Enclosure
Report Prepared by the NSC
Planning Board
Washington, undated
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U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES
Planning Board Comments and Recommendations on the Main Issues of the Nash Report
MAIN THESIS
1. Present and Future Need for the Base
System.
Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 4–5,
7–13): Our base2 system is key to our survival as a nation.
During the next ten years, despite changes in weapons technology,
our overseas base system will remain essential (a) to maintain and
disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical
forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support
foreign policy objectives. The general scope and pattern of our base
system are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this
period, and a net increase will probably be required, at least
initially, to accommodate new weapons, to meet new Soviet offensive
techniques, and to disperse. Adjustments and shifts in emphasis will
occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to new weapons,
improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces,
and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas
areas. The central problem, therefore, is how the United States can
maintain substantially its present overseas base complex over the
next ten years, recognizing that to maintain it calls for a positive
but flexible approach in our relations with our allies, and in the
formulation and administration of our own policies.
Planning Board Comment: Substantially our
present base system will be needed for at least five years, although
it is not certain that it will be needed for the next ten years.
After five years, a number of technological and political
developments could alter the base system or the reasons for its
maintenance. Even if such technological developments should permit
some reduction in base requirements related to general war, there
will probably remain substantially the present requirement for bases
to maintain tactical forces against local aggression and to support
foreign policy.
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Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
accept the validity of the thesis that:
The tremendous changes in weapons technology will not, in the
immediate future, alter the need for substantially our
present overseas base system. Most probably for at least
five years, this system will remain essential (a) to
maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to
maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local
aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. In
fact, a small net expansion of our base system may be
required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and
to meet new Soviet offensive techniques.
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OTHER CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
2. IRBM’s
Around the Sino-Soviet Periphery.
Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 7–10): In
view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting vast increase in the
vulnerability of the continental United States, our ability to
retain the edge in the deterrent race requires the positioning of
IRBM’s at widely-dispersed
bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery.
Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the
Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to
miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions
have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obliged to react
violently. Because the untested state of the IRBM’s prevents us from placing
full reliance on them and reducing our dependence on the manned
bomber, and because existing air bases will not always be the
most suitable IRBM locations,
the IRBM program will
necessitate some enlargement of our overseas base system.
Planning Board Comment: With respect to NATO, the U.S. policy decision on
this matter was taken prior to the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1957. The
positioning of IRBM’s in other
selected strategic locations around the Sino-Soviet bloc might be
considered a logical corollary on the grounds that such positioning
would represent essentially only a modernization of our current
forward strategic forces and would be designed only to maintain the
present strategic balance between the United States and the USSR. Although the stationing of
IRBM’s outside the NATO area would probably not in
itself cause the USSR to retaliate
with actions that would run serious risk of general war, it might
produce a strong Soviet reaction in some areas, and would cause the
USSR to step up its efforts to
persuade host nations to restrict our freedom to use bases.
Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting increase in
the vulnerability of the continental United States, our
continued ability to
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deter general war will be better
ensured by the
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positioning of IRBM’s in selected areas
around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Such positioning must be
carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to
the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives
and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive,
thereby making it feel obliged to react violently. [The
implications of positioning IRBM’s around the Sino-Soviet periphery outside
the NATO area are of such
import that a decision to do so should be made through
NSC procedures, only in
light of the over-all advantages and disadvantages.]3
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3. Western Mediterranean Pact.
Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 45):
Because experience to date with our various mutual security
arrangements has demonstrated that they afford the most enduring
cement for our overseas base complex, immediate and thorough
consideration should be given to the feasibility of a Western
Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, France, Italy,
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.
Planning Board Comment:
This idea is already an item of discussion between State and
Defense, and consideration should be given to including the United
Kingdom in any such arrangement because of its position in Gibraltar
and Malta. It is questionable, however, whether such a defense
arrangement would be feasible so long as the Algerian situation
remains critical. In addition, NATO countries which might become members of the pact
might find that such an organization would entail the diversion of
resources from the NATO area.
Further, there is no current U.S. military requirement for such a
pact except as additional means of ensuring adequate bases in the
area.
Planning Board Recommendations: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends
that the National Security Council note that:
Consideration is being given by the Departments of State and
Defense to the feasibility and desirability of a Western
Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,
and Libya.
