13. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC 1

[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Overseas Military Bases

REFERENCE:

  • Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 14, 1958

The enclosed report by the NSC Planning Board on the main issues of the Report to the President on the subject, prepared by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash and transmitted by the reference memorandum, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, February 27, 1958.

The Planning Board recommends that the Council:

a.
Adopt the recommendations contained in the enclosed report.
b.
Recommend that the President authorize the responsible agencies to circulate the Nash Report, together with the recommendations adopted pursuant to a above, to key operating personnel in this country and overseas, for information and such action as each agency deems appropriate consistent with approved national security policy. In view of the sensitivity of the Report in its entirety, distribution of the full Report should be limited to key operating personnel, and only appropriate extracts from the Report should be circulated to personnel having particular responsibility for specific subjects.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

[Typeset Page 35]

Enclosure

Report Prepared by the NSC Planning Board

[Facsimile Page 2]

U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

Planning Board Comments and Recommendations on the Main Issues of the Nash Report

MAIN THESIS

1. Present and Future Need for the Base System.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 4–5, 7–13): Our base2 system is key to our survival as a nation. During the next ten years, despite changes in weapons technology, our overseas base system will remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. The general scope and pattern of our base system are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period, and a net increase will probably be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons, to meet new Soviet offensive techniques, and to disperse. Adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas areas. The central problem, therefore, is how the United States can maintain substantially its present overseas base complex over the next ten years, recognizing that to maintain it calls for a positive but flexible approach in our relations with our allies, and in the formulation and administration of our own policies.

Planning Board Comment: Substantially our present base system will be needed for at least five years, although it is not certain that it will be needed for the next ten years. After five years, a number of technological and political developments could alter the base system or the reasons for its maintenance. Even if such technological developments should permit some reduction in base requirements related to general war, there will probably remain substantially the present requirement for bases to maintain tactical forces against local aggression and to support foreign policy.

[Typeset Page 36] [Facsimile Page 3]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council accept the validity of the thesis that:

The tremendous changes in weapons technology will not, in the immediate future, alter the need for substantially our present overseas base system. Most probably for at least five years, this system will remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. In fact, a small net expansion of our base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet new Soviet offensive techniques.

[Facsimile Page 4]

OTHER CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2. IRBM’s Around the Sino-Soviet Periphery.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 7–10): In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting vast increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our ability to retain the edge in the deterrent race requires the positioning of IRBM’s at widely-dispersed bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery.

Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obliged to react violently. Because the untested state of the IRBM’s prevents us from placing full reliance on them and reducing our dependence on the manned bomber, and because existing air bases will not always be the most suitable IRBM locations, the IRBM program will necessitate some enlargement of our overseas base system.

Planning Board Comment: With respect to NATO, the U.S. policy decision on this matter was taken prior to the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1957. The positioning of IRBM’s in other selected strategic locations around the Sino-Soviet bloc might be considered a logical corollary on the grounds that such positioning would represent essentially only a modernization of our current forward strategic forces and would be designed only to maintain the present strategic balance between the United States and the USSR. Although the stationing of IRBM’s outside the NATO area would probably not in itself cause the USSR to retaliate with actions that would run serious risk of general war, it might produce a strong Soviet reaction in some areas, and would cause the USSR to step up its efforts to persuade host nations to restrict our freedom to use bases.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our continued ability to [Facsimile Page 5] deter general war will be better ensured by the [Typeset Page 37] positioning of IRBM’s in selected areas around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obliged to react violently. [The implications of positioning IRBM’s around the Sino-Soviet periphery outside the NATO area are of such import that a decision to do so should be made through NSC procedures, only in light of the over-all advantages and disadvantages.]3

[Facsimile Page 6]

3. Western Mediterranean Pact.

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 45): Because experience to date with our various mutual security arrangements has demonstrated that they afford the most enduring cement for our overseas base complex, immediate and thorough consideration should be given to the feasibility of a Western Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.

Planning Board Comment : This idea is already an item of discussion between State and Defense, and consideration should be given to including the United Kingdom in any such arrangement because of its position in Gibraltar and Malta. It is questionable, however, whether such a defense arrangement would be feasible so long as the Algerian situation remains critical. In addition, NATO countries which might become members of the pact might find that such an organization would entail the diversion of resources from the NATO area. Further, there is no current U.S. military requirement for such a pact except as additional means of ensuring adequate bases in the area.

