U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, the
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense
Administrator, at the 355th Council meeting on Febraury 13, 1958,
adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5802, subject to the amendments thereto set forth in
NSC Action No. 1862–b.
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR IMPLEMENTATION
|
Paragraph and Subject
|
Primary Responsibility
|
| 5—International Collaboration |
State in collaboration with Defense |
| 6—Strategic Warning (1st two sentences) |
Intelligence agencies under DCI coordination within
existing law and established policy |
| (Last sentence) |
All appropriate agencies |
| 7—Tactical Warning |
Defense |
| 8—Active Defense |
Defense |
| 9—Passive Defense of Retaliatory Capability |
Defense |
| 10—Improvement of Alert Status of Air Defense
Forces |
Defense |
| 11—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil
Defense |
Defense in collaboration with FCD |
| 12—Research and Development |
All appropriate agencies |
| 13–18—Internal Security |
IIC and ICIS coordination |
| 19—Port Security |
Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed |
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| 20—Continuity of Government |
ODM in collaboration with
all participating agencies |
| 21—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities |
ODM in collaboration with
all participating agencies |
| 22—Continuity of Industry |
ODM
|
| 23—Stockpiling of Civilian Survival Items |
ODM in collaboration with
FCDA |
| 24–27—Civil Defense |
FCDA |
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STATEMENT
of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
SCOPE
1. This statement of policy on “continental defense” does not
encompass all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to
the defense of North America, but is limited as follows:
-
a.
- Only those U.S. policies are included which are
essentially defensive in nature, i.e., which contribute
directly to the defense of the North American Continent and
to the protection of that element of our retaliatory
capability based on the North American Continent.
-
b.
- This statement of policy does not include programs. The
omission from this statement of programs does not of itself
cancel or change any program set forth in NSC 5408. However, the
responsible agencies should review such programs in the
light of this policy statement to determine whether such
programs are currently valid or should be cancelled or
changed.
RELATIVE EMPHASIS
2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of
offensive and defensive elements and of military and non-military
measures. Each of these has its proper role in deterring an attack
or in the defense of the United States should an attack occur.
Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to
strengthen our effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent
and to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the
exclusion of—passive defense measures. Particular emphasis should be
accorded those active and passive defense measures essential to the
protection of the U.S. capability for prompt nuclear retaliation. An
effective North American continental defense system will constitute
one of the key deterrents to an attack on the North American
Continent.
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OBJECTIVES
3. The United States should be prepared at all times to counter an
attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter
Soviet attack or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a
free nation.
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-
a.
- Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and
maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World
nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which
will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory
forces, even in the event of surprise attack.
-
b.
- Such preparation should:
- (1)
- Provide warning to alert the nation to impending
attack.
- (2)
- Counter enemy subversive and clandestine
efforts.
- (3)
- Prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly
restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national
morale.
- (4)
- Maintain adaptability to make timely changes as
technology permits and as the nature of the threat
changes.
- (5)
- Provide appropriate measures of protection for the
civil population.
-
c.
- Such preparation should include appropriately organizing,
protecting and placing in a condition of readiness the resources
of the country essential to national survival.
TIME-PHASING
4. The time-phasing of U.S. “continental defense” measures should
take into account the threat posed by the present nuclear megaton
attack capability of the USSR and
by anticipated future improvements in Soviet weapons and delivery
capabilities, particularly the achievement of a significant ICBM capability.2 Effective continental defense requires that
the United States should be constantly on guard against
“technological surprise” and should continually strive for
technological superiority.
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INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND
COORDINATION
5. Continental defense requires close collaboration with certain
allies; in particular, Canadian agreement and participation remain
essential to effective continental defense. Efforts should also be
continued to achieve more effective collaboration with Mexico and
Iceland.
