Many thanks for your memorandum of December 5, which unfortunately did
not reach me until after the NSC
meeting. I shall be glad to discuss this with you at our
convenience.
Attachment
Memorandum from Morse to Gray
Washington,
December 5,
1958
[Facsimile Page 2]
SUBJECT
- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SATURDAY—DECEMBER 6,
1958
You may know that on Saturday the DOD will present before the NSC its proposed programs indicating an
across-the-board cut applied
[Typeset Page 396]
to all services approximately in proportion to
their last year’s budget apportionment.
Such an approach to budget control has no rationale except necessity,
and represents arbitrary fiscal ceiling control at its worst. Even
more seriously, it accords no recognition whatever to the coming
revolution in concept whereby massive deterrent will receive less
emphasis while capability for limited engagements receives more.
As you probably know, this issue first arose in the NSC last May 1, and was postponed
until July 24, at which time the President requested continuing
study of our military doctrine.
The issue is receiving great attention outside the Executive Branch,
particularly within Congress where it will be used politically
against the Administration during this coming session. If the cuts
mean the withdrawal of one Army division from Germany as the Army is
prepared to say they will, serious political repercussions both
internally and abroad will occur.
Mr. Dulles may raise this issue at Saturday’s meeting. If he does,
one way to handle it might be for the President to postpone such
politically dangerous across-the-board cuts pending completion of
the study he requested July 24, which bears directly on this issue.
Or, he might allow a week or two additional time for the two sides
on the issue to prepare and present their views before him much as
was done in the more general case before the NSC last May 1.
While I assume you will not wish to take sides at the Council table,
I believe you should know what is behind the issues,
[Facsimile Page 3]
if you do
not already. And you might be in a position to suggest a solution.
You probably know that I believe we shall be frozen into our present
rigid and deadly posture forever if we do not begin to change some
time, and soon. Even if we started now to
change it would be several years before forces or weapons could
significantly reflect changed emphasis. (This will be almost
impossible without continued nuclear testing for air defense and
tactical nuclear capabilities.)
I believe that any and every voice raised on the side of reason might
help.
J.H. Morse, Jr.,
Captain, USN
Special Assistant to the Chairman