military superiority. By the end of FY 1962 with a continuance of present trends and programs on both sides, and with no major technological break-throughs on either side in the intervening years, the most probable position will be that each side will possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions. While operational factors which apply in the initial action may lead to advantage for either side, an advantage, possibly conclusive, will accrue to the side taking the initiative.

Additional improvements have been made in North American defense during FY 1959, particularly in the areas of warning and defense against the air breathing threat; however, concurrent Soviet offensive improvements have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. The North American defense system is not capable of preventing an attack which could seriously damage the United States although it should significantly degrade any such attack and it does complicate seriously the attackers’ problems.

The ready forces of the United States are capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and to meet the initial requirements of general war. However, while the over-all nuclear posture of all Services has improved, modernization of non-nuclear fire support has not kept pace. The scope and timing of response to local aggression would be limited by a number of factors, including: the nature and location of the aggression, the degree to which maldeployment for initial tasks of general war could be accepted, the availability of transportation, and whether or not nuclear weapons are to be employed. The over-all military capabilities of our Allies to support U.S. and collective defense organization strategic concepts possibly increased in the Far East during FY 1959, but probably decreased on balance in the Middle East and has not significantly changed in Europe. The capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression vary from country to country. With few exceptions, the capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression in other than their own general area are very limited.

The United States and its Allies are capable of controlling essential air communications except on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. Extreme difficulty will be incurred in controlling essential sea areas until such time as the Soviet submarine capability is reduced to manageable proportions. The mining, mine countermeasures and harbor defense programs continue to be only partially satisfactory.

The military forces, as the largest segment of U.S. population abroad, are capable of significant reinforcement of overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technical and cultural measures to achieve national objectives. Although this capability has not been fully exploited, increased emphasis has been given to cold war activities and the U.S. position has thus been strengthend in several areas.

A. AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATORY CAPABILITY, ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED AND READY FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION.

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has primary responsibility for nuclear retaliation and is charged with exploiting U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems at the outbreak of hostilities. Total SAC force has been reduced from 44 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 5 reconn.) wings of bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at end FY 1958 to 43 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 4 reconn.) wings at end FY 1959, one medium reconnaissance wing having been inactivated. Programmed changes during FY 1960 will result in the inactivation of another medium reconnaissance wing and activation of one strategic missile wing, retaining the total of 43 wings (comprised of 12 heavy, 27 medium, 3 reconn. and one strategic missile wings).

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1959 as two more B–30 wings converted to B–52s, bringing total to 9 equipped² B–52 wings. Two more redesignated wings are in process of being equipped with B–52s. By end FY 1960, 11 wings will be fully converted to B–52s, and one additional wing will be in the process of converting from B–47 medium bombers to B–52s. While combat capability of SAC heavy bombers is improving through introduction of new equipment, the B–47 medium bomber fleet is approaching obsolescence. These aircraft, which make up the bulk of the bomber force and have now been in service about 7 years, have recently undergone a major safety-of-flight structural reinforcement to extend their usefulness.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, the vulnerability of SAC bases and in turn, the SAC nuclear retaliatory forces within and outside the United States, continues to be a matter of great concern. To reduce vulnerability, SAC dispersal and alert programs are being implemented. The status of these programs is:

1. Heavy bomber dispersal. Although there is a goal to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 33 squadrons are presently located on 18 bases. By end FY 1960, 36 squadrons are programmed to be dispersed on 27 bases, i.e., three bases each with three squadrons, three bases each with two squadrons, and 21 bases each with one squadron. (See Dispersal map, Sec. VIII).

2. Medium bomber dispersal. At present, there are 28 wings on 18 bases. At end FY 1960, 27 wings are programmed to be located at 18 bases (nine bases each with two wings, and nine bases each with one wing).

3. Alert. As of 30 June 1959, 268 bombers with associated tankers were on continuous 15-minute alert. By end FY 1960, approximately 335 SAC bombers with associated tankers are expected to be on continuous 15-minute alert. A test of the airborne alert concept was completed on 30 June 1959 and the results are being evaluated.

The first ATLAS intercontinental ballistic missile complex, at Vandenburg AFB, initially programmed to be operational in June 1959, is now scheduled to be operational before the end of October 1959. A second complex for the first squadron is programmed to become operational before the end of CY 1959. The second ATLAS squadron, programmed for Warren AFB, is scheduled to become operational prior to the end of FY 1960. The research and development programs for the TITAN and MINUTEMAN are progressing satisfactorily. The first TITAN squadron is programmed by the Air Force to be operational by end FY 1961 and the first MINUTEMAN squadron during FY 1963.