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4. A New Base Chain in Central Africa.
Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 25): In
light of the exposed position of our bases to the north, the
technological developments in the long-range plane and missile
fields, and the objective of getting a political “foot-in-the-door”
in rapidly-developing Central Africa, we should seriously consider,
from both the political and military points of view, whether a line
of “back bases” across the waist of Africa, with Ethiopia as its
eastern terminus, would be worth the cost involved.
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Planning Board Comment: Paragraph 20 of NSC 5719/1 (approved on August 23,
1957), dealing with the strategic importance of Africa South of the
Sahara, says:
“No immediate action appears called for. The area should be
kept under periodic survey to determine any changes in our
strategic requirements.”
There is no need at this time to revise this policy.
Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
The United States should not, at this time, establish a line of “back
bases” across the waist of Africa; but should, in accordance with
NSC 5719/1, keep the area under
periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic
requirements.
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5. Alternative Bases in the Far East.
Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 27–28,
36): In view of the weaknesses in our present Far East defense
perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile
achievements, alternatives to our present base system should be
examined for the dual purpose of increasing dispersion and of
establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.
Such a program would be costly, but the alternative to a
soundly-based defense perimeter in the West Pacific is a retreat to
“Fortress America” which would be infinitely more costly in every
respect. It is not a question of withdrawing entirely from any
country. This would be considered by our friends as abandonment, and
they would feel compelled to make concessions to the Communists even
while pursuing a policy of neutralism. The need is for alternate
positions which will protect us by dispersion and afford insurance
against a situation developing in the present host countries that
would lead us to a decision to withdraw. There are a number of good
possibilities—The Bonins, the Marianas, Ulithi, North Borneo,
Brunei, and Australia.
Planning Board Comment: Because of the
increasing political and military vulnerability of our existing
bases, alternative bases should be considered even though sizeable
expenditures would be involved and many of the alternative bases
might contain weaknesses similar to those in our present Far East
defense perimeter. The Department of Defense is currently giving
consideration to such alternatives.
Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
Because of weaknesses in our present Far East defense
perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet
missile achievements, the Department of Defense should
continue to study the desirability and feasibility of
alternatives to our present bases in the area as a means of
increasing dispersal and establishing bases in the most
politically reliable areas.
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6. Postwar Stockpile in Australia.
Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 28):
Because of her remote geographical position, consideration should be
given to transferring to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled”
merchant fleet, and to establishing stockpiles of surplus grain and
other provisions there.
If, as seems likely, the aftermath of an atomic war involving Europe,
Russia, and the United States would be characterized by acute
shortages of food and transport, it would seem prudent to develop
now a reserve stockpile of both in a place relatively secure from
the immediate consequences of a global atomic conflict.
Planning Board Comment: In the preparation of
NSC 5713/2, the Planning Board
rejected last May a similar but broader idea. The stockpiling of
food and a portion of our “moth-balled” fleet in Australia would be
of only marginal value to the United States in the event of nuclear
war and therefore not worth involving the expense and overcoming
other difficulties in implementing the proposal.
The policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1, paragraphs 3 and 23) recognizes the
desirability of “appropriately organizing, protecting and placing in
a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to
national survival”.
Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
The United States should not [now]4 transfer to Australia a portion of our
“moth-balled” merchant fleet or establish stockpiles of
surplus grain and other provisions there. However, studies
under NSC 5802/1,
paragraphs 3 and 23, should be made on placing a portion of
our “moth-balled” merchant fleet and stockpiling surplus
grain and other provisions in areas outside the continental
United States.
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7. The Organization of American States.
Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 46):
Greater use should be made of the OAS and its military organs to
provide a collective security framework for U.S. bases in Latin
America. In this connection, it is further recommended that early
consideration be given to the desirability of bringing the
now-developing West Indies Federation into the OAS.
While it does not seem practicable at this time to consider the
adoption of an infrastructure program for the OAS (similar to that
in NATO), nevertheless the
establishment of a framework of hemispheric defense in place of the
present framework of unilateral U.S. interests would do much to
relieve the U.S. of such difficulties as those recently encountered
with Brazil in securing a small area for use in the guided missile
testing range, and those presently involved in the efforts to obtain
from Panama a limited amount of real estate for radar facilities.
