Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

138. Memorandum From Gray to McElroy¹

Washington, February 18, 1959

SUBJECT

• Defense Presentations to the President

Pursuant to the understanding reached during discussions with you, Mr. Quarles, and General Twining on February 6, I plan to schedule a series of special meetings with the President which will be devoted to a discussion of major policy questions with respect to military missions and related weapons systems. Attendance at such meetings will be restricted to the following:

The President

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence—for item 1 only

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Dr. Killian)

Special Assistant to the Presidential for National Security Affairs (Mr. Gray)

White House Staff Secretary (General Goodpaster)

Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Major Eisenhower)

Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Mr. Lay)

These meetings will be held in the Cabinet Room.

The following four major areas will be considered in these special meetings:

(1) Strategic nuclear striking force requirements and capabilities, including the “optimum mix” both of weapons systems and of targets. (References: NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1994, 2009)

(2) Continental defense against aircraft and missiles (excluding antisubmarine warfare). (References: NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2009)

(3) Control of the seas, with particular reference to antisubmarine warfare. (References: Report by the Panel on Antisubmarine Warfare of the President’s Science Advisory Committee dated December 1, 1958; Study being prepared for the President by the Comparative Evaluations Group, pursuant to NSC 5815)

(4) Tactical forces and requirements for tactical weapons systems. (References: Paragraph 14, NSC 5810/1; NSC Action No. 1934)

I must say to you that as to the fourth area, I myself am not satisfied with the description of it and it may be that we should talk further about the scope and nature of this part of the overall study. However, I feel that it should be included and it seems to me that the kinds of questions asked with respect to it are appropriate.

A useful procedure might be for you to have prepared a concise discussion paper on each topic which could be circulated in advance on an “Eyes Only” basis, one copy each, to those who will attend the special meetings. Any further reproduction and circulation would be subject to your determination. I should hope you would identify major issues and cast them in a form appropriate for discussion and consideration by the President. It would seem probable that major national security policy issues identified during these discussions would later be taken to the National Security Council.

I am attaching a list of some of the kinds of policy questions which might be considered. I shall be glad to discuss with you further, as necessary, the scope of coverage of the four topics.

It would be helpful if you could indicate feasible target dates for each topic.

I wish to confirm the withdrawal of the request contained in my memorandum of January 17, 1959, subject, “Presentation to the National Security Council on Aircraft Programs,” inasmuch as its purpose will be served by the plan above set forth.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated

Questions for Consideration

1. Strategic Nuclear Striking Force

a. What will be the effect of the appraisal of the relative merits of alternative target systems, directed by NSC Action No. 2009, upon the size and composition of the striking force?

b. In the light of the appraisal referred to in a above, what is the most desirable mix of missile systems from the point of view of our optimum strategic nuclear striking capacity on the one hand, and from the point of view of the greatest degree of invulnerability on the other hand, and can these be easily reconciled?

c. Is there a valid requirement to develop another generation of strategic bombers, taking into account the probable capabilities of enemy defenses and the problems of maintaining such aircraft in an alert status?

d. Would it be desirable to extend the effectiveness of POLARIS missiles by adapting them for use on surface vessels, and on land bases, assuming the development of an appropriate mobile launching unit?

e. Should further priority be given to MINUTE MAN by the earlier establishment of a production capability and by seeking to afford it more mobility? What effect would further emphasis on MINUTE MAN have on the TITAN and ATLAS missiles program?

f. What is the proper balance between procurement of additional retaliatory weapons and expenditures to protect those now available against surprise attack?

2. Continental Defense

a. What are the best means for defending the striking force? What mixture of active defenses, hardening, dispersal, and quick reaction leads to the greatest certainty of survival for the striking force? How does this best mix change with Soviet capabilities?

b. Assuming that point defenses will be required, what areas are to be protected—SAC bases or urban industrial areas, or both?

c. In the light of the changing nature of the Soviet attack capability, how should air defenses be allocated as between the manned bomber threat and the ballistic missile threat?

d. Are our present programs for early warning against aircraft and missiles adequate to the changing threat? Will our communications have the certainty and reliability to insure that all forces can respond when warning is received?

e. What facilities have we now for determining that our bases are under attack? What facilities for disseminating this information?

f. Will the concept of perimeter, area and point defense continue to have validity in the 1960–65 period?

g. What is an appropriate balance between manned interceptors, interceptor missiles and ground-to-air missiles?

h. To what extent do our present continental defenses meet the threat of missiles launched from submarines? What measures have promise to be effective against this threat?

i. Is there a need for more centralized management of the various aspects of continental air defense?

3. Control of the Seas—Antisubmarine Warfare

a. In what ways can our present ASW capability be improved?

b. Should further emphasis be placed on methods for broad ocean surveillance?

c. Is the effort currently being devoted to ASW commensurate with the threat:

(1) against the continental U.S.?

(2) against task forces and against shipping?

d. Is there a need for more effective, centralized direction of the ASW effort?

4. Tactical Forces

a. In the event of general war involving a nuclear exchange, is it assumed that there will be a requirement for further deployment of ground forces overseas? If so, can the probable requirements be determined?

b. Taking into account our commitments and the nature of the threat with respect to hostilities short of general war, do our tactical forces have adequate mobility, flexibility and readiness? Should this requirement have priority over mobilization reserves for general war?

c. Do present programs provide aircraft and weapons wholly appropriate to such tactical combat?

d. Is there a need for so many different tactical weapons (i.e., the 280-mm gun, the 8-inch howitzer, the 155-mm howitzer, HONEST JOHN, LITTLE JOHN, LACROSSE, SERGEANT)?

e. Is there an element of overlap between the Army’s growing arsenal of short-range missiles and the Air Force’s tactical aircraft; and if so, is this desirable?

f. What will be the requirement for small nuclear weapons to equip ground forces? Can this requirement be met by our programmed production capabilities?

g. Is there an appropriate balance between the amount of resources being devoted to BW–CW procurement and those devoted to research?

1. Source: Proposes series of meetings with Eisenhower to discuss policy related to military missions and weapons systems. Top Secret; Restricted Handling. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.