U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, at
the 355th Council meeting on Febraury 13, 1958, adopted the statement of
policy contained in NSC 5802, subject to
the amendments thereto set forth in NSC
Action No. 1862–b.
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
| Paragraph and Subject |
Primary Responsibility |
| 5—International Collaboration |
State in collaboration with Defense |
| 6—Strategic Warning (1st two sentences) |
Intelligence agencies under DCI coordination within existing
law and established policy |
| (Last sentence) |
All appropriate agencies |
| 7—Tactical Warning |
Defense |
| 8—Active Defense |
Defense |
| 9—Passive Defense of Retaliatory Capability |
Defense |
| 10—Improvement of Alert Status of Air Defense Forces |
Defense |
| 11—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil
Defense |
Defense in collaboration with FCD |
| 12—Research and Development |
All appropriate agencies |
| 13–18—Internal Security |
IIC and ICIS coordination |
| 19—Port Security |
Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed |
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| 20—Continuity of Government |
ODM in collaboration with all
participating agencies |
| 21—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities |
ODM in collaboration with all
participating agencies |
| 22—Continuity of Industry |
ODM |
| 23—Stockpiling of Civilian Survival Items |
ODM in collaboration with
FCDA |
| 24–27—Civil Defense |
FCDA |
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STATEMENT
of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
SCOPE
1. This statement of policy on “continental defense” does not encompass
all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to the defense of
North America, but is limited as follows:
- a.
- Only those U.S. policies are included which are essentially
defensive in nature, i.e., which contribute directly to the
defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of
that element of our retaliatory capability based on the North
American Continent.
- b.
- This statement of policy does not include programs. The
omission from this statement of programs does not of itself
cancel or change any program set forth in NSC 5408. However, the responsible
agencies should review such programs in the light of this policy
statement to determine whether such programs are currently valid
or should be cancelled or changed.
RELATIVE EMPHASIS
2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of offensive
and defensive elements and of military and non-military measures. Each
of these has its proper role in deterring an attack or in the defense of
the United States should an attack occur. Predominant emphasis should
continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen our effective nuclear
retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve our active defenses, as
compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures.
Particular emphasis should be accorded those active and passive defense
measures essential to the protection of the U.S. capability for prompt
nuclear retaliation. An effective North American continental defense
system will constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on the
North American Continent.
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OBJECTIVES
3. The United States should be prepared at all times to counter an attack
on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack
or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation.
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- a.
- Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and
maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations,
a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect
and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory forces, even in
the event of surprise attack.
- b.
- Such preparation should:
- (1)
- Provide warning to alert the nation to impending
attack.
- (2)
- Counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts.
- (3)
- Prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly
restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national
morale.
- (4)
- Maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology
permits and as the nature of the threat changes.
- (5)
- Provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil
population.
- c.
- Such preparation should include appropriately organizing,
protecting and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of
the country essential to national survival.
TIME-PHASING
4. The time-phasing of U.S. “continental defense” measures should take
into account the threat posed by the present nuclear megaton attack
capability of the USSR and by
anticipated future improvements in Soviet weapons and delivery
capabilities, particularly the achievement of a significant ICBM capability.2 Effective continental defense requires that the
United States should be constantly on guard against “technological
surprise” and should continually strive for technological
superiority.
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INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION
5. Continental defense requires close collaboration with certain allies;
in particular, Canadian agreement and participation remain essential to
effective continental defense. Efforts should also be continued to
achieve more effective collaboration with Mexico and Iceland.
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STRATEGIC WARNING
6. As achievable tactical warning time decreases, it becomes increasingly
important to obtain strategic warning of Soviet Bloc attack against the
United States. Even if some risks have to be taken, vigorous efforts
should be made, including the development of new techniques, to collect
and accurately evaluate indications of hostile intentions that would
give maximum prior strategic warning of hostile action against the
United States. Because it cannot be concluded that the United States
surely will, or surely will not, have strategic warning of attack, U.S.
planning should take account of both possibilities.
TACTICAL WARNING AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
7. Tactical warning of an impending attack, including very high- and very
low-level altitude detection and sea surveillance, should be provided to
assure adequate time for counter-offensive forces to initiate action,
for defense forces to achieve alert readiness, and for civil defense,
internal security and other non-military measures to be effectively
implemented. To this end:
- a.
- Our early warning radar network and its seaward extensions
should be improved.
- b.
- Weaknesses in identification techniques should be
remedied.
- c.
- An effective early warning radar system against ICBM’s should be developed and
brought into operation as an integral part of the air defense
system, as a matter of the highest national priority.
ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES
8. The United States should continue to improve, and to maintain at a
high state of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air
surveillance, weapons, and control elements, providing defense in depth
capable of detecting, identifying, engaging, and destroying enemy
aircraft or missiles approaching or operating over the North American
Continent before they reach vital targets.
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- a.
- Defense against Bomber and Non-Ballistic Missile
Attack. Such a defense in depth should include interceptor
and fighter aircraft and air defense missiles. In addition to
primary air defense forces, all other forces with an air defense
capability which can be made temporarily available should be made
immediately available and employed as required within this system in
the event of attack or the threat of immediate attack.
- b.
- Defense against ICBM Attack. In view of continued USSR advances in ballistic missile
development, the United States should develop an anti-ICBM weapon system as a matter of the
highest national priority.
- c.
- Defense against the Threat of Missile Attack
Launched from Ocean Areas. In order to meet the threat of
missiles launched from ocean areas, the United States should develop
and maintain at a high state of readiness integrated sea
surveillance systems which will provide for detection and tracking
of surface ships and submarines operating within
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missile-launching range
of the North American Continent; and should improve its defense
against submarine-launched missiles and its anti-submarine
capability.