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If the
incorporation of the West Indies Federation into the OAS should be
found impracticable, consideration might be given to the development
of a Caribbean security grouping.
Planning Board Comment: The present
organization (the Inter-American Defense Board operating within the
framework of the OAS) is an adequate institutional framework. Any
additional or more substantial collective security framework within
the OAS would not be desirable from a U.S. point of view and would
probably not be acceptable to the Latin American states. There is no
reason to hope that the Latin American states would concede to an
international organization the right to establish military bases in
their territories. Further, it is improbable that Brazil, Panama, or
any of the others would provide facilities to the OAS which they
were unwilling to provide to the United States. Almost all of the
Latin American states are unwilling to enlarge in any respect the
obligations they assumed under the Rio Treaty. With respect to the
entry of the West Indies Federation into the OAS, any independent
American state may choose to join the organization.
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Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
Any additional or more substantial collective security
framework for Latin America would, on balance, be infeasible
and undesirable at this time. Consideration should be given
to bringing the West Indies Federation into the OAS at an
appropriate time.
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8. Criminal Jurisdiction.
Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 53, 58–60,
63): Except as may be specifically determined to the contrary by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, U.S. forces should not in the
future be stationed in peacetime on any additional foreign territory
unless satisfactory arrangements on criminal jurisdiction—i.e., in
substance the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement as a minimum—have been made in advance. Where
existing agreements fall below satisfactory standards in terms and
practice, they should be renegotiated at the earliest practicable
time. Where U.S. forces are now stationed on foreign territory
without any status arrangements and host governments refuse to agree
to such arrangements, U.S. forces should be withdrawn unless the
Secretaries of State and Defense jointly determine that overriding
national interest demands their continued presence. The Executive
Branch should undertake an urgent, intensive, and continuous effort
to inform and explain to the American people and its representatives
in Congress the nature and facts of U.S. policy in regard to
criminal jurisdiction.
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen abroad
is a relatively new problem resulting from the peacetime stationing
of large numbers of troops in friendly countries. The issued has not
yet seriously affected U.S. military operations, Free World
solidarity, or
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other U.S. national objectives and policies, but potentially it
contains the seeds of serious danger.
Planning Board Comment: In view of public
concern and Congressional sensitivity on the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over servicemen by foreign courts, it is believed that
the recommended position is the appropriate standard and that the
national policy should be to achieve that standard wherever
possible. [In those cases where this standard cannot be met, it is
believed appropriate that the decision not to insist on the standard
should be taken only at a high level.]5
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Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
The objective of the United States should be to obtain, where
feasible, criminal jurisdiction arrangements, with all
countries in which U.S. forces are stationed now or in the
future, at least as favorable as those contained in the
NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. [U.S. forces should not be stationed on foreign
territory unless protected by criminal jurisdiction
arrangements at least equal in substance to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, except on determination by the Secretaries of
State and Defense that overriding national interest demands
their presence notwithstanding the absence of satisfactory
arrangements.]6
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9. Sharing Defense Responsibilities with
Canada.
Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 19): The
United States should enable Canada to assume a growing share of the
responsibilities for defending North America and the North
Atlantic.
Although our base relationships are generally excellent, and Canada
realizes how closely her existence is identified with that of the
United States, both within and without NATO, there is a growing Canadian sensitivity and
feeling of national destiny that will spell trouble for us if we do
not take every step we can to give Canada a practical sense of
equality with the United States, particularly in defense matters.
Further, the manifold problems inherent in providing [text not declassified].
Planning Board Comment: The same general
position is taken by existing policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1). Although we have gone far
in cooperating with Canada in the military field, [text not declassified]. However, the principal areas for
improvement are the political and economic. Better cooperation is
also required in non-military defense matters. There is at present
no national security policy paper on Canada. There is a Joint
(U.S.-Canada) Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, made up of
the U.S. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture,
and their Canadian counterparts.
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Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly,
the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council
agree that:
| Majority Proposal |
ODM
Proposal |
| The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be requested
to study all possible means of improving U.S.-Canada
economic relations, and to transmit to the National Security
Council any recommendations requiring Presidential
consideration. |
The Planning Board should prepare, for consideration by
the National Security Council, a draft policy paper on all
aspects of our relations with Canada. |
