Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

199. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 21, 1959

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5906/1
• B. NSC Action No. 2114–c

The enclosed draft revision of paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base) of NSC 5906/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft submitted by the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization after review of current mobilization base policy pursuant to NSC Action No. 2114–c, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 1, 1959.

Also enclosed for consideration by the Council at this meeting is a draft revision of paragraph 64–f of NSC 5906/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of its review of the Mobilization Base paragraph.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Enclosure

Draft Revision

Washington, August 29, 1959

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

59. Mobilization Base.² The mobilization base consists of the military logistics base and the civilian readiness base and should emphasize those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability.

a. Military Logistics Base.³ The military logistics base should be designed to provide for the forces and the logistic requirements of: (a) cold war (b) opposition to local aggression, and (c) general war. The general objective of the military logistics base is to achieve a degree of war readiness which will provide for meeting foreseeable military contingencies. The highest priority will be placed upon achieving and maintaining optimum readiness for the active forces. To achieve this objective, implementation of the military logistics base planning, in addition to providing for a continuing deterrent (including force and equipment modernization), should be sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of the following:

(1) Cold war including periods of heightened tension.

(2) Opposition to local aggression, in accordance with paragraphs 12–a and 16 above, by:

(a) U.S. active forces, supplemented as necessary, without degrading the general war posture to a militarily unacceptable degree.

(b) Allied forces, to the extent it is essential they be provided support for combat operations from U.S. resources.

Planning for [illegible in the original] opposition to local aggression will include arrangements for the timely provision of personnel same as and combat essential materiel to insure the continued maintenance of an acceptable general war posture.

(3) General War:

(a) The active forces as of D-Day.

(b) The selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission.

(c) Additional forces necessary for continued support and reconstitution of forces required to achieve national objectives.

Planning for general war will include appropriate consideration of nuclear damage.

b. Civilian Readiness Base. The general objective of the civilian readiness base is to provide for the mobilization and management, for war and survival purposes, of all resources and productive capacity not under military control which can be made available to meet essential military and civilian requirements in any international emergency affecting U.S. national security interests. In developing this base, emphasis will be placed upon meeting the following goals:

(1) Support of the military logistics base, as set forth in a above.

(2) Implementation of the national policies set forth in paragraphs 58 (Civil Defense), 60 (Strategic Stockpiling) and 64–g (Manpower).

(3) Maximum feasible support from U.S. trade and other economic policies for both the cold war efforts of the United States and the wartime readiness posture of U.S. industry and that of our allies.

(4) Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of (measures) essential

(5) Develop plans essential to recovery in the event of general war.

STATE-OCDM-COMMERCE	BUDGET-TREASURY
to national survival and to retain a capacity for quick recovery in the event of general war.	to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government.

64. f. Develop and maintain suitably-screened, organized and trained reserve forces of the size necessary to support the military logistics base (Par. 59–a).

1. Source: Transmits draft revision of paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
2. “For planning purposes, the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs.
   “Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels; state of training; modernization of equipment; mobilization materiel reserves and facilities; continuity of government; civil defense plans and preparedness measures; psychological preparedness of the people; international agreements; planning with industry; dispersion; and stand-by legislation and controls.”
   (This is the definition of the term “Mobilization Base” adopted by NSC Action No. 1756, subsequently approved by the President.) [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The military logistics base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to the military effort in order to meet foreseeable wartime needs. [Footnote is in the original.]