153. Letter From Herter to
McElroy1
Washington, April 25,
1959
Dear Neil:
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On February 26, 1959, Deputy Secretary Quarles and I agreed that Assistant Secretaries Irwin of
Defense and Smith of State would consult together on the problems of US
strategy raised in Secretary Dulles’ letter of January 24, 1959 before
the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1,
“Basic National Security Policy”, were taken up by the NSC Planning Board in the 1959 annual
review of that paper.
In the course of a preliminary discussion on April 16 Mr. Irwin suggested
to Mr. Smith that it would be helpful if this Department could provide a
brief statement of foreign policy requirements bearing upon military
strategy. I am accordingly sending you the enclosed paper.
I recognize that there are various considerations in addition to those of
foreign policy that must bear upon the formulation of our military
strategy. I hope, however, that the enclosed paper will be of assistance
to your Department in its re-examination of the military paragraphs of
NSC 5810/1.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,
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Enclosure
Staff Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington,
April 24,
1959
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Summary Statement of Foreign Policy
Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy
US strategy should serve our national policy objectives of
maintaining the cohesion of the Free World and influencing the
policies of the Communist empire in directions compatible with US
national security interests. From the point of view of foreign
policy this requires:
1. An evident, secure nuclear retaliatory
capability and an acceptable doctrine for its use. This
capability is the primary requirement. Its existence does not,
however, solve all problems. We need to reassure our allies that
this capability would be used only in defense of vital interests and
that its use would be consistent with their continued survival.
2. An evident, adequate and flexible capability for
military operations short of general war and an acceptable
doctrine for its use against the range of possible Communist
aggressions. This requirement is of increasing importance.
As Soviet nuclear capability grows, so does Free World and Communist
questioning that the US would use its strategic nuclear capability
in any situation that did not clearly and imminently endanger vital
US security interests. Deterrence of Communist limited aggression,
and Free World confidence that such aggression will be deterred,
will depend more and more on the strengthening of US limited war
capability. The present degree of US reliance on nuclear weapons for
this purpose disturbs large segments of the Free World and impedes
the fulfillment of our national policy objective of maintaining the
cohesion of the Free World. We need from the point of view of
foreign policy a capability and a doctrine that are flexible enough
to enable us to deter and to defeat limited Communist aggression in
ways that are acceptable to Free World public opinion and that
minimize the danger of expanding local war into general war.
The foregoing generalizations apply to the deterrence and defeat of
three categories of Communist aggression as follows:
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1. Substantial Soviet aggression against the NATO area would mean general
war.
2. Overt Soviet non-nuclear aggression against
non-NATO areas. For
deterrent purposes we must retain the threat of nuclear response. In
the event of such aggression, however, it would be preferable if our
initial response were non-nuclear. Should the USSR persist in its aggression,
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limited and
local use of nuclear weapons against military targets would be
acceptable from the foreign policy point of view.
3. All other kinds of Communist aggression.
For deterrent purposes we should not explicitly deny ourselves the
use of nuclear weapons. It should, on the other hand, be evident to
the Free World that we are not overly dependent on these weapons for
deterrence or actual military operations. In the event of such
aggression, recourse to the use of nuclear weapons would, in most
situations, have highly adverse consequences from the foreign policy
point of view. We should, therefore, plan and be prepared for a
non-nuclear response in these situations. The use of nuclear weapons
should be regarded as a last resort.