Supplementing the SAC retaliatory capabilities are the USAF tactical nuclear strike forces. In the Pacific, these forces consist of 3 wings of tactical fighters, one wing of tactical bombers and 2 squadrons of MATADOR tactical missiles, all to continue in the program during FY 1960. In the United Kingdom, Europe and the Middle East, tactical nuclear strike forces consist of 6 tactical fighter wings permanently deployed plus 4 squadrons on continuous rotation from the United States; one wing of tactical bombers, and 3 squadrons of tactical missiles (2 MATADOR and one MACE). The tactical nuclear strike units in these areas are programmed to remain unchanged during FY 1960 except for converting one of the 2 MATADOR squadrons to MACE missiles. Nuclear-capable tactical air forces in the United States, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 6 tactical fighter wing equivalents which continue in the program through FY 1960. One bomber wing and 6 tactical fighter wings were inactivated during FY 1959.

Continuing progress is being made in providing the above delivery systems with weapons and warheads having improved weight to yield ratios. Continuing dispersal of nuclear weapons to combat units in the field has improved greatly the operational readiness of our offensive forces. This action, coupled with streamlining of our release procedures, has reduced substantially the reaction time of these forces to counter enemy aggression. However, due to political denial of storage rights in certain countries, weapons allocated to some combat units are not immediately available to those units. Action is continuing to obtain the authority for dispersal of nuclear weapons to those additional countries.

Certain major U.S. Navy forces, with the primary mission of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications, possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability is primarily in the attack carrier striking forces with a secondary capability in missile delivery from surface ships and submarines. There are 14 attack carriers (including 2 new carriers in “shakedown” status) and 16 associated carrier air groups of which 4 to 5 attack carriers with their attached air groups are normally in position to strike assigned targets. Deliveries of new jet aircraft and modernization and new construction of attack aircraft carriers have materially increased the Navy’s nuclear weapon delivery capability. The 4 CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have markedly increased this capability in fleet operations. Included in the naval forces are Marine Corps forces which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. This includes one Marine aircraft wing in the Pacific (2/3 wing in 7th Fleet and 1/3 wing in other Pacific areas). One Marine division in the Pacific (2/3 division in 7th Fleet and 1/3 in other Pacific areas) and one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) with Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean can contribute to a nuclear retaliatory capability when deployed into position. Two Marine aircraft wings and 1-8/9 divisions, all nuclear capable, located within CONUS are available for augmenting overseas forces. Fleet Marine Force troops reinforcing the division in the Pacific had both 8” howitzer and HONEST JOHN equipment while the BLT with the Sixth Fleet was reinforced by an 8” howitzer unit.

The present Naval capability for guided missile delivery of nuclear warheads from surface ships and submarines is represented by the REGULUS I system for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS I system is now installed in 4 submarines and 3 heavy cruisers. There are 11 other submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance system (TROUNCE) to provide terminal control of a REGULUS missile launched from either a submarine or cruiser. By end FY 1960, one more submarine will be equipped with REGULUS I system. Normally 1/3 to 1/2 of these ships are deployed and contribute to capabilities of unified commands.

The first 5 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines authorized, for which money was appropriated by Congress, are under construction. Congress appropriated funds for 4 additional FBM submarines in the FY 1959 budget, plus additional funds to lend assurance to the achievement of an effective early operational capability for the POLARIS missile. In December 1958, funds for one of these submarines were released for obligation in FY 1959. Excellent progress has been made in the POLARIS missile development and the system support programs.

Nuclear delivery systems organic to deployed major U.S. Army forces contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability. In Europe, the Army currently maintains 2 REDSTONE missile groups, 8 CORPORAL missile battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN rocket battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN batteries, six 280mm gun battalions (to be reduced to 4 during FY 1960), nine 8-inch howitzer battalions and five 8-inch howitzer batteries. In the Pacific, the Army currently maintains one 280mm gun battalion, one HONEST JOHN battalion, two 8-inch howitzer battalions, three 8-inch howitzer batteries and 3 HONEST JOHN batteries. Nuclear warheads are stored in the immediate vicinity of the above units thereby insuring maximum operational readiness. New weapons design and missile check-out procedures have appreciably reduced reaction time. Nuclear delivery units in the United States capable of augmenting forces overseas include one medium missile command (HONEST JOHN and CORPORAL), one air transportable missile command (HONEST JOHN) and one REDSTONE missile group. By end FY 1960, eight of the newly developed air transportable LACROSSE missile battalions will be available for U.S. Army forces deployed in CONUS, Europe and Pacific. The planned transition from the liquid-fueled REDSTONE and CORPORAL missiles to solid propellant and all-inertial guidance system for the PERSHING and SERGEANT systems will greatly improve mobility and reaction time. One SERGEANT missile battalion will also be activated during FY 1960. Current developmental progress of the PERSHING missile indicates that it will have an operational capability in FY 1963.

