Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 23, 1959

SUBJECT

• Strategic Concept and Military Paragraphs of NSC 5810/1

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Secretary Herter
  • Gerard C. Smith
• Defense
  • Secretary McElroy
  • John N. Irwin II

Mr. McElroy opened the discussion by saying that he foresaw a time when we would have to change our counterforce strategy. He suggested that this might be some years in the future when the USSR has invulnerable missile sites. They do not have such an invulnerable striking force now and Mr. McElroy is accordingly opposed to a change away from our present counter-force strategy.

On our limited war capability, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that last year’s State-Defense limited war study had shown that the US had the capability to handle two limited war situations at the same time. Mr. Smith pointed out that this study had been based on the assumption, insisted upon by the JCS, that only the US would use nuclear weapons in limited war situations.

Mr. McElroy tentatively suggested that perhaps there should be a new limited war study on a different assumption, although he was not prepared to agree immediately to the launching of such a study. The Secretary of State commented that if such a study were undertaken it might help the Department of Defense if it showed up areas in which our capabilities needed improvement. Mr. Herter spoke of the need for mobility. The Secretary of Defense said the problem of mobility was not so much one of aircraft as of ground facilities at prospective landing points.

There was considerable discussion of the language in paragraph 10a in NSC 5810/1 to the effect that nuclear weapons are to be regarded as conventional weapons from the military point of view. Mr. Smith pointed out that each time a situation had arisen in which the possible use of nuclear weapons had been considered the decision had been against using them. He thought that our weapons systems and force structure had been erected on a fallacy—i.e., that the use of nuclear weapons would be authorized in less than all-out situations.

The Secretary of State pointed out that our existing doctrine might call for the automatic use of nuclear weapons in limited situations. (In that connection, he inquired concerning the status of the advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Irwin said that the papers had recently been sent to State Department for resubmission to the President.) Mr. Herter hoped that the US could develop such forces as would make an automatic nuclear reaction unnecessary. Mr. McElroy expressed agreement with this position and said that paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1 might well have some change to clarify this point. The Secretary of Defense took the line that it was not so much the language of the basic National Security Policy that mattered; more important thing was that State and Defense had a common understanding of what the language means.

Mr. Smith said that another central point was whether or not massive retaliation could still be relied on to deter all kinds of Communist aggression. He cited the present Berlin situation and possible troubles to come. Mr. McElroy doubted that massive retaliation had lost its effect. Mr. Irwin said that it was the threat of massive retaliation that was now restraining the USSR from turning over its responsibilities re Berlin to the GDR. The Secretary of State indicated a measure of agreement with this assessment.

In a discussion of possible requirements for the use of force in the Middle East, the Secretary of Defense said that we ought to use all force necessary to deal with a specific situation. Mr. Smith identified this as the Radford doctrine and expressed dissent from it.

Mr. Irwin described in general terms Defense thinking re possible limited military operations in the Middle East. Mr. Smith pointed out that the planning described was inconsistent with the strategic doctrine which had been discussed earlier in the meeting. He felt that this illustrated the difficulty that we were in. We could not even in planning for possible situations follow current doctrine.

Mr. McElroy commented that if there was a “fundamental” line of State Department thought on the strategic concept perhaps it would have to be changed for foreign policy reasons.

Mr. Irwin raised the point that a change in the strategic concept would at bottom be a budget matter. Two other things that would have to be taken into account were the statement of foreign policy requirements which State had provided to Defense and the Gray target mix study which is still to come. Mr. Smith said that in his view the Gray study should come after, not before, a decision on the strategic concept.

Mr. Irwin subsequently commented to Mr. Smith that there were two possibilities with respect to language of NSC 5810/1: (1) there might be some change in the language about nuclear weapons being conventional weapons; (2) there might be some virtue in including a definition of limited war.

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On May 25, the Secretary of State commented to Mr. Smith that even if there were no language change in the National Security Policy, State should try to get into the NSC record the State paper on foreign policy requirements and a Department of Defense statement that the currently planned Military Establishment can meet these foreign policy requirements.

1. Source: Strategic concept of basic national security policy. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.