Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

146. Briefing Note for the March 5 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 2, 1959

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958–1963

AND

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

In the Planning Board we are now starting upon the annual review of Basic Policy. As a first step, and by way of background, we have been discussing two National Intelligence Estimates—Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963 (NIE 11–4–58) and Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100–59).

This morning Mr. Allen Dulles is going to summarize the two estimates for the Council, after which there will be an opportunity for questions and discussion. No policy issues are being put forward for decision at this time.

(CALL ON: ALLEN DULLES)

(Note: To the extent that Allen Dulles does not cover or adequately highlight them, you may wish to mention the following 5 points which were identified in the P/B)

The Planning Board noted five respects in which the estimate of the world situation this year differs from last year’s:

1. More emphasis on Soviet Bloc confidence.

2. Decline of Communist influence in Western Europe.

3. Strengthened cohesion of NATO.

4. The restoration of faith as to U.S. leadership, in Western opinion.

5. The lack of Communist success with immediate objectives in under-developed areas.

It was noted that these developments of 1958 seem to look favorable when compared to the rather gloomy developments of 1957. However, it was pointed out that the East-West struggle continues and indeed during 1958 “took on a somewhat more ominous character.”

(Para 6, NIE 100–59)

(Note: If adequate Council discussion is not generated, you may wish to mention some of the following issues which were indentified at the P/B.)

The Planning Board indentified five longer-range developments which it thought should be called to the Council’s attention:

1. The rise in scale and intensity of the Soviet threat: the new confidence of the Soviet leaders; a more assertive and challenging policy; the continuing increase in military power; and an already powerful economy, growing faster than ours

2. The continuing chance of general war occurring through misinterpretation of the opponent’s acts in a major international crisis

3. The growing challenge to the West of the Soviet increased emphasis on trade and aid, and particularly the impact upon under-developed countries

4. The long-range implications of the growing strength of Communist China

5. The conclusion on the part of some members of the intelligence community (although, of course, there is a split) that “the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas, and probably feel somewhat freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in those areas, although probably not initially with overt Soviet forces.” (Para 16, NIE 100–59)

1. Source: NIEs 11–4–58 and 100–59. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.