In opposing U.S. retaliatory forces, the Soviet Bloc air defense system has the following general capabilities:

1. Capabilities are greatest against penetration conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between 5,000 feet and about 45,000 feet.

2. At altitudes above about 45,000 feet enemy air defense capabilities decrease progressively as altitude is increased, except in the areas equipped with surface-to-air missiles where capabilities are unimpaired to at least 60,000 feet.

3. At altitudes below about 5,000 feet, enemy capabilities decrease progressively as altitude decreases and are probably seriously reduced at altitudes below about 1,500 feet.

4. Against penetrations conducted at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the capabilities of the enemy system are greatly reduced because of the limited availability of all-weather fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

5. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, decoys, and electronic countermeasures, the capabilities of the enemy system are diminished through disruption and saturation.

The degree of advantage accruing to the United States and its allies as a result of retaliatory attacks would depend on a number of strategic and operational considerations, to include exercise of initiative, the amount of warning of Soviet attack, the degree of protection, and the mobility or concealment afforded military forces and installations, particularly those from which our retaliatory effort would be launched. It is estimated that enemy losses sustained as a result of a U.S. retaliatory attack would provide a margin of advantage to the United States and its allies which, if exploited in conjunction with other military operations, would assure eventual victory.

B. HIGHLY MOBILE AND SUITABLY DEPLOYED READY FORCES WITH THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND SELECTIVELY AND FLEXIBLY TO LOCAL AGGRESSION USING ALL WEAPONS (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AS REQUIRED, AND TO CARRY OUT GENERAL WAR TASKS.

1. Over-all Capabilities.

a. U.S. Army forces are capable of reacting selectively and flexibly and with appropriate means to situations ranging from local aggression to general war. Integration of organic nuclear delivery systems in the reorganized infantry, armored and airborne divisions has increased the operational capability of the Army to engage in nuclear warfare. The dual capability of individual weapons systems has been improved by a new high explosive warhead for HONEST JOHN rocket, which is now available in limited quantities, and will be further improved by activation of LACROSSE missile battalions scheduled for FY 1960. Introduction of DAVY CROCKETT [text not declassified] atomic weapon planned for FY 1961 will further enhance nuclear capabilities of Army forces. Exploitation of the helicopter, together with introduction of self-contained, readily transportable combat units provides an increased degree of flexibility and mobility. The Army considers that principal limitations on effectiveness of Army forces are: insufficient manpower and funds; lack of modernization of non-nuclear weapons and equipment; an insufficiency of combat support and logistic support; lack of forward depots, and insufficiency of adequate high speed troop lift.

b. Naval. Highly mobile and strategically deployed ready naval forces have the capability and flexibility to respond selectively and with the degree of force necessary to meet local aggression and to carry out general war tasks. U.S. naval forces have increased their nuclear and non-nuclear capability which adds materially to the effectiveness of the ready forces. The Navy has continued integration of guided missiles weapons systems into fleet operations. BULLPUP air-to-surface missile, a close air support guided missile, is now in the combat inventory of Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in limited quantities. Atlantic Fleet has a limited capability in surface-to-air missiles for fleet air defense with 3 TERRIER equipped ships and the USS GALVESTON now conducting evaluation of TALOS shipboard system. All attack carriers are equipped with SIDEWINDER and some with SPARROW III air-to-air missile squadrons for air defense operations. Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Force ground and air units with capability to employ nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, either surface or air launched. The vertical assault technique developed by Navy and Marine Corps no longer ties an initial assault to the shore line but permits landing of troops quickly and selectively to points up to 50 miles inland.