PASSIVE DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
9. Passive measures, such as dispersal, reduction of reaction time, and
protection of essential facilities, should be taken to minimize the
vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory striking forces.
IMPROVEMENT OF ALERT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES
10. The United States should continue to improve and maintain the alert
status of its primary air defense forces, and cooperate in improvement
of Canadian primary air defense forces, so as to provide an immediate
reaction to warning of an enemy attack. Passive defense measures, such
as dispersal and protection of essential facilities, should be taken to
minimize the vulnerability of air defense forces.
EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN
CIVIL DEFENSE
11. In the event of attack on the United States, the active defense of
the United States and the U.S. nuclear counter-offensive will be the
paramount and most immediate tasks of certain U.S. forces. Additionally,
certain other forces will be immediately involved in support of these
defense and counter-offensive forces. Forces not required in the
execution of essential military missions should be prepared to assist
civil authorities, for a temporary period, in maintaining law and order
and in other essential civilian tasks.
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
12. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained in
order to develop new weapons and needed improvements in the continental
defense system and to counter improving Soviet technological
capabilities for attack against the United States. Of particular
importance are the following (without indication of priority):
- a.
- Early warning capability against enemy aircraft and
non-ballistic missiles, by radar and other techniques.
- b.
- Detection and defense against very high- and very low-level
attacks.
- c.
- Reduction of vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures.
- d.
- Submarine detection, identification, and defense against
submarines and submarine-launched missiles.
- e.
- Early warning capability against ICBM’s, by radar and other techniques.
- f.
- Active defenses against ICBM’s.
- g.
- Defense against satellites and space vehicles.
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INTERNAL SECURITY
13. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security measures
presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack
against the United States.
14. In particular, the United States should, to the extent practicable,
increase safeguards so as to provide adequate deterrents (a) to
clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by any means such as
submarines, small craft, merchant vessels, aircraft, illegal entries of
persons and things, and diplomatic channels; and (b) to utilization of
such weapons against vital targets. Intensive efforts should be
continued to develop active and improved passive devices for the
detection of fissionable material introduced by such means, and to
assure their effective use.
15. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports, as
appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc
airlines.
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16. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical
nature should be protected against espionage and clandestine attack by
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and conventional sabotage.
17. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of
foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in
activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic assignments.
18. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons
potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a
high state of readiness.
Port Security3
19. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels
therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities,
(b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of vessels, and (c) to
provide appropriate safeguards relative to the presence in U.S. ports of
Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. In so far as feasible, having due regard for
legal procedures and rights, subversives should be excluded from vessels
and waterfront facilities.4
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CONTINUITY OF ESSENTIAL WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
20. Plans and relocation facilities needed to ensure the continuity of
essential wartime functions of the Federal Government should be
completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness at the
earliest time practicable.
- a.
- Plans should provide a ready and certain system of attack warning,
reaction and decision-making, with adequate communications and
provision for conducting emergency operations.
- b.
- Emergency Federal relocation facilities should be equipped as
required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of relocated
personnel, and should be continuously staffed as determined by the
President.
- c.
- The few most critical emergency Federal relocation facilities
should be protected against blast, thermal and radiation effects at
the earliest time practicable. Other Federal relocation facilities
in “the Federal arc”5 should be
protected against fallout.
PROTECTION AND DISPERSAL OF FEDERAL
FACILITIES
21. a. Except as otherwise determined by proper
authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing
Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be
located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military
installations, excluding the Pentagon and other similar administrative
headquarters, shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of
Defense.
b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in the
construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size,
designed after this date, along the lines stated in NSC 5807/1.
CONTINUITY OF INDUSTRY
22. a. (1) Dispersal of private industrial
facilities, and the inclusion of fallout shelter therein, as
appropriate, should be encouraged.
(2) Guidance and leadership should be provided to industries essential to
initial recovery from nuclear attack in the development of plans and
programs designed to insure the continuity of essential production and
services.
b. Action should be taken to determine the
critical industries (such as drug, liquid fuel) in which construction of
hardened, dispersed plants is essential to insure national survival.
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STOCKPILING OF CIVILIAN SURVIVAL ITEMS
23. Civilian items essential to initial recovery from nuclear attack
should be identified, minimum requirements determined, and industrial
inventories located and related to Government and State stocks. Where
total availabilities appear inadequate, measures should be developed to
meet minimum requirements with the least disruption of the economy, the
least cost to the Government, and maximum encouragement of private
participation.
CIVIL DEFENSE
24. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is improved and
strengthened civil defense which seeks, by both preventive and
ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack and to
contribute to deterring such attack.
25. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out
their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or
other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments to
function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the
form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance should
include pre-attack planning for the use of local resources and, as
provided in paragraph 11 hereof, of military forces not required in the
execution of essential military missions.
26. Civil defense policy for protection of the civil population in case
of nuclear attack, while continuing to include local planning for the
emergency dispersal of urban populations on attack warning, incorporates
the concept of fallout shelter in accordance with NSC 5807/1.
27. The United States should continue its present policy of supporting
activities which will:
- a.
- Warn the people of impending attack and make possible
essential communication before, during and after attack.
- b.
- Give emphasis to the protection (including dispersal where
necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies, equipment
and facilities.
- c.
- Provide for a continuing effort in research and development of
civilian measures in radiological defense, defense against
chemical and biological warfare, mass communications, medical
care, survival requirements, and other survival measures.
- d.
- Provide appropriate and adequate information to the public of
the nature and extent of the dangers from nuclear attack on the
United States now and in the future, and of the measures being
taken or which could be taken to alleviate them.