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STRATEGIC WARNING
6. As achievable tactical warning time decreases, it becomes
increasingly important to obtain strategic warning of Soviet Bloc
attack against the United States. Even if some risks have to be
taken, vigorous efforts should be made, including the development of
new techniques, to collect and accurately evaluate indications of
hostile intentions that would give maximum prior strategic warning
of hostile action against the United States. Because it cannot be
concluded that the United States surely will, or surely will not,
have strategic warning of attack, U.S. planning should take account
of both possibilities.
TACTICAL WARNING AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
7. Tactical warning of an impending attack, including very high- and
very low-level altitude detection and sea surveillance, should be
provided to assure adequate time for counter-offensive forces to
initiate action, for defense forces to achieve alert readiness, and
for civil defense, internal security and other non-military measures
to be effectively implemented. To this end:
-
a.
- Our early warning radar network and its seaward extensions
should be improved.
-
b.
- Weaknesses in identification techniques should be
remedied.
-
c.
- An effective early warning radar system against ICBM’s should be developed
and brought into operation as an integral part of the air
defense system, as a matter of the highest national
priority.
ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
8. The United States should continue to improve, and to maintain at a
high state of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air
surveillance, weapons, and control elements, providing defense in
depth capable of detecting, identifying, engaging, and destroying
enemy aircraft or missiles approaching or operating over the North
American Continent before they reach vital targets.
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-
a.
-
Defense against Bomber and Non-Ballistic
Missile Attack. Such a defense in depth should include
interceptor and fighter aircraft and air defense missiles. In
addition to primary air defense forces, all other forces with an
air defense capability which can be made temporarily available
should be made immediately available and employed as required
within this system in the event of attack or the threat of
immediate attack.
-
b.
-
Defense against ICBM Attack. In view of continued USSR advances in ballistic
missile development, the United States should develop an
anti-ICBM weapon system as
a matter of the highest national priority.
-
c.
-
Defense against the Threat of Missile Attack
Launched from Ocean Areas. In order to meet the threat
of missiles launched from ocean areas, the United States should
develop and maintain at a high state of readiness integrated sea
surveillance systems which will provide for detection and
tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within [Typeset Page 49]
missile-launching range of the North American Continent; and
should improve its defense against submarine-launched missiles
and its anti-submarine capability.
PASSIVE DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
9. Passive measures, such as dispersal, reduction of reaction time,
and protection of essential facilities, should be taken to minimize
the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory striking forces.
IMPROVEMENT OF ALERT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES
10. The United States should continue to improve and maintain the
alert status of its primary air defense forces, and cooperate in
improvement of Canadian primary air defense forces, so as to provide
an immediate reaction to warning of an enemy attack. Passive defense
measures, such as dispersal and protection of essential facilities,
should be taken to minimize the vulnerability of air defense
forces.
EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN
CIVIL DEFENSE
11. In the event of attack on the United States, the active defense
of the United States and the U.S. nuclear counter-offensive will be
the paramount and most immediate tasks of certain U.S. forces.
Additionally, certain other forces will be immediately involved in
support of these defense and counter-offensive forces. Forces not
required in the execution of essential military missions should be
prepared to assist civil authorities, for a temporary period, in
maintaining law and order and in other essential civilian tasks.
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
12. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained
in order to develop new weapons and needed improvements in the
continental defense system and to counter improving Soviet
technological capabilities for attack against the United States. Of
particular importance are the following (without indication of
priority):
-
a.
- Early warning capability against enemy aircraft and
non-ballistic missiles, by radar and other
techniques.
-
b.
- Detection and defense against very high- and very
low-level attacks.
-
c.
- Reduction of vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures.
-
d.
- Submarine detection, identification, and defense against
submarines and submarine-launched missiles.
-
e.
- Early warning capability against ICBM’s, by radar and other techniques.
-
f.
- Active defenses against ICBM’s.
-
g.
- Defense against satellites and space vehicles.
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INTERNAL SECURITY
13. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security
measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to
covert attack against the United States.
