Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

126. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 7, 1959

SUBJECT

• Review of NSC 5410/1

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5410/1
• B. NSC 5810/1
• C. NSC Actions Nos. 1077 and 1102

The enclosed Discussion Paper, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith as a basis for discussion of the subject by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 22, 1959.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be limited on a need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Discussion Paper

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER

on

U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR INITIATED BY THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

NSC Planning Board review of NSC 5410/1, “U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc” (approved April 29, 1954) has developed a number of fundamental issues which the Planning Board submits herewith for discussion by the National Security Council, with a view to receiving guidance as a basis for rescinding or revising NSC 5410/1.

1. Should a statement of U.S. policy in the event of war be limited to the subject of existing policy (NSC 5410/1), i.e., U.S. objectives in the event of general war with the Soviet Bloc; or should it cover additional contingencies such as (a) major war initiated by Communist China, and (b) other war initiated by a member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc?

2. In the light of the capability of the United States and the USSR in the foreseeable future to destroy one another, even after a surprise nuclear attack, should the United States in the event of general war initiated by the USSR:

Despite the loss of U.S. lives and resources which might be involved, endeavor by all necessary means to reduce the capabilities of the USSR to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies; and yet be prepared to consider an offer by the USSR to cut short the nuclear exchange at a point advantageous to the United States, even though the USSR might retain some will and ability to continue the struggle?

3. Should the United States accept an otherwise advantageous settlement:

a. If Communist control were maintained over the satellites?

b. If a Communist Government retained power in the USSR?

c. Only if all Communist controls were destroyed?

4. In the event of general war initiated by the USSR, should the United States seek to keep Communist China out of the war, or endeavor by all necessary means to reduce the capabilities of Communist China to the point where it would be unable to endanger the security of the United States?

5. In the event of major war initiated by Communist China, or war initiated by a state other than the USSR, in which the USSR did not participate at the beginning, should the United States, in order to avoid a clear and immediate danger of general war with the USSR, be prepared to terminate hostilities before the aggressor state had lost its will or ability to continue to wage war?

6. Can and should the United States undertake now to formulate post-war policies and plans, e.g., terms of enemy surrender, border and territorial arrangements, administration of enemy territory, and independence for national minorities?

1. Source: Transmits discussion paper on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.