Planning Board Recommendations : Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council note that:

Consideration is being given by the Departments of State and Defense to the feasibility and desirability of a Western Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.

[Facsimile Page 7]

4. A New Base Chain in Central Africa.

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 25): In light of the exposed position of our bases to the north, the technological developments in the long-range plane and missile fields, and the objective of getting a political “foot-in-the-door” in rapidly-developing Central Africa, we should seriously consider, from both the political and military points of view, whether a line of “back bases” across the waist of Africa, with Ethiopia as its eastern terminus, would be worth the cost involved.

[Typeset Page 38]

Planning Board Comment: Paragraph 20 of NSC 5719/1 (approved on August 23, 1957), dealing with the strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara, says:

“No immediate action appears called for. The area should be kept under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements.”

There is no need at this time to revise this policy.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The United States should not, at this time, establish a line of “back bases” across the waist of Africa; but should, in accordance with NSC 5719/1, keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements.

[Facsimile Page 8]

5. Alternative Bases in the Far East.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 27–28, 36): In view of the weaknesses in our present Far East defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, alternatives to our present base system should be examined for the dual purpose of increasing dispersion and of establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.

Such a program would be costly, but the alternative to a soundly-based defense perimeter in the West Pacific is a retreat to “Fortress America” which would be infinitely more costly in every respect. It is not a question of withdrawing entirely from any country. This would be considered by our friends as abandonment, and they would feel compelled to make concessions to the Communists even while pursuing a policy of neutralism. The need is for alternate positions which will protect us by dispersion and afford insurance against a situation developing in the present host countries that would lead us to a decision to withdraw. There are a number of good possibilities—The Bonins, the Marianas, Ulithi, North Borneo, Brunei, and Australia.

Planning Board Comment: Because of the increasing political and military vulnerability of our existing bases, alternative bases should be considered even though sizeable expenditures would be involved and many of the alternative bases might contain weaknesses similar to those in our present Far East defense perimeter. The Department of Defense is currently giving consideration to such alternatives.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Because of weaknesses in our present Far East defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, the Department of Defense should continue to study the desirability and feasibility of alternatives to our present bases in the area as a means of increasing dispersal and establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.

[Typeset Page 39] [Facsimile Page 9]

6. Postwar Stockpile in Australia.

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 28): Because of her remote geographical position, consideration should be given to transferring to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet, and to establishing stockpiles of surplus grain and other provisions there.

If, as seems likely, the aftermath of an atomic war involving Europe, Russia, and the United States would be characterized by acute shortages of food and transport, it would seem prudent to develop now a reserve stockpile of both in a place relatively secure from the immediate consequences of a global atomic conflict.

Planning Board Comment: In the preparation of NSC 5713/2, the Planning Board rejected last May a similar but broader idea. The stockpiling of food and a portion of our “moth-balled” fleet in Australia would be of only marginal value to the United States in the event of nuclear war and therefore not worth involving the expense and overcoming other difficulties in implementing the proposal.

The policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1, paragraphs 3 and 23) recognizes the desirability of “appropriately organizing, protecting and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival”.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The United States should not [now]4 transfer to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet or establish stockpiles of surplus grain and other provisions there. However, studies under NSC 5802/1, paragraphs 3 and 23, should be made on placing a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet and stockpiling surplus grain and other provisions in areas outside the continental United States.

[Facsimile Page 10]

7. The Organization of American States.

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 46): Greater use should be made of the OAS and its military organs to provide a collective security framework for U.S. bases in Latin America. In this connection, it is further recommended that early consideration be given to the desirability of bringing the now-developing West Indies Federation into the OAS.

While it does not seem practicable at this time to consider the adoption of an infrastructure program for the OAS (similar to that in NATO), nevertheless the establishment of a framework of hemispheric defense in place of the present framework of unilateral U.S. interests would do much to relieve the U.S. of such difficulties as those recently encountered with Brazil in securing a small area for use in the guided missile testing range, and those presently involved in the efforts to obtain from Panama a limited amount of real estate for radar facilities. [Typeset Page 40] If the incorporation of the West Indies Federation into the OAS should be found impracticable, consideration might be given to the development of a Caribbean security grouping.