Capability to conduct vertical assault operations was increased materially by conversion of 2 CVS’s to LPH’s, bringing to 3 the number of interim LPH’s available. One of these ships is assigned to Atlantic Fleet and 2 to Pacific Fleet. Two of the LPH’s are capable of carrying a fully combat-ready BLT and one helicopter squadron, while one LPH is capable of carrying one-half BLT and one helicopter squadron.

c. Air Force. There was a substantial reduction in the number of USAF tactical air wings world-wide during FY 1959. These forces were reduced from a total of 45 wings at end FY 1958 to 35 wings at end FY 1959, and are being reduced further to 34 wings at end FY I960. Nevertheless, tactical as well as strategic air units retain a capability to respond effectively to general war or local aggression, resulting from improved nuclear delivery means, decreased reaction time and increased mobility. However, our present programs do not compensate entirely for future improvements and increase in Soviet capability. The most pressing problems in the tactical area concern the slow rate of aircraft modernization and the need for improved ground environment systems which can control effectively both air defense and tactical air weapon systems in overseas areas.

d. In the succeeding paragraphs the ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and general war are treated by geographical areas.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section II of the report.]

III. EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEM.

A. OBJECTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINENTAL U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Based on NSC 5802/1). To be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory forces, even in the event of surprise attack. Such preparation should: (1) Provide warning to alert the nation to impending attack; (2) counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts; (3) prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale; (4) maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes; (5) provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population; and (6) include appropriately organizing, protecting, and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

B. ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES.

1. Current Soviet capabilities for full-scale air attack on the continental United States depend mainly on their long range aviation. Although still consisting primarily of medium bombers capable of attacking the continental United States only through the extensive use of one-way missions, Soviet long range aviation has continued to be improved by the phasing-in of additional jet bombers, more realistic and larger scale training exercises, improvement of potential staging bases in the Arctic, development of in-flight refueling, and improvement of electronic equipment for ECM, bombing, navigation, and other purposes. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been identified at many home bases of the Soviet long range aviation force and it is believed that nuclear bombs are now the primary weapon of this force. The number of aircraft launched against the United States in an initial attack, even under conditions where surprise was a major Soviet consideration, could range in the several hundreds.

2. It is estimated that the USSR is developing and stockpiling a versatile group of nuclear weapons with yields ranging from about 1 KT to about 12 MT.

3. For planning purposes, it should be considered that the Soviets will probably attain an operational capability with ten ICBMs in the first half of 1960, with a possibility of this occurring in the latter part of 1959.

4. The USSR probably now has a limited number of submarines capable of launching subsonic, cruise type missiles with a range of 150–200 nautical miles. These missiles could be launched by a submarine only after surfacing. Additional submarines could be converted to include this capability in four to six months from the time the decision is made to do so. At least 3 Z-Class submarines may have been converted to include a missile capability, possibly of the short range ballistic type.

5. Clandestine attack on the United States by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

C. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND PROBLEMS. The absolute capability of our forces to defend the United States against air attack by air breathing weapon systems has progressively increased. This over-all increase results from establishment of North American Air Defense Command; installation of additional early warning radar coverage (including full activation of Aleutian extension of Pacific DEW lines); provision of more effective control of the air defense system through automation; increased coverage of the sea surveillance system; and availability of improved weapon systems including those with nuclear warheads. Although U.S. air defense capabilities have improved during FY 1959, Soviet nuclear weapons development and improved delivery capabilities during same period have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. Soviets are probably now capable of exploiting weaknesses in our air defense system at very high and low altitudes and of utilizing electronic countermeasures, sabotage, and deception to contribute to their attack. The estimated Soviet initial limited ICBM capability will provide an additional means of exploiting weaknesses in the continental air defense system. This system cannot be expected to counter completely an all-out attack of the magnitude which the Soviets are capable of launching against the North American continent. Solutions to the following problems are being pursued on a high priority basis as funding permits:

1. Procurement, training and retention of the highly skilled personnel required by modern and increasingly complex defense systems.

2. Detection of airborne vehicles at very high and very low altitudes, and development and availability of weapons which can be effectively used at these altitudes.

3. Development and implementation of measures to overcome or counteract enemy electronic countermeasures.

4. Development of a system which can be used in the defense against enemy ballistic missiles.

5. Development of an effective and integrated sea surveillance system which will provide for detection, identification, and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within missile launching range of the North American continent toward the goal of development of the capability to establish control over the submarine or surface ship prior to the launching of its missile.

6. Identification and engagement of hostile aircraft as far from our borders as possible.

7. Means to shorten the long lead time involved in the completion of programmed improvements to the systems.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

1. Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5912, Defense Department report on “Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 June 1959.” Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extracts—12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5912.
2. Note: An “equipped” unit possesses 50% or more of authorized number of aircraft. [Footnote is in the original.]