14. In particular, the United States should, to the extent
practicable, increase safeguards so as to provide adequate
deterrents (a) to clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by any
means such as submarines, small craft, merchant vessels, aircraft,
illegal entries of persons and things, and diplomatic channels; and
(b) to utilization of such weapons against vital targets. Intensive
efforts should be continued to develop active and improved passive
devices for the detection of fissionable material introduced by such
means, and to assure their effective use.
15. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports,
as appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc
airlines.
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16. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly
critical nature should be protected against espionage and
clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
conventional sabotage.
17. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of
foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in
activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic
assignments.
18. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons
potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a
high state of readiness.
Port Security3
19. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels
therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities, (b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of
vessels, and (c) to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
presence in U.S. ports of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. In so far as
feasible, having due regard for legal procedures and rights,
subversives should be excluded from vessels and waterfront
facilities.4
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CONTINUITY OF ESSENTIAL WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
20. Plans and relocation facilities needed to ensure the continuity
of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government should be
completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness at the
earliest time practicable.
-
a.
- Plans should provide a ready and certain system of attack
warning, reaction and decision-making, with adequate
communications and provision for conducting emergency
operations.
-
b.
- Emergency Federal relocation facilities should be equipped as
required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of
relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed as
determined by the President.
-
c.
- The few most critical emergency Federal relocation facilities
should be protected against blast, thermal and radiation effects
at the earliest time practicable. Other Federal relocation
facilities in “the Federal arc”5 should be protected against
fallout.
PROTECTION AND DISPERSAL OF FEDERAL
FACILITIES
21. a. Except as otherwise determined by
proper authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of
existing Federal facilities, important to national security, should
not be located in target areas. The location of new or expanded
military installations, excluding the Pentagon and other similar
administrative headquarters, shall be within the sole discretion of
the Secretary of Defense.
b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in
the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable
size, designed after this date, along the lines stated in NSC 5807/1.
CONTINUITY OF INDUSTRY
22. a. (1) Dispersal of private industrial
facilities, and the inclusion of fallout shelter therein, as
appropriate, should be encouraged.
(2) Guidance and leadership should be provided to industries
essential to initial recovery from nuclear attack in the development
of plans and programs designed to insure the continuity of essential
production and services.
b. Action should be taken to determine the
critical industries (such as drug, liquid fuel) in which
construction of hardened, dispersed plants is essential to insure
national survival.
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STOCKPILING OF CIVILIAN SURVIVAL ITEMS
23. Civilian items essential to initial recovery from nuclear attack
should be identified, minimum requirements determined, and
industrial inventories located and related to Government and State
stocks. Where total availabilities appear inadequate, measures
should be developed to meet minimum requirements with the least
disruption of the economy, the least cost to the Government, and
maximum encouragement of private participation.
CIVIL DEFENSE
24. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is improved and
strengthened civil defense which seeks, by both preventive and
ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack and to
contribute to deterring such attack.
25. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out
their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or
other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments
to function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance
in the form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance
should include pre-attack planning for the use of local resources
and, as provided in paragraph 11 hereof, of military forces not
required in the execution of essential military missions.
26. Civil defense policy for protection of the civil population in
case of nuclear attack, while continuing to include local planning
for the emergency dispersal of urban populations on attack warning,
incorporates the concept of fallout shelter in accordance with
NSC 5807/1.
27. The United States should continue its present policy of
supporting activities which will:
-
a.
- Warn the people of impending attack and make possible
essential communication before, during and after
attack.
-
b.
- Give emphasis to the protection (including dispersal where
necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies,
equipment and facilities.
-
c.
- Provide for a continuing effort in research and
development of civilian measures in radiological defense,
defense against chemical and biological warfare, mass
communications, medical care, survival requirements, and
other survival measures.
-
d.
- Provide appropriate and adequate information to the public
of the nature and extent of the dangers from nuclear attack
on the United States now and in the future, and of the
measures being taken or which could be taken to alleviate
them.