Planning Board Comment: The present organization (the Inter-American Defense Board operating within the framework of the OAS) is an adequate institutional framework. Any additional or more substantial collective security framework within the OAS would not be desirable from a U.S. point of view and would probably not be acceptable to the Latin American states. There is no reason to hope that the Latin American states would concede to an international organization the right to establish military bases in their territories. Further, it is improbable that Brazil, Panama, or any of the others would provide facilities to the OAS which they were unwilling to provide to the United States. Almost all of the Latin American states are unwilling to enlarge in any respect the obligations they assumed under the Rio Treaty. With respect to the entry of the West Indies Federation into the OAS, any independent American state may choose to join the organization.

[Facsimile Page 11]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Any additional or more substantial collective security framework for Latin America would, on balance, be infeasible and undesirable at this time. Consideration should be given to bringing the West Indies Federation into the OAS at an appropriate time.

[Facsimile Page 12]

8. Criminal Jurisdiction.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 53, 58–60, 63): Except as may be specifically determined to the contrary by the Secretaries of State and Defense, U.S. forces should not in the future be stationed in peacetime on any additional foreign territory unless satisfactory arrangements on criminal jurisdiction—i.e., in substance the NATO Status of Forces Agreement as a minimum—have been made in advance. Where existing agreements fall below satisfactory standards in terms and practice, they should be renegotiated at the earliest practicable time. Where U.S. forces are now stationed on foreign territory without any status arrangements and host governments refuse to agree to such arrangements, U.S. forces should be withdrawn unless the Secretaries of State and Defense jointly determine that overriding national interest demands their continued presence. The Executive Branch should undertake an urgent, intensive, and continuous effort to inform and explain to the American people and its representatives in Congress the nature and facts of U.S. policy in regard to criminal jurisdiction.

The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen abroad is a relatively new problem resulting from the peacetime stationing of large numbers of troops in friendly countries. The issued has not yet seriously affected U.S. military operations, Free World solidarity, or [Typeset Page 41] other U.S. national objectives and policies, but potentially it contains the seeds of serious danger.

Planning Board Comment: In view of public concern and Congressional sensitivity on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over servicemen by foreign courts, it is believed that the recommended position is the appropriate standard and that the national policy should be to achieve that standard wherever possible. [In those cases where this standard cannot be met, it is believed appropriate that the decision not to insist on the standard should be taken only at a high level.]5

[Facsimile Page 13]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The objective of the United States should be to obtain, where feasible, criminal jurisdiction arrangements, with all countries in which U.S. forces are stationed now or in the future, at least as favorable as those contained in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. [U.S. forces should not be stationed on foreign territory unless protected by criminal jurisdiction arrangements at least equal in substance to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, except on determination by the Secretaries of State and Defense that overriding national interest demands their presence notwithstanding the absence of satisfactory arrangements.]6

[Facsimile Page 14]

9. Sharing Defense Responsibilities with Canada.

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 19): The United States should enable Canada to assume a growing share of the responsibilities for defending North America and the North Atlantic.

Although our base relationships are generally excellent, and Canada realizes how closely her existence is identified with that of the United States, both within and without NATO, there is a growing Canadian sensitivity and feeling of national destiny that will spell trouble for us if we do not take every step we can to give Canada a practical sense of equality with the United States, particularly in defense matters. Further, the manifold problems inherent in providing [text not declassified].

Planning Board Comment: The same general position is taken by existing policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1). Although we have gone far in cooperating with Canada in the military field, [text not declassified]. However, the principal areas for improvement are the political and economic. Better cooperation is also required in non-military defense matters. There is at present no national security policy paper on Canada. There is a Joint (U.S.-Canada) Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, made up of the U.S. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, and their Canadian counterparts.

[Typeset Page 42] [Facsimile Page 15]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Majority Proposal ODM Proposal
The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be requested to study all possible means of improving U.S.-Canada economic relations, and to transmit to the National Security Council any recommendations requiring Presidential consideration. The Planning Board should prepare, for consideration by the National Security Council, a draft policy paper on all aspects of our relations with Canada.
  1. Source: Transmits NSC Planning Board report on U.S. overseas military bases. Secret. 15 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
  2. The word “base” is used in its broadest sense to cover the installations and deployments of all elements of the U.S. ground, sea and air forces located outside the territory of the United States. [Footnote is in the original.]
  3. ODM-Treasury-Budget proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]
  4. State-Defense-JCS-ODM proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]
  5. Defense-Treasury proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]
  6. Defense-Treasury proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]