Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

132. Memorandum From John Eisenhower to Goodpaster¹

Washington, January 27, 1959

SUBJECT

• Comparison of NIE 11–4–58 with NIE 11–4–57

NIE 11–4–58 (hereafter referred to as NIE 58) and NIE 11–4–57 (hereafter referred to as NIE 57), which it supersedes, are generally consistent except for the estimates on Soviet long-range bombers.

ICBM

NIE 57 estimates ten prototype missiles of 5500 nautical miles, CEP 5 nautical miles, to be available for operational use in 1959. This assumes that the first operational unit will be equipped with prototype rather than series produced missiles. NIE 59, while it states that progress in ICBMs has not been so fast as had been estimated, continues to give the Soviets 10 operational ICBMs during the year 1959. It adds the factor of 50% operability and further estimates that as of 1962–66 the CEP could be reduced to about 3 nautical miles, with a payload of 2000–5000 pounds. Furthermore, NIE 58 estimates that the Soviets could have in their inventory 500 ICBMs in 1962, a date which could possibly be pushed forward to 1961.

IRBM

NIE 57 estimates that the first operational capability of 1000 nautical mile missile occurred in 1958. NIE 58 deals with the IRBM very little but estimates this capability to be in existence.

Surface-to-Air-Missiles

Both NIE 57 and NIE 58 picture an extensive system of surface-to-air missiles in the complex around Moscow. These missiles are estimated to be effective at altitudes up to 60,000 feet. NIE 57 mentions vulnerability to low-altitude attack. This is confirmed in NIE 58 with the additional estimate that the horizontal range would be only 15–30 nautical miles. Furthermore, NIE 58 believes the Soviets will have a limited A–ICBM capability between 1963 and 1966.

Long-Range Aircraft

In the area of long-range aircraft, the two estimates represent a continuing downward trend. NIE 57 states that production of both BISONs and BEARs has fallen short of NIE 56 estimate. NIE 58 goes much further stating the belief that despite the efforts devoted to developing the BISON and BEAR the Soviets have probably decided within the last year or so to forego a rapid buildup with present heavy bomber models. The following estimates apply to heavy bombers and tankers.

NIE 11–4–572				NIE 11–4–58
1957	—	90–150			—
1958	—	150–250		1958	—	100–125
1959	—	250–450		1959	—	100–150
1960	—	400–600		1960	—	100–200
1961	—	400–600		1961	—	150–250
1962	—	400–600		1962	—	200–300
1963	—			1963	—	200–300

JSDE

1. Source: Comparison of NIE 11–4–58 with NIE 11–4–57. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, CIA.
2. Here we have a three-way split. The Air Force claims that these figures will represent only bombers. The Army and Joint Staff think the figures are too high. The Navy thinks that the low-limit figures should be correct (400 aircraft in 60–62). [Footnote is in the original.]